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ABSTRACT
A COVERT WAR AT SEA: PIRACY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN MALAYA, 18241874
Scott C. Abel, PhD
Department of History
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Eric A. Jones, Director
Piracy around the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century was extraordinarily prevalent
and resulted in the death and loss of liberty for an untold number of people. This dissertation
examines the connections between the piracy of this era and the political economies of the Straits
Settlements and the Malay states in the region. Malays pirates often had the support of local
rulers who required the goods and slaves brought back by pirates to reinforce their own political
and socio-economic positions. The piratical system supported by the rulers was a component of
the overall Malay economic system known as kerajaan economics, which helped maintain the
status quo for Malay states. This system came under threat once Great Britain and the
Netherlands worked to suppress piracy in the region and helped persuade the Malay elite to
phase out state-sanctioned piracy. Some people living in Malaya took advantage of the
characteristics of British and Malay political economies to engage in acts of piracy regardless of
the policies of the British and Malay governments. This study of piracy enables us to understand
better the experiences of people of various backgrounds living in 19th-century Malaya, along
with how piracy influenced their worldviews.
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GLOSSARY
Agar-agar: type of seaweed commonly consumed in mainland China in the 19th century
Autonomous history: An historical methodology that focuses on using and investigating the
worldview of indigenous Southeast Asians; history from the Southeast Asia-centric perspective
Bahar: a measurement of weight around 428 pounds avoirdupois
Bendahara: high-ranking official in a Malay government; the treasurer, frequently the holder of
the title was the highest ranking non-royal in the state; in 19th century, effectively meant a chief,
specifically the ruler of Pahang
Brig: a two-mast sailing vessel with the forward mast lower than the aft one
Cochin-China: a land that includes modern Cambodia and southern Vietnam
Gutta percha: a rubber-like substance found in Insular Southeast Asia that required the
destruction of its tree for its harvest
Iranun/Lanun/Illanoon: An ethnic group from the southern Philippines known for rampant acts of
piracy; synonymous with “pirate” in the Malay language
Jong/junk: vessel commonly used by Chinese
Jurumudi: helmsman
Jurubatu: navigator
Kapal: ship; large vessel
Kerajaan: kingdom; government; rule; empire
Kerajaan economics: political economy of Malay states that involved the seizure of assets to
prevent the rise of potential opponents
Keris/kris: type of sword or dagger with curvy blade
Kurnia: bounty, gift; code of conduct for Malay princes

viii
Laksmana: chief admiral
Nakhoda: commander of vessel; master of vessel; captain
Orang laut: “sea people” or sea gypsies; a group of nomadic people found in Southeast Asia
Penjajap: war vessel common used by Malays
Perahu/prahu: marine vessel; later evolved to mean vessel native to Southeast Asia.
Perompak: pirate, sea robber
Pikul: weight of 3 pounds avoirdupois according to J. Church
Raja laut: high-ranking naval officer, admiral
Raja muda: crown prince; heir apparent; chief minister
Raja: prince; king
Rakyat: the common people; sea people, orang laut
Sampan: boat
Sampan-pukat: trading vessel sailed usually by Chinese or Cochin-Chinese seafarers
Syahbandar: harbormaster
Temenggung/temenggong: high-ranking Malay state official; chief of police; later evolved into a
chief of territory, namely Johor
Tope: vessel commonly employed by people from southern Vietnam or Cambodia
Vessel: floating object manned by a crew; example: boat; ship
Wangkang: vessel commonly employed by Chinese seafarers
Yang di-pertuan besar: sultan; “He Who Is Made Lord” is one translation
Yang di-pertuan muda: (see Raja Muda)

INTRODUCTION

“All along the shore there were hundreds of human skulls rolling about on the sand; some
old, some new, some with hair still sticking to them; some with the teeth filed and others
without,” Abdullah Munsyi wrote of the shores of Singapore shortly after the arrival of William
Farquhar, who represented British interests there as the new resident. Farquhar commanded the
local sea nomads to dispose of the remains in the sea. "These are the skulls of men who were
robbed at sea. They were slaughtered here.” The indigenous sea nomads living at Singapore
explained further to Farquhar: “Wherever a fleet of boats or a ship is plundered it is brought to
this place for a division of the spoils. Sometimes there is wholesale slaughter among the crews
when the cargo is grabbed. Sometimes the pirates tie people up and try out their weapons here
along the sea shore."1
The removal of the remains of pirate victims from the shores of Singapore symbolized a
new era in the island’s history. This evidence of Singapore’s dark connection with piracy sank
below the waves and yet, like with the bones themselves, British policy only slightly shielded
piracy from view rather than eliminated it all together. Not only did Singapore residents benefit
at times from piracy but also much of the Malay political system exploited the shipping of the
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. Piracy served as a means to both undermine and

1

Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, “The Hikayat Abdullah,” trans. by A. H. Hill, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society 28, 3 (171): 130.
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support the regional political order. It acted as a stopgap measure to ensure the survival of
individuals and organizations alike. With the unwillingness of leaders and perpetrators to
confess openly of their maritime violence for fear of punishment, maritime violence drifted into
the shadows. Colonialism and Western imperialism altered the patronage network and mid-level
hierarchy by eliminating or paying off large portions of the Malay hierarchy and thereby making
them much less disposed to piracy.
Despite the popularity of piracy as a subject for contemporary Southeast Asian studies,
monographs on piracy in and around Malaya during the 19th century are exceedingly rare.
Historical works on piracy usually refrain from investigating its relation to Malay political
economy and so we must ask, “How did political economy in Peninsular Malaya and the Riau
Archipelago influence piracy during the decades after the British occupation of Singapore?” The
following dissertation will argue that piracy was an important extension of “kerajaan
economics” in that piracy permitted those within the Malay elite to keep their hold on power
until they concluded that it no longer served their interests. Furthermore, pirates exploited the
characteristics of Malay and British political economies by gathering the necessary materials,
collecting intelligence, and at times receiving protection under these systems.
My study will examine piracy’s causes and decline during roughly the period of 1824 to
1874, with state-sanctioned piracy virtually disappearing by the 1870s. In light of the often
broad and ambiguous connotation of the “Malay” people, this work will define who the Malay
people were for the sake of clarity. I recognize there is much scholarly debate over who
constitutes a “Malay” and respect that nearly any definition will have problems. However, this
work needs a definition to avoid confusion. A Malay person is an indigenous Malay-language
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speaker residing in the Malay kingdoms of Insular Southeast Asia or British colonies of the
Malay Peninsula, which include the central east coast of Sumatra, coastal Borneo, the Malay
Peninsula from the Kra Isthmus southward, and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, along with
southern India, Sri Lanka, and Champa communities in south and central Vietnam. I consider
the various orang laut or orang suku laut, or sea people, who lived in the Straits of Malacca and
parts of the South China Sea to be Malay. Various peoples such as Bugis, Batak, and others
potentially became Malay in this definition. These Malays often had common views on
statecraft, religious beliefs, and culture.2
The geographic scope of my study, however, remains more limited in that I do not intend
to examine all the Malay kingdoms in much detail and describe the minutiae of politics only
when required. The primary geographic focus of the work includes the Malay Peninsula and the
Riau Archipelago. Although the study may examine various parts of Sumatra and examines
peoples from outside of my geographic focus, my arguments apply only to the people within my
geographic focus. I will employ “Malaya” and “Malay Peninsula” interchangeably, unless
referring to “British Malaya,” which only refers to territories on the Malay Peninsula under
formal British influence. I define the Malay Peninsula as being from the Kingdom of Ligor
down to and including the Island of Singapore. Although I acknowledge having few Dutch
sources given limited time, resources, and linguistic skills, I have included the Riau-Lingga
Archipelago because of its historical importance to the Malay kingdoms and the practical
infeasibility of separating maritime activity between Johor and Riau-Lingga.

2

Leonard Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2008), 48, 236-237; Shamsul A. B. “A History of an Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and
Practice of ‘Malayness’ in Malaysia Reconsidered,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 33, 2 (2001): 355-366.
.
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Another contentious issue within the historiography remains the question, “Who
constitutes a ‘pirate’ and what constitutes piracy?” When I employ the word “pirate,” it does not
reflect a moral judgment or the modern Western legal construct. The definition of piracy
according to Western-led international law is robbery in international waters or the high seas.3
However, this definition is Eurocentric and nearly impossible to apply in retrospect because the
sources rarely reveal the distance the attack was from shore. “Piracy” remains a subjective term
because it varies depending on the perspectives employed, but for the purposes of this
dissertation it means the covert attack on a vessel with the intent of robbery and kidnapping.
This work will examine two main types of piracy, which includes opportunistic piracy in which
seafarers attack a vessel at sea because the opportunity presented itself or they were desperate for
cargo or labor. Another type was the organized raiding and blockading of vessels and coasts,
which often blurred lines with regular warfare. These operations were usually highly
sophisticated and led by professionals who desired to seize cargos, vessels, and slaves.
My spelling methodology tries to remain faithful to original texts while maintaining
clarity for the reader. I am primarily naming locations by their contemporary English-language
spelling without being excessively anachronistic (Singapore instead of Singapura and Malacca
instead of Melaka). However, I use contemporary Malay spellings for other, less well-known
places to avoid confusion. For names of people, I keep to the original text unless the mentioned
person was well documented, such as monarchs and other famous people. I am employing
weights and measures no longer in use and that often lack extensive standardization, which
makes a precise equivalent recognizable to contemporary readers difficult to determine.

3

Alfred Rubin, Piracy, Paramountcy, and Protectorates (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1975), 20.

5
Seafaring communities along the Straits of Malacca survived the changes in the maritime
economy through violence during the 19th century. With the decentralization of Malay politics
and the development of powerful Chinese factions, the lack of an adequate centralized authority
contributed to a failure to check an explosion of piracy in the Straits of Malacca. Many seafarers
exploited the lack of centralized authority at sea and plundered the vulnerable vessels of
merchants and fishermen accordingly. In the face of such violence, merchants relied on naval
forces to secure waterways and hunt down pirates. British naval forces were often too
inadequate or only present in sufficient numbers at select times. Seafaring communities relied
on their own crews, vessels, and weapons to combat pirates and protect themselves. Singapore
offered easily accessible weapons and a market to sell stolen goods, which led to the city
benefitting from piracy despite its attempts to suppress it. Maritime violence provided one
avenue of response to the economic and political changes for seafaring communities living in the
Straits of Malacca during the 19th century.
The 19th century brought tremendous change to the Malay world that wrought political
and economic shifts unimaginable to some in the region. Resulting from the Netherland’s fall to
Napoleon, the English East India Company seized Malacca without a fight in 1795, rendering the
Dutch East India Company’s (V.O.C.) power practically irrelevant in the Straits and reversing
over a hundred years of V.O.C. preeminence there. The 1790s saw the rise of the lanun or
pirates from the Sulu Sultanate who raided the coasts as far as Sumatra. The Johor-Riau-Lingga
Kingdom experienced a succession dispute between two sons after the death of Sultan Mahmud
in 1812. The Dutch government, which replaced the defunct V.O.C., backed Raja Abdul
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Rahman in 1818 for the reestablishment of a post in Riau.4 The English East India Company,
having acquired Pulau Pinang in 1786, sought the development of a new base in the Straits area
and permitted Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles with Major William Farquhar to protect British trade
heading through the southern Straits of Malacca. Both were experienced in dealing with the
Malay world and participated in the Southeast Asian theater of the Napoleonic Wars. Raffles
was the Lieutenant Governor of Java during the wars and performed much research on the
region’s history, geography, and zoology. On 30 January 1819, Raffles signed a preliminary
agreement with Singapore’s temenggung in the name of Sultan Husain, Johor-Riau-Lingga’s
other claimant, to establish a factory in Singapore. Raffles signed a formal treaty with Husain
and the temenggung on 6 February 1819.5
The year 1824 saw two treaties that helped shape the politics of the Malay Peninsula and
establish firmly a British presence in the region. The British and Dutch governments signed a
treaty on 17 March 1824 resulting in the English East India Company exchanging its territories
and claims in Sumatra for Malacca and recognition of British authority in Singapore. The treaty
greatly limited British influence south of the Straits of Singapore after the Government of India
assented to the treaty in March 1825. On 2 August 1824, Singapore Resident John Crawfurd
signed a treaty with the sultan and temenggung to acquire Singapore and for the latter to
surrender any official authority over the island. Despite Crawfurd’s efforts, the two remained on

4

Barbara Andaya and Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 112114.
5
C.M. Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press,
2009), 22-29.

7
the island.6 After the final departure of Dutch governance from Malacca, the size of British
territory in Malaya remained virtually unchanged until 1874.
Despite the peaceful resolution of Anglo-Dutch tensions in the region, other conflicts
remained prevalent in Malaya. The new Siamese dynasty in Bangkok viewed the northern
Malay states, Kedah, Terengganu, and Kelantan, as their vassals. In 1821, Ligor, under the
instruction of their Siamese overlords, invaded Kedah. Briefly, Perak fell under Siamese
vassalage from the period 1825-1826 through the efforts of Ligor. Kedah fell back to the Malays
in 1831 and 1838, but each time ultimately resulted in Siamese control. Only in 1842 did Sultan
Ahmad return to Kedah to rule as a Siamese vassal, resulting largely from British pressure.7 The
Siamese remained a significant power in northern Malaya throughout the rest of the century.
Perak and Selangor, Malay states on the west coast of the peninsula, experienced years of
conflict in the 1860s and 1870s. Perak experienced a succession crisis because of disagreements
between the chiefs over whom to appoint as the sultan. Meanwhile, tension grew between
various Chinese factions largely over mining rights, particularly between the Ghee Hin and Hai
San factions that spilled over into violence. They allied with Malay factions in the succession
dispute and eventually civil war emerged between the various factions and the war consumed
much of Perak.8 Selangor princes secured wealth by establishing domains throughout the
kingdom, taxing passing commerce, and receiving shares of profits from tin mines. A dispute
emerged between Raja Abdullah and Raja Mahdi over the harbor town of Klang in 1866,
resulting in Raja Madhi seizing the town. Sultan Abdul Samad requested Tengku Kudin retake
the town from Raja Madhi and Kudin eventually gained the upper hand in the war with outside
6

Ibid., 47-48.
Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 119-123.
8
Ibid., 152-154.
7
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help. However, by 1872, Raja Madhi regained the advantage but British support enabled Kudin
to keep fighting the war without strong support from local chiefs. Governor Andrew Clarke of
the Straits Settlements, the three British colonies in Malaya, in late 1873 moved to end the
conflict.9
Given the lack of historical literature written mainly on 19th-century Malayan piracy,
portions of the literature review will focus on arguments concerning piracy and Malay political
economy during that period. One of the understudied questions concerning Malay political
economy, which historians attempted to explain, was the decline of Malay shipping during the
19th century. Although this question is not the research question for this work, the decline of
Malay shipping overall likely intersected with the Malay political system, colonialism,
technology, immigration, and other factors relevant to 19th-century piracy.
Nicholas Tarling wrote the most important work on Malay piracy thus far in Piracy and
Politics in the Malay World but focused mainly on the relationship between the campaign to
suppress piracy and the expanding influence of British power in Insular Southeast Asia. Tarling
argues that British influence expanded considerably in the Malay world in the decades after the
founding of Singapore, focusing particularly on the southern Straits of Malacca but also Aceh,
Sulu, and the other kingdoms, especially during the 1830s and 1840s through the suppression of
piracy.10 The work’s primary source base is composed almost entirely of materials written by
Europeans, with very few works even translated from Southeast Asian sources. Tarling provides
a letter from the ruler of Ligor’s son but this was an exception to an otherwise overwhelmingly

9

Ibid., 150-152, 161.
Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World (Melbourne: F. W. Chesire, 1963), 19-20.
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European source base.11 Therefore, there remains room to examine piracy from a more Asiancentric perspective by placing greater focus on sources from literature written by Asians with
experience in Insular Southeast Asia. Tarling’s work focuses more on British imperialism in
Southeast Asia over the ways piracy influenced the local rulers in Southeast Asia by examining
the role of the suppression of piracy by British forces.
Harry Miller focused on pirates more broadly in East Asia and even though historians
rarely employ his work on this issue, he made an often ignored but important point. Miller
suggests that the various small states in the archipelago not only extracted tribute and duties from
each other but also had fleets of warships that also acted as pirate vessels. Pirates sailed into
harbors and conducted business there at times.12 The direct connection between piracy and
Malay states is important because public colonial narratives often minimized the relationship
between contemporary allies’ families and the issue of piracy to protect the legitimacy of the
rulers. The Malay states themselves conducted piracy rather than simply abetted it.
In the colonial historiography, narratives of former colonial officials from British Malaya
usually take a cautious approach to determining which Malay ruler or chief acted as a pirate.
Usually, these precautions fit neatly within the friendships and alliances between such officials
and the Malayan rulers. For example, Richard Winstedt in his general political histories of
Malaya and Malay states likely selected carefully whom to declare a pirate. Winstedt declared
that Raja Abdullah of Klang, Selangor, during the 1860s commanded pirate vessels in the waters
of Selangor until 1866 when Raja Mahdi forced him to take refuge in Malacca.13 However, in

11

Ibid., 241.
Harry Miller, Pirates of the Far East (London: Robert Hale, 1970), 15, 16-17.
13
R. O. Winstedt, “A History of Malaya,” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 13, 1 (1935):
227-228.
12
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writing about Johor, Winstedt sought the assistance of Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, who reviewed
the chapters on Daing Ibrahim. Winstedt recognized Ibrahim extorted gutta percha traders and
established a monopoly of it but did not in the work associate him with pirates despite evidence
to the contrary, which I will show later.14 Although piracy was usually within the general
historical narratives of colonial officials, the more detailed reports on piracy remained usually
unavailable to a general audience. They often employed such approaches likely to avoid
embarrassing critical allies whose assistance in governing proved invaluable.
Historians lack a consensus on the reasons for the decline of Malay shipping economy
but usually relate its fall to piracy indirectly. According to Wong Lin Ken, the trade routes in the
archipelago once dominated by Malay seafarers lost out to competition from square-rigged
vessels and Malays had difficulty in negotiating with Europeans because many rarely interacted
with them. Wong asserts that Malay and archipelago maritime merchants lacked the business
skills and resources to compete with the square-rig ship owners. The European square-rig
vessels offered superior protection against pirates and were eligible for maritime insurance,
which placed Chinese and Europeans at an advantage over Malay and Bugis shipping during the
19th century.15 Leonard and Barbara Andaya argue that a Royal Navy and East India Company
counter-piracy campaign in coordination with Malay rulers devastated the Malay shipping
industry and significantly contributed to the decline of the Malay seafarer.16 These historians
support their assertions concerning the fate of Malay seafarers such as pirates with inadequate
evidence and focus. My research method involves analyzing statistical evidence such as data on

14

R. O. Winstedt, “A History of Johore,” The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 10, 3 (1932): 1, 91-97.
Wong Lin Ken, “The Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869,” The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33, 4
(1960), 60, 82-83.
16
Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134-135.
15
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Asian shipping and piracy to search for correlations between Malay political economy and
piracy.
Existing literature on the Malay world needs new work for us to understand pirates
employing Asian perspectives. Carl Trocki and James Warren contribute to this important field,
but their work leaves questions about 19th-century maritime Singapore. Trocki researched the
adaptation of the increasingly land-based elite but excluded thorough examination of the Straits
of Malacca’s seafaring communities,17 while Warren’s work does not examine Malay and
Chinese piracy in the Straits.18 Eric Tagliacozzo does not take into account much of the political
dynamics of the Straits of Malacca during the 19th century by not examining Malay and Chinese
political structures in the region well.19 Recent books on the subject aimed at popular history
audiences, though entertaining, only scratch the surface of the field’s full potential. These works
form a foundation for my future research on maritime history.
The most accepted version on the fall of the Malay shipping industry and seafarer comes
from Trocki’s Prince of Pirates, which is problematic on the issue because of insufficient
evidence and a lack of clarity. Trocki argues that the sea peoples gradually became harmless
under British and temenggung rule and that Malays lost their position as important seaborne
traders by the mid-19th century because of developments in maritime technology, population
shifts, and changes in the way in which traders conducted commerce.20 However, he also argues

17

Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784-1885
(Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1979).
18
James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the
Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); James Warren,
Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 2002).
19
Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 18651915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
20
Trocki, Prince of Pirates, xix.
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that the seafaring lifestyle disappeared when Malay rulers adopted a new political model based
on agriculture and a Chinese economic base. The sea people lost their prominence and political
influence with a British anti-piracy campaign in 1836 sealing their fate. The British colonial
government ensured that no leader based his authority on the orang laut and the latter became a
scattered nomadic people by 1860, diminished in commerce by competition from European,
Chinese, and Arab square–rigged vessels.21 The Malays declined through technology and
population, with Chinese becoming a majority population in July 1845. British and Dutch
pressure destroyed the maritime states by mid-century. Johor’s rulers lived off gutta percha,
which the orang laut collected and shipped, along with acting at the limits of their ruler’s
power.22
However, there are severe problems with this argument in that it is too Eurocentric for an
autonomous history monograph and lacks sufficient evidence. Trocki argues Malays fled from
the seas and ports with a British anti-piracy campaign that focused on gaining control of the seas
for state building and eliminating slavery to destroy piracy and replace it with a Chinese coolie
system.23 Furthermore, his work lacks a consistent argument concerning piracy and Malay
shipping. The illustration of the fall of the Malay maritime state and shipping industry as
something being acted upon by outside factors does not sufficiently look within the dynamics of
the Malay political system. Such a perspective presents the British and Dutch colonial forces as
being virtually all-powerful and the Malays, along with other local groups as helpless against a
genocidal onslaught. Ironically, he portrays the Malays not as pirates but as victims to a brutal
anti-piracy campaign with insufficient evidence. Trocki rarely backs his argument with
21

Ibid., 85.
Ibid., 87-88.
23
Ibid., 208-209.
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statistical evidence and my research did not validate the existence of a British strategy to
eliminate Malay sea trade through a violent counter-piracy campaign.
The argument that a European counter-piracy campaign violently destroyed Malay
shipping dominance remains baseless and without merit. Trocki, Barbara Andaya, and Leonard
Andaya employ one source in support of this argument, but their reading of the source is
incomplete and out of context. The chief if not sole source is the Tuhfat al-Nafis, which indeed
states that a British vessel sank a Malay perahu, or sailing vessel, for no apparent reason because
their crews were peaceful traders. “How can the English do such a thing? We are already taking
steps to eradicate piracy, and they come and act like this,” proclaims the same source. This
indicates surprise by the Riau-Lingga leadership that British warships destroyed vessels with
supposedly peaceful purposes, especially considering the increased measures they took to fight
pirates. The Riau-Lingga envoys explained the situation to Mr. Elout and Resident de Groot, to
which Elout responded that although the Dutch and Britons erred in their policies and actions,
the sultan was the most responsible for the problem of piracy and that he ought to bear the worst
of the campaign. The envoys returned to the sultan and commenced the implementation of the
piracy suppression campaign, which concludes the issue of maritime treaties and piracy in that
work.24 Raja Ali al-Haji Riau never mentions that the anti-piracy campaign was so onerous on
Malay trade that it destroyed its dominance but instead resembles Dutch narratives on this topic.
Rather, the work suggests British attacks of this scale were unusual because they shocked the
leadership. If the attacks were regular and continued after the agreement, some sources would
mention such attacks, especially if they wiped out nearly all of Malay trade. Furthermore, the
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Riau-Lingga leadership protested the attacks because they fretted the loss of their naval forces
and a significant source of income.
Other evidence that I will provide later in the rest of the dissertation will provide greater
evidence that contradicts Trocki’s argument. Chapter One will show that the Straits Settlements
government was keenly aware of the desires of the merchant community concerning the issue of
excessive state intervention in sharp contrast to the Malay states, as seen in Chapter Two. A
table in Chapter Three will show that Singapore’s maritime trade grew after the anti-piracy
campaign of 1836, which strongly suggests the campaign worked in curtailing piracy.
Furthermore, neither colonial power had the vessels or the labor to destroy Malay commerce
given its large volume.25 Chapters Three and Four will show the limitations of the colonial
forces in the Straits of Malacca region, which made such a campaign impossible.
The historiography of piracy in Southeast Asia during the 19th century rarely examines
the relationship between the Malay sultans, the kerajaan or the kingdom, and maritime violence.
A few of the historians, such as Windstedt and Trocki, downplay the piratical nature of Johor’s
rulers, which in return, leaves a large gap in our understanding of naval history and the influence
of the kerajaan on the growth of piracy. Other historians, such as Tarling and Tagliacozzo,
though effective in on their attention toward piracy, wrote works that do not focus sufficient
attention on the Malay political and economic systems. The established economic histories on
Malay shipping usually provide insufficient or contradictory evidence and therefore employing
these works extensively in new literature might cause problems. Furthermore, the use of primary
Malay-language sources in the historical literature usually ignores or attempts to downplay the
role of piracy when it remained an important aspect of Malay society in the 19th century.
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Therefore, we may surmise that a new work on Malay and Chinese piracy in the waters off
Malaya with greater attention on how local politics and societies influenced maritime violence
without the absurdities of particular colonial and post-colonial theories is necessary.

Commentary on Autonomous History

Autonomous history’s prevalence in contemporary dialogue in Southeast Asian
historiography during the Postwar Era has created new challenges and risks. Students from the
universities within Southeast Asia itself are especially poised to contribute new ideas to history
with greater wealth and openness for the most part being available within the region. John Smail
effectively argues for the possibility of historians writing from a Southeast Asia-centric
perspective, along with challenging the notions of the meta-narrative in history. Smail’s
autonomous history involves employing and examining the perspectives of Southeast Asians in
writing history. 26 In doing so, he supports the legacy of Jacob van Leur and criticizes the
obsession with “decolonizing” minds because of its purveyors’ overestimation of the strength of
colonial powers. Some of van Leur’s important concepts included the resilience of Insular
Southeast Asian societies in the face of powerful outside influences and rejecting one-sided
viewpoints that include concepts of “civilization transfer.”27 Smail also forms two important
goals for Southeast Asian historians: writing autonomous histories ought not become restricting,
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along with creating a morally neutral viewpoint.28 However, despite the popularity of Southeast
Asian autonomous histories, the discipline remains woefully underdeveloped. Historians of
Southeast Asia often ignore Smail’s two important suggestions by creating new rules to control
the nature of future research, as seen in the chapter on legitimacy. There remains Eurocentrism
in works proclaiming to be autonomous histories because of assumptions about European power
and ignoring the historical impact of Southeast Asians.
Writing autonomous history requires caution and prudence to avoid falling into various
pitfalls. Sometimes, moral neutrality suggested by Smail may well be impossible, so historians
should at least attempt moral consistency in evaluating historical actors. The “decolonization” of
institutions, such as archives, ought to require ascribing power to Southeast Asians throughout
history. Even when writing about European atrocities in Southeast Asia, the historian takes a
Eurocentric tone by ascribing power to Europeans even if delegitimizing the already-deceased
colonial states. Of course, European organizations during the Colonial Era possessed much
power, but autonomous history means keeping them in the background when reasonable.
Proclaiming that certain global events happened because of the conspiracies of some Western
cabal without any real evidence are highly Eurocentric by suggesting Westerners have some
superhuman powers to shape human history such as the notion of in a few years wiping out most
Malay commerce by force of arms. Writing about history through dichotomy of European and
Asian creates a Eurocentric narrative, especially given the diversity of interests and people in
Southeast Asia. The focus on subjects such as gender, ethnography, and other similar topics
related to cultural studies while sacrificing developing new ideas in politics and economics has
created a gap in the literature on the former with many important historical questions left
28
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unanswered or answered in an unsatisfactory manner. Avoiding these pitfalls might help
historians maintain a focus on the diversity of people and interests indigenous to Southeast Asia.
Scholars ought not to confuse bias with autonomous history, which are separate and
distinct categories. Even if an historian or other scholar writes a fervently pro-Southeast Asian
account of a particular historical event, that does not necessarily mean they are writing from that
perspective. Liberal Europeans or Americans who write disparagingly of particular policies of
colonial governments in Southeast Asia do not translate automatically to writing autonomous
history. It remains entirely possible for an author to write a highly critical work that is biased
against particular Southeast Asians and their institutions if written within the parameters of
autonomous history. For instance, Abdullah Munsyi, though not writing along modern scholarly
lines, gives a perspective that attacks the Malay elite but still keeps a Southeast Asian
perspective. Writing a work with a pro-Southeast Asian bias does not make the work
automatically an autonomous history because bias does not reflect power or an entire worldview.
This study will examine piracy through an autonomous history methodology that focuses
on how the Malays themselves determined the rise and fall of maritime violence during the 19th
century rather than examining the topic through merely the Malay perspective. We cannot
simply take the views of individuals at face value and use them as the main reasons for the rise
and decline of Malay piracy because nobody could have possibly known the entirety of the
problem. We ought not to write an argument based solely on the perspective of a single Malay
person. Writing from the Southeast Asian or Malay-centric approach should not mean merely
writing about the perspectives of Southeast Asians, but rather to develop an argument that
primarily focuses on them. This dissertation relies on Western and English-language sources
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because officials, merchants, and others needed reliable intelligence on piracy from Malays and
Chinese to survive and succeed, whereas Malay rulers and pirates depended on secrecy
concerning pirate operation for their survival and therefore left little record of them.
Instead, historians should work with the idea that Southeast Asians generally possessed
more control over their own futures than the amount of control Europeans, Chinese, or Arabs had
over the lives of Southeast Asians. The basis of autonomous history should be “autonomy” or
power and not merely duplicating or fabricating the views of Southeast Asians. Of course,
problems of perception and evidence may arise from the issue of granting such autonomy to
Southeast Asians. Stating that Malays’ and others’ problems arose from their own actions over
their victimization by foreigners may cause controversy, but it is necessary for the development
of the field. Foreigners should also remain a part of the story in a role that complements
autonomous history, especially considering the roles of non-Southeast Asian sources in the
writing of pre-independence history. Writing under the basis that Southeast Asians had more
control over their own lives than any other group of people had over them means that their
perceptions and outlook concerning ongoing and previous events are merely pieces of the puzzle
rather than the entire picture itself. This essay will employ autonomous history with assumptions
based more on Malay power over perception.
This dissertation will examine the relationship between seafaring Malays and various
Malay states in the first chapter. The first chapter looks at how seafarers selected their masters
and even betrayed them, which in turn shows how the various rulers and chiefs in Malaya risked
losing their followers if they failed to earn their support. Seafarers, traders and fighters alike,
had their own measures for selecting the best leader to follow. The chapter contrasts deeply with
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the arguments by historians such as Warren who suggest Malays did not understand the concept
of “piracy.” This section also examines how law codes, which acted as a social contract between
rulers and nakhoda, evolved and reflected the relationship between the aforementioned
relationships.
The second chapter concerns the Malay kingdoms and kerajaan economics, which
exemplified the ways in which the Malay ruling elite stayed in power. In the 19th century, the
political economy of the Malay states restricted political and economic privileges to a few people
as a means to maintain the status quo. Elements of this system diffused into or mirrored nonMalay territories, too. Malay commoners possessed few options in retaliating against oppression
by the government. Furthermore, the 19th century marked an era in the Malay Peninsula with
decreasing state-level power and the increase of power in lower levels of government, otherwise
known as political decentralization. Overall, the ruling elites divided much of the economy in
rents in which particular leaders received economic privileges as a means of protecting their
status, while the commoners had few means to push back against the oppression of the elites.
I divide the following two chapters between Malays and Chinese concerning piracy and
warfare because of the usually ethnic divisions between them. The third chapter focuses more on
the relationship of kerajaan economics and piracy and the fourth focuses more on the influences
of societal change led by Chinese in Malaya during the 19th century. Evidence will reveal in
these chapters that determining the reasons behind individuals becoming pirates is usually
impossible given the incomplete nature of historical records, but some evidence remains for
specific individuals who felt free to divulge their motivations.
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The third chapter will examine the relationship between Malay political economy and
piracy off the coast of Malaya. Kerajaan economics gave economic privileges to the elite,
especially the ruler, but such advantages decreased in economic value when international trade
declined. This segment examines piracy in Malaya largely from 1824 to 1850 with particular
attention focused on the influences of Malaya’s political systems on maritime violence. The
epilogue examines the role of the Malay elite in the 1870s when the piratical system was on the
brink of collapse. It will also compare economic trends from Strait Settlements shipping data
with quantitative research data on piracy collected from a variety of sources. This segment will
show a strong connection between pirates and the Malay political order from the most powerful
rulers to the various Malay chiefs.
The development of free trade influenced increases in piracy during the 19th century with
large populations of Chinese migrants arriving on the Malay Peninsula largely independent of
Malay or even British authority with easy access to weaponry. Chinese seafarers, though
commonly portrayed as docile in the beginning of the century, by mid-century at times evolved
into feared pirates for their violence and power throughout the waters off Malaya. This section
will expose the crucial role of Singapore as a pirate haven and that Chinese pirates took
advantage of British and Malay political economies by plundering vessels throughout Malayan
waters.
The annexation of Singapore in 1824 by the East India Company among other events
created a challenge in that it placed various seafaring nations at odds. The importance of antislavery and anti-piracy to Great Britain’s imperial mission and the necessity of those institutions
to the Malay kingdoms set them on a collision course. A covert conflict emerged between Great
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Britain and the pirates of Malaya. Malay seafarers, possibly the most skilled boat people of their
time, with their centuries of maritime tradition and superior knowledge of the local waters held
tremendous advantages over their opponents. Their Chinese counterparts developed into
remarkably skilled naval warriors, capable of overtaking all but the most powerful of enemies.
The Royal Navy in coordination with the East India Company possessed the most powerful fleets
in the world, with a naval officer corps arguably unequalled in naval experience in terms of
combined years in fighting conflicts and breadth of service throughout human history because
they fought in seemingly unending wars throughout the globe.
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CHAPTER 1:
PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY IN MALAYA IN RELATION TO MARITIME RAIDING
AND LAW

On 30 August 1831, Commander C. Daviot wrote to the editor of the Singapore
Chronicle warning the public of pirates in Southeast Asia and told how he barely escaped their
clutches. The British-flagged brig Lady Harriet Frances of 250 tons burthen sailed from her
homeport of Cuddalore, India, to the island of Penang on a trading expedition. The brig departed
on 15 August from Penang and on 23 August, her nakhoda visited another vessel via the brig’s
boat and spoke to a self-proclaimed raja with twenty men aboard armed with cutlasses and keris.
After a quarrel between the raja and the nakhoda, five of the Chuliah30 crew of the brig
surrendered and joined their captures while some others onboard escaped. The pirates tied up
Daviot and later forced him to sail the brig westward to Mount Clay where on August 24 three
vessels, some of them armed, plundered the brig of most of her cargo and other valuables.
The next day, the Lady Harriet Frances’s turncoat crew showed the pirates the brig’s
treasure and four boats continued emptying the vessel. They also armed the brig with four
swivel cannons, from which Daviot inferred their intention to make her a pirate vessel. At
daybreak, W. M. Wyatt and the Emily approached and requested a meeting to which they
complied while managing to keep their deed a secret. A son of the Sultan of Aceh was onboard
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the vessel according to a message, but the pirates ignored him. However, the respectably armed
Emily maneuvered into a threatening position and the pirates panicked. They loaded roughly
10,000 Spanish dollars of coins and jewels into their boat and sabotaged their swivels before they
escaped via their boat. Daviot raised the Union Jack and hailed the Emily, which dispatched a
boat with eight people that included Captain Smidt, a nakhoda, and the syahbandar of Sawang.
The Emily took the four messengers prisoner and supplied Lady Harriet Frances with supplies
for the return voyage to Penang.31
The capture and subsequent liberation of the British brig raises questions about the role of
the state and piracy in early 19th-century Southeast Asia. A seemingly high-ranking official
orchestrated a sophisticated piratical expedition with much coordination. The raiders ignored
supposedly superior authority but fled when confronted with superior force. So we must ask:
What was the nature of the relationship between Southeast Asian seafarers and political
authorities at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca during the first half of the 19th century?
In recent years, historians have brought more of a Southeast Asian perspective to the study of
raiding in Southeast Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries, resulting in the exploration of the limited
amount of material with more balanced considerations of violence at sea and the legitimacy of
violent assailants. The legalistic-semantic battle for defining “piracy” within recent
historiography embodied the problems of the recognition of political entities as either legitimate
states or pirate haunts. Earlier historians employed such language as a cudgel for legitimizing or
gaining political support for colonial actions in Southeast Asia. Post-colonial historians
countered the employment of the word “pirate” as inappropriate because it was a Eurocentric
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word and delegitimized Southeast Asian rulers. “Asia-centric” works at times ignore the
negative repercussions for Asians from their decisions while ascribing such events as the
consequence of Westerners. This dissertation seeks to counter elite-centric arguments by various
historians on the subject of maritime legal history in Southeast Asia through the examination of
non-elite perspectives from people in the Straits of Malacca region during the early 19th century
while acknowledging their actions were self-destructive at times.
For both seafarers and states in the Straits of Malacca region in the early 19th century,
flexibility concerning loyalty and law were critical for survival in a particularly violent period.
The once-strong relationship between the Malacca Sultanate and seafarers of various origins in
the 15th century broke down almost completely by the early 19th century. By the latter period,
Southeast-Asian states adapted their views on legality in conformity with their political
circumstances as a means to increase their political influence. The legal tradition passed down
from the 15th century weakened to a point where it became virtually irrelevant to the sultanates
by the early 19th century. In turn, seafarers from Southeast Asia selected the political leaders to
whom they pledged loyalty based on their own immediate interests and their perceptions of the
leader, along with his followers. The seafarers based their perceptions on a ruler through their
own concepts of honor and spirituality that specified the acceptability of actions taken by
political and military leaders. They adapted to the economic and political changes for their own
ends in the Straits of Malacca during the traumatic period of the early 19th century. Honor meant
showing courage and loyalty in battle by fighting enemies valiantly while charms and rituals
reinforced political legitimacies when successful. A failed charm or ritual challenged the
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legitimacy of a ruler but also brought legitimacy to new leaders who broke the power of the
charm.
Seafarers employed both violent and nonviolent tactics against European states and
Southeast Asian sultanates for their own ends. More important than the debate over who was or
was not a pirate were the tremendous economic and political changes that transformed the lives
of many throughout Southeast Asia during the 19th century. Technology and a new form of order
in maritime professions forced alterations hitherto unknown to the region in ways unstudied by
historians.

Traditional Malay Legal Codes in Historical Context

The pre-colonial legal tradition of the Malay world took a more hostile position toward
maritime raiding than did of the practices of the early 19th century. By the latter period, the legal
protections from the Malay states diminished or fell completely out of practice, which decreased
the incentive for strong relationships with Malay sultanates. Undang-Undang Melaka was the
most important of the three types of legal digests as its writers codified the original work in the
15th-century Sultanate of Malacca. Later legal traditions throughout the Straits of Malacca
region stemmed from Undang-Undang Melaka, including courts at Kedah the in northwest of the
Malay Peninsula and Pontianak in Western Borneo. At least forty manuscripts of UndangUndang Melaka survived the ravages of time, disaster, and climate, with each state possessing its
own legal tradition.32 The legal digests of Malacca showed that property owners, on paper
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anyway, possessed assurances of protection from the government before the European arrival in
Southeast Asian in force. The lack of these protections from Malay sultanates during the early
19th century discouraged seafarers from submitting to their authority as they had in previous
centuries.
The Malay language lacks a single word precisely translated to the word “piracy,” which
has caused semantic confusion throughout the historiography since the 1970s. R. J. Wilkinson
defined “rompak” as the Malay word for “piracy; robbery on the water….” He defined
“perompak” as “pirates or buccaneers” and those who called themselves a “land pirate” were
particularly ruthless robbers. “Lanun” generally meant pirates sailing the high seas, whereas
“perompak” sometimes connoted pirates sailing in their own waters.33 James Warren
emphasized the Eurocentric origins of the word “piracy” and its usage in description of state
behavior as the Malay word “merompak” more aptly described their behavior because of the
necessity of raiding for the sustenance of coastal maritime communities by the forceful
acquisition of labor and goods. Raiding therefore allowed commercial expansion of the coastal
maritime states of Southeast Asia through the trade of goods with Chinese and European
merchants that also permitted the expansion of their own political power.34 For the sake of
clarity, this work will employ Wilkinson’s definition of “rompak” as sea robbery or piracy and
use the word “piracy.”
The Malacca Sultanate’s position as a maritime state insisted on the formation of legal
digests dedicated to conduct at sea. Undang-Undang Melaka possessed statutes pertaining to
conduct at sea including sea rescues and vessel recovery, along with regulations for weights and
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measures. Undang-Undang Laut or “Law of the Sea” likely emerged after the codification of
Undang-Undang Melaka as a result of its limited decrees in regard to conduct at sea and the
condition maritime vessels.35 Undang-Undang Melaka most likely formed under Sultan
Muhammad Syah (1445-1458), with its compilation finished under his son Sultan Muzaffar Syah
(1445-1458) at the height of the Malacca Sultanate’s wealth and power as a commercial-trading
state.36 Their compilation coincided with the economic development of the sultanate and the
formation of a law code or legal digest supported the prosperity of the kingdom.
The Malay state offered protection for merchants traversing its territorial waters as a
means of bringing trade into royal ports for collection of duties. Undang-Undang Laut evolved
over time and varied from district to district with its origins from the reign of Sultan Mahmud
Syah (1488 to 1511). Five nakhoda or sea captains named Harun, Elias, Zaini, Dewar, and Ishak
petitioned Sultan Mahmud with the new code as an addendum to Undang-Undang Melaka.37
The new code provided stricter rules and a more detailed code of conduct for crews of vessels
because of the transience of maritime life, along with the distance from authority. UndangUndang Laut defended property at sea through state assurances for protection from pirates,
incompetence, and malfeasance. The ability of the nakhoda to gain state concessions showed the
historical strength of seafarers within their relationship to the Malay kings and conversely their
weakness correlating with the strength of the Malacca and maritime codes.
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According the codes, the sultan and his government possessed immense power over a
nakhoda, who risked grave punishment for violating the property of a sultan or a high-ranking
official. One edict states, “If a ruler’s slave is stolen, the thief must be killed and (all) his
property confiscated. Even in the case of a Sea-Captain, the rule is the same.”38 If someone
stole a slave who “belongs to a high dignitary or the Chief Minister, the thief is also to be
killed[.]”39 The kidnapping of a slave belonging to a high official challenged the authority of the
sultan by interfering with the functions of state and usually required the offender’s execution. “If
a slave belonging to an ordinary solider or subject is stolen by a Sea-Captain, the ruling is that he
(the Sea-Captain) shall either be killed or be fined… is left to the discretion of the judge.”40 This
statement indicated that if an individual stole a subject’s slave, the punishment was potentially
less severe; this indicated the code’s adherence to hierarchy in Malay society. The government
reserved the right to execute pirates who challenged its authority because its authority was
supreme.
The punishment of execution for capturing a slave belonging to a sultan or a high-ranking
government official or the potentially strict punishment for stealing a slave from an individual
subject revealed that states in the Straits of Malacca recognized the illegitimacy of a nakhoda or
other people kidnapping slaves. The rulers recognized such actions as piracy or a type of illicit
raiding regardless if there was a Malay word for the concept. It continues, “If a Sea-Captain
steals a slave of the Harbor-master, the ruling is that either he shall be killed and his property
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confiscated or he shall be fined … because the Harbor-master is the ‘father and mother’ of the
foreign merchant [.]”41 The combination of matriarchic and paternalistic authority of the state
symbolized its supreme power over seafarers with the establishment of the codes. Seafarers
likely submitted to such codes with the guarantees of protection by the state outlined in the
maritime codes. That statute exemplified the importance of slavery to the state as demonstrated
by the severity of the punishment. Slave raiding was a significant economic activity, especially
in conflict when opposing forces sought the increase of their prestige and power by the addition
of more people, usually more so than land, to their authority.42 The importance of government
slaves lasted into the 19th century as even when Sir Stamford Raffles abolished slavery in
Singapore on May 1, 1823, the temenggung43 and Sultan Husain kept their personal attendants as
slaves.44 Malay sultanates prized their slaves as important symbols of status and authority but
also as servants.
The Malay state conceptualized illegitimate and illegal attacks on property at sea in
Undang-Undang Melaka with the state reserving the right of taxation at sea while denying that
right to seafarers not under its command. Undang-Undang Melaka established punishment for
“people who steal perahu” that “if a man steals a perahu then sells it or secretes it but there is
clear evidence… he must pay the value of the perahu to its owner in compensation” and a fine of
10 gold.45 Although a lesser punishment compared statutes regarding kidnapped slaves, the cost
of replacing the vessel and the fine likely exceeded the means of most people. Therefore, elites
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were likely the few who committed such a crime and escaped without debt bondage. Stealing a
vessel was a crime in Undang-Undang Melaka that carried a costly punishment because the theft
of vessels undermined the commercial system of the Malacca sultanate. Malay sultans
understood the idea of piracy before the arrival of European imperialism and enforced the laws
against it to protect the overall maritime commercial system.
Undang-Undang Laut had a decree regarding theft of cargo onboard maritime vessels,
the former of which extended to the possession of stolen property. The punishment for a
freeman stealing gold or silver items differed depending on the thieves’ country of origin. If a
slave stole gold or silver items and his master knowingly received the stolen goods, both were
equally guilty, but the slave lost his hand and the master received a fine.46 The severe
punishment of amputation served as a deterrent against stealing at sea while the laws concerning
that of other countries and the prohibition against stolen goods represented the flexibility and
strength of the cosmopolitan and diverse Malacca and Johor sultanates. Sovereign authority of
the sultanates extended beyond the shores and onto the seas but the Johor Sultanate was flexible
in that it allowed the application of foreign legal codes in specific situations.
By the 1830s, Malays still recalled the existence of the codes and recognized its utility
but also complemented them with Islamic codes when deemed necessary. By this time, the
codes remained more than simply rules for the operation of a vessel but also for dealing with
crimes committed overseas. Islamic law covered the gaps concerning “persons who committed
murders or theft whether on land or on sea” because they “were equally liable to punishment.”47
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However, the application and enforcement of such laws remained another issue entirely.
Temenggung Ibrahim’s eldest son, while speaking to Governor Cavenagh, “confessed that there
were no rules, and that the sentences were passed according to his own judgment.”48 Malays had
conceptualizations of legality at sea that influenced state-seafarer relations concerning theft and
murder prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century and these notions evolved into
the 19th century. The evolution of these codes reveals the collapse of centralized authority by the
early 19th century to a point where seafarers possessed enough independence to create their own
standards of leadership.

Malay Sultanates’ Political Structure and Piracy

According to Malay tradition, the sultans of Malacca and elsewhere in the Straits of
Malacca region possessed absolute authority over their subjects. Challenging a sultan’s authority
meant the death of the traitors and their families, the destruction of their homes, and the tossing
of the soil they lived on into the sea. Since the establishment of rule by the Malacca Sultanate, it
depended on the loyalty of the orang laut49 for political control of the straits and for the
collection of important trading goods through their skills and numbers as seafarers. The
relationship between the Malacca dynasty and the orang laut maintained the latter’s power in the
region for centuries.50 The laksamana or admiral became more important during periods of
warfare as the laksamana led fleets of orang laut, who not only fought the sultan’s enemies but
also established his capital and redirected maritime commerce to it for the collection of revenue
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essential for the survival of the sultanate.51 A large part of the legitimacy of a sultan was the
economic support of merchants and military backing of the orang laut, who were essential for a
sultan’s power in the Straits of Malacca. As the connection between the sultan and various
seafaring communities broke down over time, the communities became more autonomous and
redefined the relationship.
The Malay elite often considered themselves outside the authority of traditional
sultanates and therefore piracy and other forms of violence prevailed in the early of British
authority in Malaya. In the early days of colonial Singapore between its establishment in 1819
and 1824, Sultan Husain Shah’s men, the temenggung’s men, and others walked around town
fully armed with virtually no law and order in the early days as the town only possessed four or
five comparatively powerless policemen who often lost their lives. When the sun came up,
people discovered wounded and dead men lying in the street while some of the sultan’s and
temenggung’s men robbed people in the street and in their houses. They only feared, it seemed,
Resident William Farquhar, the British commanding officer in Singapore.52 At one point, Sultan
Husain requested an increased allowance from Raffles, who offered him a trading deal with his
associate in India that could make him rich. Sultan Husain and his temenggung laughed at the
proposition and declared it beneath their dignity. A surprised Raffles asked why trading was
shameful while piracy brought “no such disgrace?” Sultan Husain responded, “Piracy is our
birthright and so brings no disgrace. Even so, those who take part in acts of piracy are not Malay
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by descent.”53 The sultan viewed plundering as a legitimate function of a sultan and his
descendants. He denied the Malay people’s responsibility or involvement in piracy despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The framework for taxation from the old codes usually
became distorted as the political elite’s relationship with various seafaring communities
weakened immensely.
The decentralization of authority throughout the various states throughout the 18th
century made consolidating control over the peninsula difficult for any power, European or
Asian. Dutch and Malay overlords found enforcement of maritime laws extraordinarily difficult
as bringing culprits to justice depended on knowing their origin, which in turn was also
challenging. Some seafaring noblemen dissociated themselves from the royal courts such as the
anak raja or princes’ sons whose significant numbers created problems for supporting their
livelihoods. Their hereditary rights permitted a degree of raiding for plunder by sea under
particular constraints called ruler’s bounty or kurnia that included restraints on location and
timing of attacks, but a limited centralized authority allowed them to become pirates and plunder
as they pleased. Piracy by the orang laut or “sea people” with anak raja often dissented against
royal authority in the seas around the Malay Peninsula during 18th century.54 As early as 1784,
the power of various chiefs and princes limited the power of the centralized state in Riau, an
archipelago in the southern Straits of Malacca, and marked its decline as a government capable
of administering the region. Maritime violence accompanied the decentralization of power in the
Straits of Malacca and South China Sea region and an influx of seafarers challenged royal
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authority by plundering vessels at sea. The old relationship between the sultanates in the Straits
of Malacca and Southeast Asian seafarers deteriorated into virtual nonexistence.
By the early 19th century, the Malay sultanates became so decentralized that Malay
sultans’ authority often became only nominal outside of their capital as chiefs and others of royal
blood increased their power at the expense of the sultans. Offices of servants to the Riau-Johor
kingdom such as the bendahara of Pahang and the temenggung of Singapore gained de facto
independence from the sultan. Events limited the power of the centralized state in Riau and
marked its decline as a government capable of administering the region as early as 1784. 55
Herman W. Muntinghe of the Dutch East Indies filed a report in 1818 regarding two orang
kaya56 at Palau Mapar under the titles of datuk penghulu and datuk muda with eight-hundred
men and eighteen vessels for warfare under their command. Meanwhile, the ungku temenggung
of Pulau Lima commanded twenty-four vessels and one thousand men.57 Sultan Mahmud Shah
died in 1812 with his likely chosen successor, Husain, passed over by Abdul Rahman through
the efforts of the Bugis raja muda of Riau-Lingga.58 The investiture of the traditional regalia of
Sultan Abdul Rahman occurred in Riau-Lingga once the Dutch officials enthroned him on
October 1823 to reinforce their own authority and claim to the old sultanate.59 The Shah
Dynasty of the Sultanate of Riau-Lingga lost much of its power by the early 19th century with
Europeans and Malay chiefs filling the political vacuum. Ultimately, the sultans became
figureheads for other officials and colonial authorities.
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The traditional relationships between political authorities and actors within the wider
Malay economy almost disintegrated from internal and external pressures. The temenggung of
Singapore and other leaders financed and supplied orang laut raiders for income in
compensation for lost revenue. The Sulu sultanate plundered and kidnapped people for sale into
slavery during their seasonal assaults on Malaya. 60 According to an 1825 report, Christiaan van
Angelbeek, Dutch Resident of Riau, one of the Mapar chiefs led orang laut raids. Angelbeek
reported that foreign maritime traders from places such as China and Siam avoided Lingga
because of passport fees levied by the government.61 According the acting resident of Singapore,
Edward Presgrave, in 1826, Sultan Husain possessed little power over a large number of his
subjects. British officials knew that the sultan’s subordinates or associates likely plundered
vessels in the region either with or without his blessing.62 Orang laut communities often broke
with previous masters, such as the sultans, and found leaders more accommodating to their
interests.63 Edward Presgrave, a Singapore official, stated, “… all the orang rayat [orang laut]
may be looked upon as pirates, ready to obey any leader…,” which suggests they followed
leaders who served their interests.64 The important relationship between the sultanate and the
orang laut weakened while merchants called less frequently at the sultans’ ports, which helped
decentralize their authority in the Straits of Malacca. Without a strong commercial and political
relationship with the seafaring community, the sultanates became almost powerless. Seafarers
received more power in deciding whom they obeyed based on their idealized leader.
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Seafarers’ Perspectives on Maritime Authority

Seafarers in the Straits of Malacca region shifted political allegiances based on their
perceived interests, which often meant an allegiance to a local strongman or a foreign power
during the first half of the 19th century. Few accounts of such decision-making processes by
Southeast Asian seafarers survived but Sherard Osborn wrote an in-depth account of his
experiences with his Malay crew in 1838 during his service as a midshipman on the eighteen-gun
corvette Hyacinth. Osborn commanded a forty-eight-foot gunboat with a crew of twenty-five
plus one serang or boatswain. As nobody else spoke English, Osborn depended on his translator
Jamboo, who claimed that much of the crew served time in a Singaporean jail for piracy.65
Jamboo failed to convince Osborn that most of his crewmen were pirates or violent men, but
Jamboo’s comment on the diversity of the crew was likely true. He claimed Sumatra,
Terengganu, and Java as some of their places of origin.66 The serang Jadee was the most
notorious pirate of the group who at one point waved his Iranun keris while shouting at the crew
with great enthusiasm and telling them what great plunder lay in store for them because having
white men on their side assured their victory.67 Jadee proclaimed himself a servant of the same
“Great Rajah” as Osborn.68 The gunboat crew showed a willingness to fight for the British
Crown and risk their lives with the expectation of reward in return for their services because of
the honorability of gaining plunder in Malay seafaring society.
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In the past, Jadee the boatswain followed other leaders and switched loyalties depending
on his various circumstances at the time before sailing with Osborn. Jadee, a Batak from the
interior of Sumatra, became a slave of Sulu raiders who became a warrior. He fought Dutch,
Spanish, and Chinese seafarers for years alongside his Sulu masters, and despite his dislike of
them, he possessed “respect for their enterprise and skill as sea-rovers.” He fought with
considerable success for a raja of Johor who operated out of Singapore where Jadee eventually
settled. When he ran out of money, he returned to the sea as an oarsman until his luck ran out in
a naval engagement with a British man-o-war that utterly defeated his vessel. Despite past
victories over other Europeans, namely Spanish and Dutch vessels, no charms or verses uttered
from the mighty Koran saved him from the British warship. Although Jadee previously sailed
with powerful raja laut, or literally “king of the sea,” none surpassed the British raja laut who
drove many of Jadee’s companions into new lines of work.69 Military prowess earned the
respect of seafarers in the Malay world with British naval forces reaching the top of the pyramid
during this period. For Jadee and other seafarers, the prospect of plunder and serving with the
most powerful was more important than traditional ties to old sultanates.
The opportunism and survival of seafarers meant adapting to new laws and moral codes
during the politically dynamic period of the early 19th century in the southern Straits of Malacca.
While living in Singapore, Jadee participated in peaceful trade but also ran an extortion racket
with Chinese traders at night. His operation ended when a group of victims organized, seized
him, and brought him to the British authorities on charges of piracy. In court, Jadee promised
the adoption of European way of life in fear of execution, which worked as the usually harsh
judge sent him to prison instead. Jadee freed himself after he officially executed a prisoner in the
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absence of the professional executioner. By choice, he worked for the British East India
Company as a pirate catcher.70 Jadee embodied the survivalist ethos of seafarers in the Malay
world by adapting to new codes of conduct and masters when necessary. Even after his
imprisonment by British authorities, he still wished to serve them because of their power.
Jadee’s opportunism reflected the willingness of seafarers and Malay officials of rank to
switch loyalties when they benefitted materially and politically. According the Tufat al-Nafis,
the Iranun princes Raja Merkung and Raja Merasan humiliated the orang laut of the Riau
Archipelago by attacking local shipping and evading capture. Some orang laut, along with
Panglima Raman, leader of the sea people, and a locally born Bugis nobleman named Panglima
Tengkuk consequently joined the Iranun forces. These Iranun and their followers operated from
the Induk River in East Sumatra. In response to their attacks, the Riau-Lingga Kingdom
mobilized thirty penjajaps, a Dutch cruiser, and Galang forces, which defeated the Iranun at
Induk and captured their leaders. Yang di-pertuan Muda Abdul Rahman witnessed one of his
personal attendants, Tengkuk, among the prisoners and ordered his execution before setting foot
on his home soil. Raja Merkung and Panglima Raman also lost their heads while others faced
exile.71 Though punished for their treason, Panglima Tengkuk and the various others displayed
the willingness and ability to betray their kingdom to advance their short-term interests. Contrary
to the paragon of Malay steadfast loyalty, vassals possessed a fair amount of autonomy and
switched political allegiance on occasion when necessary.
Another incident in the north of the Malay Peninsula showed the willingness of vassals to
accept new leaders and vice versa. Nakhoda Udin possessed a sophisticated network with an
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intelligence and logistics apparatus in Penang led by his wife, along with river chiefs who
provided tribute in return for a share of plunder.72 Before Udin expelled him, Tuanku Long
Putch, the brother-in-law of Perak’s sultan, operated from the Kurau River under the Sultan of
Perak’s nominal authority. During this era, the various sultans of Perak found the Kurau chiefs
difficult to control, which permitted the place to become a haven for pirates. Nakhoda Udin
forced Long Putch from Kurau and established it as his piratical base. The Raja of Ligor or
Chao Phrya in 1822 expressed his desire for Governor Phillips of Penang to capture the
“notorious pirate” Nakhoda Udin. However, on 14 January 1827, Captain James Low and his
Sepoys soundly defeated Udin and captured documents 23 miles upstream proving the Chao
Phrya’s support for Nakhoda Udin as the Kurau chief in Perak.73 Such evidence strongly
suggests the willingness of chiefs to find new clients and the willingness of overlords to accept
vassals who once served other rulers. Elites employed pirates to weaken their neighbors by
seizing local commerce and redirect that wealth to themselves and their allies.
Flexibility in selecting masters did not necessarily sacrifice loyalty or zeal for new
masters. When Malay seafarers joined new crews, they became fiercely loyal to their new
masters and brave in the face of danger. Osborn’s crew showed immense zeal for battle during a
chase of an enemy perahu despite their failure in capturing her.74 In a more successful
engagement, the gunboat caught an enemy vessel, and before boarding, Jadee proposed Osborn
remain onboard his vessel because the presence of a white man in the boarding party would
likely mean violent resistance. Osborn remained onboard his vessel and the other crew promptly
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surrendered when boarded by Jadee and other crewmen.75 In another instance, after an exchange
of insults during negotiations, Osborn told Jadee that such conduct would gravely anger Captain
Warren of the Hyacinth or the raja laut. Saddened for days, Jadee offered to run amok with his
crew on the enemy positions, which meant certain death.76 Jadee showed his concern for his
commander’s safety by requesting he stay behind and his devotion to duty by offering his life
because of the mere displeasure he brought to his commander. Such an extreme example of
loyalty demonstrated that although seafarers potentially switched sides on occasion, they
maintained loyalty when in the service of a commander. The importance of loyalty, perhaps a
leftover from the Malacca Sultanate, played a significant role in the perception of honor by
Malay seafarers.
Malay seafarers possessed certain expectations of their leadership and violation of those
expectations often resulted in earning the disdain of the seafarers. The Dutch authorities failed in
gaining Jadee’s and other Southeast Asians’ loyalty because of their treachery and lies to gain
power. Before entering the service of the East India Company, Jadee served a raja of Johor,
almost certainly Temenggung Ibrahim, who possessed a secret refuge around Cape Romania and
was quite a successful leader in plundering the seas and coasts. The raja earned his servants’
loyalty by making them rich, which allowed them to have beautiful wives and sumptuous feasts.
Furthermore, various clerics and famous datuk77 joined the raja and his fleet. Jadee clearly stated
that the fleet engaged in warfare and not piracy, as he perceived it as a legitimate military action
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under this leader.78 A successful leader maintained legitimacy by sharing the spoils of war and
earned the legitimacy of his rule through successful plunder-based warfare.
Malay seafarers likely sought the services of a leader who offered them the opportunity to
increase their social status. Chiefs offered their support to states and elites in exchange not only
for material goods and slaves but also for symbolic rewards and nama. To improve one’s nama
meant receiving increases in official rank titles from the ruler. Raja Laut at times married into
royal families to solidify their relationships and maintain relationships with orang laut. In
Kedah, the laksmana maintained a strong relationship with the monarch throughout much of the
18th century and until the invasion of Kedah to Siam in 1821.79 The lure of new titles and
marriage opportunities provided an incentive for seafarers to serve a particular ruler.
The skill of these seafarers at sea and in repairing their vessel on land showed the
importance of crew self-reliance because they simply possessed few other options without
reliable support from land. Osborn noted the Malay seafarers’ handicraft skills were at least
equal to that of British seamen with similar abilities to improvise solutions in difficult or even
under seemingly impossible circumstances. Aside from regular seafaring ability, the crew
showed proficiency in carpentry and sail making. In one particular instance, the rudder needed
repairs and so the crew created an impromptu tidal dock as effectively as if English shipwrights
worked on it. Shortly thereafter, the crew repaired the gunboat Emerald to a like-new condition.
The quartermaster built Osborn a sampan or boat of twenty-two feet in length as a replacement
of his lost canoe with an expenditure of only a rupee.80 The Malay crew of the Emerald showed
a superb resourcefulness. Their astonishing versatility showed that Malay seafarers needed self78
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reliance as they simply could not always go into port for repairs, especially given the political
situation of the Malay world during the early 19th century. Such skills were also useful to pirates
who lacked a friendly port for repairs of their vessels and access to specialist shipwrights at
dockyards.
If a state pressed too hard on Malay seafarers to the point of being disadvantageous for
the seafarers or acted dishonorably according the local custom, a state risked earning their
animosity regardless of their military and seafaring prowess. Jadee called the Dutch the “bane of
the Malay race” and “false men,” along with many other Malays who detested their presence in
maritime Southeast Asia because of their historical cruelty to them. Dutch taxes and laws drove
them into perahu, while the Dutch hunted them down as pirates.81 The excessive taxation and
laws on seafarers by Dutch authorities showed the limits of Southeast Asians’ tolerance for the
presence of the state. The animosity toward the Dutch for such reasons suggests that the
Malacca Sultanate possessed a less restrictive enforcement of its authority than the future
European powers. Jadee and other seafarers perceived Dutch actions in the region as
dishonorable and destructive to the Malay people, which made them mortal enemies.
Honor for Southeast Asian seafarers meant sticking to a particular unwritten code of
conduct in battle, which reinforced a sense of community and loyalty to the state. One of Jadee’s
stories in particular exemplified such notions as he followed the Raja of Johor into battle. The
raja’s fleet of thirteen perahu fitted out for battle in Singapore and sailed to Patani and later
Borneo with the assistance of two Iranun pilots. The fleet searched for Chinese and Dutch
vessels while proceeding to the Bangka and Belitung islands off eastern Sumatra.82 The fleet
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engaged an Amoy junk, which resisted fiercely with burnt joss-paper, stones, pikes, and boilinghot water. Jadee called them “pigs,” likely for using such tactics and weaponry that prevented an
honorable fight. After three hours of fighting and sustaining several casualties, the fleet planned
a new assault with a ritual performed by holy men, but a Dutch flotilla led by a schooner
intervened to the cheers of the Chinese sailors. The twenty-four hours of rowing and the battle
with the junk tired the Malay seafarers who rowed fiercely to Belitung as Dutch gunboats chased
them and exchanged fire out of striking distance. The Johor seafarers preferred the destruction
of their fleet and hiding in the jungle to surrender, but a datuk sacrificed his perahu to the Dutch
to buy time for the rest of the fleet to escape the onslaught.83 The engagement showed the espirit
de corp of the Johor fleet with their refusal of surrender, self-sacrifice, and commitment in battle
as the seafarers fought bravely with their raja.
The Johor fleet’s fight exemplified the values of seafaring warriors in the service of a raja
as service was glorious when brave seafarers killed their enemies in an honorable battle. The
datuk who sacrificed his perahu received cover fire from other vessels. The Malays brave
enough to stay onboard and fight the attacking Dutchmen fought until they killed enough of them
and escaped or died honorably in battle with the datuk. Despite the brave sacrifice of the datuk
and much of his crew, the Dutch schooner sailed in between the fleet and their objective while
firing its guns on the exhausted fleet. The Johor fleet dispersed to escape the Dutch with a loss
of three perahu while the survivors baled and pumped the water pouring through the shot holes
in their hulls. Even the fighting men assisted in baling the water from their perahu even though
it was beneath their station as it was necessary for survival.84 In this battle, according to the
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Malay perception, the Dutch fought dishonorably by engaging their opponents by ambushing
them in the middle of another engagement, whereas the crew of a perahu sacrificed themselves
for the other vessels in the Johor fleet. In time, the various royal houses no longer floated such
magnificent fleets and lost the support of seafaring warriors as the rajas found other means of
income more acceptable to their colonial overlords.

Abdullah and the Malay Sultanates

During the first half of the 19th century, natives of the Malay Peninsula and other
Southeast Asians rejected the legitimacy of the Johor Sultanate’s authority. Abdullah bin Abdul
Kadir, born in Malacca in 1797, became the intellectual leader of Malays who questioned the
authority of the sultanates during the early 19th century and became a renowned scholar of the
Malay language by age fourteen.85 Abdullah provides one of the few non-elite Malay accounts
from this period and therefore is worthy of such focus. An incident after Sultan Husain ceded
power in Singapore on August 2, 1824, revealed the sultanate’s reliance on force to enforce their
authority. Roughly one month later, twenty-seven beautiful young women fled the bondage of
the sultan to the police station bearing evidence of torture on their bodies with stories too terrible
for Abdullah to record. The sultan starved them and his consort threatened to kill them for fear
they might become the sultan’s other wives. The British resident in Singapore, John Crawfurd,
permitted their escape to new homes, regardless of the inhabitants’ ethnicities, for food and
clothing, much to the chagrin of Sultan Husain who charged Crawfurd as having no right to free
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his slaves.86 Such instances were common in sultanates as the royal household often kept many
young girls and destroyed their lives.87 Such an instance of the behavior by the sultanate
exemplified a general rift between the public of Singapore and the sultan, with the latter doing as
it pleased. Although the direct impact on the seafaring community during this instance remained
unknown, it revealed the sultan’s unchecked power by the early 19th century.
Abdullah wrote of the general discontent within the sultanate because of the royal
family’s behavior. The sultans’ brutality and disgraceful conduct often disgusted their people as
the sultans based their legitimacy on their whims and certainly not public opinion. According to
Abdullah, most Malay sultans by the 19th century were tyrants and only a few were effective as
they often abducted women and children for their own personal use, killed men for little or no
reason, and confiscated property without compensation. They gambled and ingested opium
while possessing debts with no intention of ever paying back their creditors. Abdullah
proclaimed the sultanate’s involvement in plundering the ships of white men and slaughtering
their crews, but also killing Muslims, too. The sultans’ children acted worse than their parents as
they also were usually drug-addicted, gambling womanizers who often resorted to murder and
piracy. Abdullah, nostalgic for the previous more successful sultans of the golden age, lamented
the cruelty and incompetence of various sultanates such as Selangor, Perak, and Kedah, which all
fell into ruin because of their rulers.88 Most people on the Malay Peninsula suffered under the
terrible rule of Malay sultans who based their authority on their own power rather than popular
political support. Generally, the populace distrusted the sultans, along with their spoiled
families, and often served them under force or threats thereof. Those with greater mobility, such
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as seafarers, had the option of seeking a new authority elsewhere. The overall disrespect for the
sultans showed the degradation of the old relationship between seafarers and the Malay states.

Legitimacy and the State in the Straits of Malacca

During the first half of the 19th century, seafarers expected honorable behavior of the
political leadership, such as sultans, off the battlefield. During the blockade of Kedah in 1838, a
Chinese barber reported to British forces of an atrocity after barely escaping with his life from
the town. In Kedah, Tunku Mahomed Typetam89 ordered the massacre of three hundred Siamese
prisoners in revenge for Siamese brutality. His troops pushed their dead bodies into a reservoir
as a message to the Siamese troops. Such actions disgusted the crew of the Emerald, including
Jadee, who declared the actions of Typetam as “unmanly” and that those who raised him acted
differently from the troops in Kedah.90 The reaction by Osborn’s crew showed revulsion to mass
slaughter by the Kedah leadership, which demonstrated an expected code of conduct from
seafarers of their leadership that included mercy on the lives of civilians.
The relationship between the state and seafarers often blurred the line between the
sultans’ official Islamic religious practices and traditional mysticism. The seafaring
community’s perception of spiritual authority of certain leaders reinforced their loyalty to that
individual. Abdullah informs us of the sultans’ indifference concerning the following of Islamic
law and teachings during the early 19th century.91 Traditional mysticism92 survived in Malay
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seafaring as demonstrated by Jadee during a severe squall on the Emerald with Osborn. The
Raja of Johor taught Jadee a ritual for reducing the wind’s power by reciting an incantation while
hitting the lanyards of the mainsail with the vessel’s spoon and vowing to sacrifice roosters. In
this particular instance, Jadee determined that the ritual failed for the first time in his maritime
career.93 The first time he witnessed its power was when the Raja of Johor employed this ritual
known as “Company Sahib.” Afterwards, he saw the wind die down within the hour.94 Jadee
perceived the ritual as effective, which reinforced his admiration for the raja because of his
connection with the supernatural. Ritual reinforced a leader’s legitimacy, but perhaps the loss of
physical power coincided with the perception of a loss of supernatural or spiritual power.
If a ruler failed to rule properly, he risked finding himself without followers as did Sultan
Husain and his heir in Singapore. In splits between a sultan and his chiefs, leaders risked losing
important allies and their followers if they mismanaged Malay politics. Sultan Husain lamented
his subjects’ disobedience: “All my followers are trying to ruin me and bring about my downfall.
None of them has any regard for the privacy of my palace or my powers as a ruler.”95
Temenggung Abdul Rahman with his followers departed for Singapore shortly before Raffles’
arrival because of his dispute the yang di-pertuan of Riau. Years later on Singapore Island,
Tememggung Ibrahim of Telok Belanga and Sultan Ali of Kampong Gelam, the son of Husain,
split over the jurisdiction of Johor. Temenggung Ibrahim previously spent his Straits Settlements
stipend on providing for his followers and paying aboriginal Malays or Jakun for natural goods
such as rattans. During his dispute, his followers, such as Mohamed Salleh bin Perang, remained
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faithful to the temenggung over the sultan.96 Malay leaders required wealth to keep followers
loyal and prevent them from deserting to another chief. Even sultans by this time had no
guarantee of support and loyalty from local Malays.

Merchant Seafarers’ Views on Governance

Merchant seafarers played an important role concerning the success and longevity of
Malay kingdoms, which made their relationship with their rulers important. The kingdoms
depended on the merchants to provide revenue for the royal coffers by sailing into their
respective harbors, which gave merchants considerable influence with the rulers. Merchants not
only provided kingdoms with wealth but also worked in a bureaucratic capacity for the states.
The symbiotic relationship supposedly provided economic growth with protecting the
sovereignty of the kingdoms.97 A strong relationship between merchants and a ruler permitted
economic success in a kingdom. However, this reciprocal relationship meant merchants
possessed immense power and little prevented them from leaving a particular harbor if it was no
longer in their interests to stay.
Malay merchant seafarers’ conceptualization of fairness contributed to expectations from
the government and their relationship with the merchant community. According to an 18thcentury document describing more ideal circumstances, a Malay seafaring merchant by the name
of Nakhoda Makuta decided to settle in Samangka, South Sumatra, after sailing around the
archipelago for some time. He settled there after receiving an invitation from the local leader
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and avoided cheating buyers to prevent the buildup of animosity toward him.98 In Nakhoda
Makuta’s dying words to his only son, he warned against becoming in debt to anyone and that he
should “cut timber in the woods” and “catch the fish in the sea” for sale if he required capital.99
By his death, the local ruler respected Nakhoda Makuta and was beloved by the local Malays
who considered him the merchant chief of the village.100 Nakhoda Makuta selected Samangka,
Sumatra as his home because of economic and political considerations and remained prosperous
through his endeavors and the economic climate. His story showed an ideal merchant’s virtues
of fairness, honesty, and cooperation, along with the importance of the ruler’s respect.
Circumstances in the 19th-century Straits of Malacca as mentioned by Siami showed
aspects of Nakhoda Makuta’s ideals of merchant behavior remained even without their
application. Siami described an incident where a Malay or Bugis nakhoda becomes enraged at a
Chinese merchant who broke his word and failed to pay for his purchases. The nakhoda
attempted to fight the Chinese merchant and almost pulled his dagger until a white merchant told
him to go to the police magistrate to settle the issue. The Chinese merchant received the support
of an English merchant. Siami emphasized the importance of patronage and receiving
compensation before handing over goods.101 The incident showed the importance of honesty in
business dealings with other merchants and the importance of having a patron in dealing with
authorities or having a special relationship with the authorities themselves in order to succeed in
business.
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If a nakhoda found trading in a particular place undesirable, he possessed the right and
the ability to sail to another harbor that offered a better opportunity for prosperity. In the span of
a few days during August 1831, multiple vessels from throughout the archipelago fell victim off
Pulau Tinggi, Johor, to a fleet of twenty-two perahu each with a crew of approximately one
hundred or more and most with double-banked oars. After the loss of three Bugis vessels laden
with sarongs, gold dust, and diamonds, the Chief of Bugis Kampong in Singapore, also a
nakhoda, criticized the local authorities for failing to deal with the piracy problem in contrast
with the Dutch forces and threatened to move elsewhere for better security. In response,
authorities dispatched H.M.S. Crocodile and Cochin with no success in finding the culprits.102 A
nakhoda had the right to select the harbor from which he traded and possessed influence with the
government. Pressuring governments for better security remained an important component of
the relationship between merchants and the state. The competitive environment103 compelled a
successful entrepôt state to keep the merchants content through favorable policies. In this
particular instance, the Bugis nakhoda had enough clout to increase security in the troubled area.
Merchant seafarers questioned the authority of local chiefs to tax shipping if they
believed the chief lacked the right to do so. Asian merchants complained to the Singapore
Chamber of Commerce, which went to the government with the complaint “that native boats
bringing supplies of Gutta [Percha] for sale in Singapore had been forcibly intercepted by the
Tommungung’s [sic] followers…” and that the temenggung of Johor instituted the systematic
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monopolization of gutta percha through threats and extortion.104 The temenggung’s armed men
patrolled the entrances of Singapore harbor and threatened Asian shippers who did not hand over
their gutta percha to them, which resulted in a virtual monopoly for him of the valuable product.
To avoid this extortion, Siak merchants sailed to Malacca to dispose of their gutta percha. In
another incident, the temenggung’s men forcibly purchased between 300 and 400 pikuls of gutta
percha from nine boats from Kampar at $12.5 a pikul,105 when a Chinese merchant had already
bought it for $14 a pikul.106 The temenggung’s purchase of gutta percha at below market rates
and his outright extortion persuaded Malay merchants to ask for help from the Europeandominated chamber to prevent his actions. The seafarers rejected his right to take their cargo
despite his position, publically blamed him for essentially seizing assets away from them, and
questioned the legitimacy of his role in maritime affairs.
The trade growth of Singapore reflected the general indifference of maritime traders to
the Johor Sultanate’s authority as British colonial authorities replaced the old order. Singapore’s
success remained dependent on maritime trade without the support of a significant agricultural or
mining sector during the first years of British rule with the support of Malacca Chinese as
intermediaries between various traders.107 Total trade in Singapore grew dramatically with
import and export totals growing from $11.6 million in 1824 to $18.1 million in 1834.108 While
Sultan Husain still ruled Singapore, 1,454 Asian vessels carried 15,892 tons in 1822 to Singapore
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and 1,519 Asian vessels carried 20,193 tons the next year.109 Despite his loss of power, 1,886
Asian vessels carrying 58,810 tons entered Singapore in 1825 and 1,614 such craft arrived there
carrying 72,172 tons of goods.110 The relationship authority of the state and the Maritime
Southeast Asian seafarer as of 1825 did not depend on the authority or legitimacy of sultans but
that of the British colony of Singapore, which continued its trade with the archipelago.
Therefore, seafarers mostly cut off the traditional sultans from their old source of power through
their decisions to trade with colonial powers instead.
Many seafaring merchants grew weary of their poor treatment at the hands of Malay
rulers and operated more out of their economic interest than that of the various Malay sultanates.
According to a colonial report, “The Native Traders are timid from [previous] oppression, and
any check upon their [freedom to] voluntary visits would in all probability cause them to less
frequent [Singapore], and destroy the confidence and freedom with which they now
approach.”111 Asia traders sailed to Singapore on their own volition and disliked the manner in
which Malay rulers coerced the traders into their anchorages because it impeded their economic
interests and freedom of navigation. Such merchants preferred sailing to places that offered
them the freedom to conduct business for themselves, rather than for the interests of the local
ruler.
Seafaring merchants in the Straits of Malacca area looked for fairness in trading and
living in a harbor or town. The relationship between a monarch and the merchants of the country
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was critical to its success, with each side having particular responsibilities. The merchants, in
accordance with their own interests and values, moved to new locations if they deemed the local
ruler too ineffective or oppressive. If a ruler was unjust, merchants potentially questioned his
legitimacy and sought the assistance of other political players if necessary to protect their
interests.

Conclusion

Southeast Asian seafarers adapted to the socio-economic and political changes for the
survival of their way of life, but even in desperate times, they had standards before finding work
elsewhere. Before becoming a loyal servant, a seafarer expected a return for his efforts, an
honorable leader, and often some sort of spiritual vindication for the loyalty. The relationship
between the seafarer and the state in the Straits of Malacca underwent immense changes between
the 15th century and the early 19th century.

Southeast Asian states adapted their legalities to

their current political situations, but respect for the law declined to the point where centralized
authorities often became mere figureheads.
Abdullah and Jadee, both sympathetic to British authority, expressed their admiration for
British colonial power and its overall system. The sultanates disgusted Abdullah the intellectual,
for whom piratical habits inhibited the Malay world’s economic, intellectual, and spiritual
growth. The martial prowess of the British warships impressed Jadee, a former pirate, who
joined British arms and obeyed a new master at the expense of the old rulers. Their opinions
may not be precisely representative of Malay public opinion but that is not as important as the
overall economic and political shifts in 19th-century Southeast Asia that occurred with the shifts
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of political relationships of Southeast Asian seafarers to the various states there. The saga of the
Lady Harriet Frances symbolized the breakdown of regional centralized authority as a raja
organized the plundering of a British vessel and carried it out with a reasonable amount of
success. Much of the former crew of the vessel joined the raja’s ranks rather than being victims
and without much of a punishment from the raja. Although the raja’s men ignored centralized
authority from Aceh and elsewhere onboard the Emily, they certainly respected Emily’s
firepower. Daviot was fortunate enough to live another day, but many other seafarers were not
so lucky.

56

Figure 2. A Malay seafarer.112
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CHAPTER 2:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MALAY KERAJAAN

In the days of Singapore when Temenggung Abdul Rahman ruled, the people there lived in utter
poverty. Panglima Besar Encik Salleh, Abdul Rahman’s closest minister and grandfather of
Mohamed Salleh bin Perang, followed him to Singapore when fleeing Riau following a dispute
with the yang di-pertuan there.113 When Raffles and Farquhar landed in Singapore for the first
time, the village had fewer than a hundred small houses at the mouth of the Singapore River.
The temenggung’s house, located between the straits and the river, was the sole large home on
the island. Upriver, thirty orang laut families resided in boats and huts. Shortly after Raffles
arrived, ten people presented him and his men with rambutan and other fruit.114 The eyewitness
account of the landing by a local showed the poverty of the inhabitants living on the island.
Mohamed Salleh described his life in Singapore as difficult for his family despite their
high rank. Born in 1841 at Telok Belanga to a family of ethnic Bugis, he was the son of Perang,
a fisherman whose name translates from Malay to English as “war.” Although they claimed
high rank and descent from servants of the Johor-Riau-Lingga rulers since the fall of Malacca,
they struggled to survive at Singapore. He recounted how his mother suffered from poverty
when he reached seven years old. Even Temenggung Ibrahim was impoverished even though he
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received a stipend from the British government because he needed to support his followers.
Some of them worked in the jungles with the Jakun to acquire forest products, while his mother
worked on decorating various articles such as pillows and shoes. Both parents received
inconsistent income, which made acquiring even food and clothing difficult.115 Circumstances
eventually changed for his family in later years, but these accounts show the difficulty for
Malays living in Singapore for the first few decades of the 19th century.
Furthermore, Salleh’s account reveals some aspects of the Malay political economy in
Singapore. In order for a chief such as Abdul Rahman or his son Ibrahim to maintain followers,
they needed to distribute their income to support their attendants and other followers even if it
meant a substantial drop in their standard of living. The chief’s relationship with the Jakun
permitted the acquisition of forest products for sale to merchants in Singapore and ultimately
elsewhere. Perang, although described as a fisherman, likely engaged in robbery on the seas as a
supporter of the temenggung. “For at the time when the English had just opened up Singapore
Island, pirates were scattered everywhere like chickens, lying in wait all around the islands near
Singapore,” Salleh explained.116 The Malay kerajaan system came under great pressure during
the 19th century, which forced the rulers to adapt or fall into ruin. Piracy became an option to
alleviate the various problems encountered by Malay rulers but at a potential cost to their
relationship with European governments. Salleh wrote of the desperation for Malays during the
early years of Singapore as a British colony, which represented broader problems for the states in
the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century.

115
116

Sweeney, Reputations Live On, 22, 51, 74-75.
Ibid., 83.

59
Malay kingdoms during the 19th century generally possessed an economic system in
which only limited groups of people possessed the lawful right to trade peacefully because the
ruling elite desired to keep power through a series of economic restrictions such as monopolies
that stifled political competition. Those caught transgressing such restrictions suffered
immensely and lost their possessions, which forced them into poverty or resistance against unjust
actions by moving to the margins of society or another nation altogether. Entrepreneurs in the
region usually needed to obey the dictates of political authorities or risk losing their enterprises.
As the 19th century progressed, the Malay states’ hold on maritime traffic slipped and the royalty
began to lose an important aspect of their power base. Conversely, the local chiefs and headmen
gained more power in the years before direct colonial domination.

Kerajaan Economics and the Limited Access Order

The Malay states developed their own economic system based largely on maritime trade,
which various Malay rulers attempted to control. Malay rulers employed “kerajaan economics,”
or “kingdom economics,” to gain followers by amassing wealth. However, the way in which
wealth translated into political power made wealthy people a potential political threat to a Malay
ruler’s power base. Therefore, to preserve the power of a ruler, the ruling elite needed to either
bring the wealthy into their power base or deprive them of their wealth or lives if necessary.117
Kerajaan economics serves as a framework for understanding the political economy of the
Malay state along with the way in which rulers made decisions concerning maritime trade and
the preservation of their political power. Previous material on the concept requires some
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expansion, especially on the topic of maritime commerce in its relations to political power
because of its importance to Malay society.
The kerajaan economics framework also works well within the limited access order
(LAO) framework developed to understand better the political economy and societal forces of
the nations of the Global South. The framework attempts to explain how various societies
attempt to limit or prevent mass violence through economic policies. A limited access order or
LAO is when the political system of a middle-income or lower country attempts to limit
organized violence through the distribution of rents to limit the violence caused by powerful
individuals or organizations. When these powerful organizations receive rents or particular
economic interests, the political system may rein in violence through inter-organization
coordination and making actions more predictable by threatening to attack each other’s
privileges. Formation of a system of privileges becomes preferable to mutual disarmament
because neither side trusts each the other. However, such an arrangement prevents the formation
of other organizations.118 Kerajaan economics appear remarkably similar to an LAO in that the
Malay ruling elite stays in power through the distribution of privileges.
In fragile or basic LAOs, political figures have direct control over economic assets,
which form their rents and support their political goals. The distribution of rents, a form of
buying off political opponents, also made their interests visible and actions more predictable.
The formation of rents through exclusive privileges held a dominant coalition together through
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agreements on the distribution of those privileges. These privileges form rents119 through most
people’s limited access to enforcement, which formed the interests of the various organizations
within the dominant coalition. A fragile LAO is a society with economic and political
organizations that are not clearly distinguishable, with few exceptions, and all organizations have
a violence capacity with little or no distinction between the military and civilians. In a basic
LAO, the organizations within the dominant coalition can use violence, which remains the
principal way of obtaining rents. The dominant coalition remains fragile with organizations
demanding greater access to resources with shifts in economic and political circumstances.120
At times, LAOs faltered because of the inability to maintain peace or monopolies, resulting in
extensive warfare. The dominant coalition in a weaker LAO has direct access to rents and its
organizations possess the ability to inflict violence. Such societies had a high risk of falling into
armed conflict, which deprived them of peace and wealth-generating opportunities.
The Malay system of succession potentially strengthened chiefs at the expense of
centralized authority during the 19th century until the advent of colonialism. Although the power
of each sultan varied for each state and generation, according to the Malay tradition of
succession, chiefs selected the new sultan from a number of men of royal blood with patrilineal
descent from a sultan. A candidate required a combination of a strong claim to the crown
through lineage and receiving support from a majority of the chiefs according to Malay tradition.
The Malay system did not strictly follow the rules of primogeniture. Malay chiefs, as they did in
Perak during the mid-19th century, often preferred a weak ruler whom they could control to
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maintain a favorable balance between chiefs and the royal household.121 Such rights potentially
gave chiefs significant power in shaping the level of centralization for a Malay state. Chiefs
likely threw their support behind a candidate who promised them sufficient rewards such as
economic rents. Conversely, the chiefs might select a weak sultan and persuade him to give
concessions afterwards or protect entrenched interest. The traditional Malay succession system
created frequent conflicts over the crown but the system endured for centuries. The rules of
succession permitted chiefs to exert influence on the monarchy to bend the politics of the country
to their advantage through the decentralization of power.
The leadership of the Malay states during the 19th century comprised of various factions
that vied for power, which for some claimants included the possibility of becoming the ruler.
The elite in Malay states often sought the formation of multiple lines of succession that enabled
chiefs and the elite to select a suitable candidate of royal blood for the next ruler. The desire for
rotation between various lines to share the position of the ruler by the chiefs often conflicted with
the desire of a ruler for his male descendant to rule the country. However, rotation usually
prevailed except in cases when the previous ruler was exceptionally powerful, which in turn led
to royal lines intermarrying with each other to contain the number of acceptable heirs to a limited
number of candidates.122 The ruling elite in Malay states comprised of various factions
delineated by each faction’s claim to the throne by means of their strongest claimant.
The established elite sought to legitimize its hold on power in the Malay state and
exclude others from replacing them by the strength of their claim to the throne. The dominant
faction within the ruling coalition sought to legitimize their monopoly on certain privileges by
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emphasizing the importance of being a close descendant of previous rulers, along with having
royal lineage on both the patrilineal and matrilineal sides. Various factions attempted to
strengthen their claim to the ruler’s title through marriages and political alliances.123 Those not
belonging to the ruling elite possessed virtually no chance of gaining official political power in
Malay states. A Malay rakyat rarely married into the ruling elite and rarely entered the elite
through the merits of his or her actions in service of the state.124 The dominant faction within a
ruling elite at times managed to keep the office of the ruler within their ranks, while in turn the
ruling elite usually kept the rakyat from entering their ranks and therefore kept the privilege of
ruling within the ranks of a few Malay families.

The Kerajaan Maritime Revenue System

The Malay kingdoms adapted over the centuries to the changing economic and political
climate depending on its strength and relationship with merchants. In order to collect taxes, the
various Malay kingdoms required sufficient followers and vessels to maintain its authority.
Oftentimes, the means in which the kingdoms received income reflected its interest and
relationship with the local colonial power. The Dutch monopoly system reserved a place for
Malay shippers and the rulers through guaranteed pricing that heavily restricted the options for
growers and miners, along with some of their shipping counterparts at risk of confiscation of
cargo and arrest of crew. Western traders and the British East India Company’s free trade
system added great pressure to the old Dutch system and eventually collapsed from internal and
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external pressures. The free trade system gave greater leverage initially to local traders but also
contributed to other problems that threatened the Malay kerajaan system. Kerajaan economics,
like most if not all political economies, adapted to fit with each era to ensure its survival.
The state possessed the important right of taxation over vessels sailing in its territorial
waters. The Malay state taxed the cargo by the eight divisions in the hold, along with the
number of sails, with one division for every two sails of the topsails or one rattan bundle for
every two sails. However, if the nakhoda already paid the necessary duties, the nakhoda needed
not pay the tax. In subsection thirteen, the state reserved further rights of taxation in subsection
thirteen of the maritime codes:
a) The penalty for evading a patrol-boat at sea is that all on board the ship, men, women,
and children, freemen and slaves pay a fee in lieu of slavery.
b) A country at war can levy a toll on merchant vessels. The levying of this toll is
comparable to the enforcing of a blockade by patrol-boats at sea, and the penalties are
the same.125
The state possessed more power at sea in times of war with the right of collecting fees from
vessels in its waters. Rather than the enslavement of passengers and crew, the payment of
customs duties became a sufficient punishment for evading royal vessels. The law codes
revealed the importance of maritime commerce to the strength of the state through the collection
of revenue, along with the power the state theoretically possessed along the waterways within its
domain.
Undang-Undang Melaka also possessed rules concerning tax collection from trading
vessels and market regulations that reinforced the power of the state. In the overall hierarchy of
the Malay Sultanate, the nakhoda was clearly subordinate to the government as it forced taxation
on him. Failure in complying with the sultans’ fees meant a severe punishment:
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Regarding a Sea-Captain who avoids customs duties: if he returns to the country again,
the law is that either (his goods) shall be confiscated or he shall be fined twice the
customs duties, (this is) because he has twice entered the country, and furthermore he did
outwit the high dignitaries and the harbormaster of the country (and) his conduct was
uncivilized. (None) but the ruler can grant him (the Sea-Captain) royal pardon and that
only at the intercession of the Harbormaster.126
This subsection set a strict ban on smuggling but also clearly stated that the nakhoda deserved
punishment on the grounds that he was foolish enough to return to the country he cheated and
that his conduct was “uncivilized” as it weakened the state. Widespread practice of tax evasion
threatened not only the stability of the kingdom but also civilization itself as the state maintained
order at sea and therefore only the sultan possessed the power for pardoning such as serious
crime. Maritime customs duties were critical to the civilized state as it connected the latter to
commerce in the region. In another subsection, the sultanate also regulated trade and mediated
disputes between merchants for the sake of fairness in commercial dealings. Masters of
seagoing vessels, regardless of their size and type, answered to the syahbandar whose duties also
included the regulation of weights, measures, and the overall marketplace. Furthermore, the
official also adjudicated disputes between traders, violent or otherwise, regardless of the reason
for it.127 In the traditional recorded law codes of the Malay Peninsula, seafarers ignored the
sultanate’s taxes and regulation at their own peril and risked the future use of a port if they
evaded taxation. With assurances of fair treatment and royal protection in exchange for customs
duties, the relationship between seafarers and Malay sultans remained cordial so long as they
maintained that balance.
The V.O.C. or Dutch East India Company implemented a commercial system that
permitted the sultanates under its influence to gain an income through trade as in previous years
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but through a highly restrictive political and economic system. The monopolistic system gave a
role to the local governments and traders, but the V.O.C. absorbed most of the risk and the
reward. A Malay merchant had the ability to reserve a crop or mineral in advance for a fixed
price, purchase the goods, and transport it to the local ruler. The merchant exclusively sold the
product to the sultan for a fixed price who in turn exclusively sold the product to the V.O.C. In
turn, local rulers stipulated a monopoly of their own where the V.O.C. promised not to purchase
the product elsewhere, as was the case with the Sultan of Bantam and pepper.128 This system
tied local rulers to the V.O.C. by ensuring they received a large portion of their income through
the company. Much of the archipelago’s political economy remained largely dependent on
maritime trade during the V.O.C. era because the company needed the help of local rulers and
merchants to bring products to market because they lacked the labor, capital, and commercial
connections.
The V.O.C. had similar arrangements within the Malay Peninsula in the years before the
first British settlement at Pulau Pinang in 1786. The Dutch in Perak possessed a monopoly of
tin, which resulted in local Malays shipping tin at $32 a bahar or 428 pounds or around $10 for
each pikul. The Dutch there built a small stockade to enforce the monopoly, but the development
of George Town, Prince of Wales Island, otherwise known as Pinang or Penang, resulted in a
new market for locals. The Dutch officials lost the ability to compel local traffic to sell them
their tin exclusively.129 The V.O.C. created a similar policy with Selangor in which it compelled
the local sultan to trade exclusively with the company in Malacca. Every year, the perahu
emerged from the rivers Klang and Selangor to sail for Malacca with an estimated annual 2,000
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pikul. The trade decreased with the new British colony on Pulau Pinang because traders sailed
there instead of Malacca. In 1818, a British agent arranged a deal in which the English East
India Company received 1,500 pikul of tin annually at Selangor for $43 per bahar of 400
pounds.130 Under the monopoly system, Malayan kingdoms received income through the sale of
tin to the Europeans, which left space for Malay shipping to operate.
The various Malay kerajaan employed monopolies and trade restrictions as a means to
ensure it possessed sufficient funds. According to John Crawfurd, most states in Insular
Southeast Asia employed a monopoly system to collect revenues. Rulers decided with which
merchants they traded and therefore foreigners whom they permitted to trade within their
territory. A ruler offered trading privileges to favored foreign merchants that permitted them to
trade with subjects of that state, which saved them much expense.131 If a foreign merchant
wanted the right to trade, the merchant needed to offer the local ruler a gift. To circumvent
kerajaan monopolies, the merchant needed to gain favor or offer a concession of some kind.
Monopolies permitted rulers to purchase local goods cheaply and sell them at higher prices than
in an open market. With regular duties on imports and exports seldom existing in Malay states,
their rulers gathered income through their status as the biggest, if not the only, merchant in their
state.132 Internal trade via rivers was easier to regulate than oceanic trade because the rulers
needed to control the mouth and the river, whereas regulating oceanic trade required a large
naval presence.133 Monopolies existed as a means for Malay states to gather sufficient funds for
their operation. Kerajaan economic policies limited the abilities of private merchants to trade
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with foreigners and required connections to the governing elite for the right privileges. The
trading elite, with their position secured through monopolies, represented the political elite and
their allies.
The maritime forces under a sultanate received special privileges in exchange for
upholding the monarch’s power. The Kedah Sultanate established a system of economic and
social privileges for the raja laut or “sea lords” and their orang laut followers who patrolled the
sea routes into the 19th century. The sea lords effectively operated much of Kedah’s royal navy,
which permitted them, as in Johor, to sit at the royal court. The laksmana became a power
position with its close familial connection with the monarch as with other Malay kingdoms.134
Sea lords in Kedah developed timber-falling operations for the export of lumber and had other
privileges such as fishing rights and rights concerning forest goods and the pearl industry at one
point. In times of war, sea lords received rights concerning plundered goods and prisoners.
During the 18th century, the laksmana was among the few subjects in Kedah permitted to trade
internationally and own vessels for such purposes. Other privileges for him included managing
bird’s nest production areas and a joint monopoly of the opium trade with the sultan. The sea
lords collected tolls from vessels at sea and for the tin trade at ports, which permitted safe
passage for traders. In collecting tolls, they received a portion with the rest going to the treasury.
If the ruler commanded, the sea lord provided protection for the transport of goods and people.135
Special maritime privileges permitted an alliance between seafaring leaders by offering
incentives for supporting the ruler and securing the waterways.
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Of course, the weak political control over the islands ensured that maintaining such a
monopolistic system was impossible. Both Malay men and women engaged in regular peaceful
industries, agriculture, and the collections of Straits produce or naturally occurring products in
the region such as sago, agar-agar, and sea cucumbers. Throughout the various islands in the
Riau-Lingga Archipelago, they sold the Straits produce directly to Chinese merchants on their
annual voyage to Singapore and the archipelago.136 This was smuggling because it circumvented
the royal monopolies and undermined the revenue system of kerajaan economics. To avert such
problems, rulers placed their palaces at maritime chokepoints that forced traders to sail through
spaces where patrolling vessels could more easily intercept them. Such actions reveal that the
sea peoples and others of the archipelago defied royal authority when it was in their interest.
Malay chiefs, usually lacking the necessary abilities such as arithmetic to conduct the
day-to-day business of ruling, resorted to the employment of Indians acquainted with
mathematics to run each government’s commercial affairs. According to John Anderson, “The
Revenues of all the Malay Princes arise from the profits on a restrictive Commerce in general,
managed by a Malabar, who acquires influence in consequence of the command of Cash…” and
these “Malabar” or other Indians use the profits of government commerce to gain political
advantages.137 Anderson, who saw these officials as corrupt, noted Kedah, benefitted from
having no such agent and thrived in the years with revenues of 100,000 rupees per annum.138
The employment of these agents demonstrated the restrictiveness and inefficiency of the Malay
kingdoms during the early 19th century and that rulers employed outsiders to protect their hold on
power, while the outsiders themselves often used state wealth for personal political gain.
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The most notorious of these merchant officials during this era was Abdul Kadir, the
servant of Sultan Husain of Johor. Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, a Malacca-born Indian,
achieved great influence and power over Sultan Husain at the expense of the Malay ministers
who received less attention from the ruler. Contrary to the advice of his people and Samuel
Bonham, a British official, the sultan refused to remove Abdul Kadir from his court, despite the
“disgraceful and unsavoury tales about the Sultan became such common knowledge among all
races in Singapore and Malacca.”139 Eventually, Singapore Malays became so desirous of killing
him that the royal family secreted him to Malacca in a woman’s garb in a vessel owned by Baba
Hok Guan. In June 1834, Sultan Husain and his family sailed for Malacca to remain near Abdul
Kadir.140 Although Abdul Kadir was an extreme case, Malay rulers found it necessary to
maintain the support of their followers, especially government ministers, to maintain a strong
political base of support. Compromising such a coalition had the potential to force a ruler to flee
or become too feeble to govern effectively and therefore the ruler needed to balance his political
base of support between various factions and leaders to maintain his power.
In conducting commerce, the ruling elite possessed critical advantages sanctioned by
Malay tradition over other segments of society. A local ruler often received revenue from tolls
from maritime traffic on a river or farmed out the revenues to a merchant. Malay tradition
exempted princes from paying such taxes, which gave them a sound commercial advantage.141
Rivers provided the most efficient form of transportation in the pre-colonial era throughout the
Malay Peninsula. Without a degree of centralized authority, any chief along the river could
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impose tolls. In one such instance, To’ Silawatang levied tolls along a river to obtain money
without permission from a ruler. However, a Mr. Irving, a British colonial official, explained to
him that collecting levies without permission from the ruler was “nothing less than piracy.” He
warned Silawatang, “I am not saying you are a pirate, but if it were true… you would certainly
be sentenced to hang.”142 Silawatang responded, “What am I to do? I have lost face because
four or five of my men have been killed and several others wounded, and I have got no
money.”143 In the constant need for funds to maintain prestige, local chiefs established tolls to
gather revenue, which in turn made river commerce more difficult for merchants. Royalty, of
course, maintained trading privileges that made payment of such tolls unnecessary, which
increased their economic advantages in commerce.
Organizations within the ruling elite or dominant coalition in the Malay kerajaan often
employed a rent system through trade monopolies to keep the ruler in power in defense against
vast challenges. The Sultan of Kedah possessed monopolies for his income, aside from duties on
shipping, cattle, and slaves, concerning the trade and produce of his country’s tin mines. 144
According to Councillor Muntinghe, the chief Dutch official for Palembang and Bangka, the
Sultan of Lingga received the sole trading rights with the orang laut who sold him low-price
tripang, agar-agar, and the other sea products they collected, which the sultan then sold to
merchants at a much higher price.145 The various sultans likely distributed the profits from the
mine rents to his supporters or gave them important positions. Kedah and Lingga, the most
142

Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah, The Voyages of Mohamed Ibrahim Munsyi, trans. Amin Sweeney and Nigel
Phillips (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 53.
143
Ibid., 53-54.
144
Anderson, Political and Commercial Considerations Relative, 153-154.
145
Great Britain House of Commons, Account and Papers: Thirty Volumes Piracy: Slave Trade (1851), Google
Play, https://play.google.com/books/reader?printsec=frontcover&output=reader&id=JZMAAAAcAAJ&pg=GBS.PA62, 66-67.
Sea cucumber and a type of seaweed.

72
prestigious of the Malay kingdoms, possessed a monopolistic economy during the early 19th
century that centralized, at least temporarily, the wealth of these states in the hands of the
monarch. Such policies made it more difficult for potential challengers to obtain the resources
necessary to establish the ruling elite or dominant coalition.
Other Malay states possessed similar policies that centralized foreign trade in the hands
of the ruling elite, which suggests the dominant coalition distributed rents to maintain peace
between various factions. George Windsor Earl sailed to Kelantan and anchored there on 22
March 1835 only to find that the sultan already gave away his gold dust and dollars to the
Siamese who demanded it as tribute. He arrived in Terengganu on 9 May and traded with the
secretary of the sultan and other Malays. The monarch there had quite limited power with the
aristocracy deposing the previous sultan for overreaching his power. The sultan and the local
elite formed an economic union or sort of company to monopolize the foreign trade of the state.
No subject outside this cartel had the right to trade directly with foreigners. All goods, including
basics such as rice, went first through the cartel before the other subjects bought it.146 Malay
sultanates formed LAOs with rents that often focused on monopolizing foreign trade and
distributing it among themselves to the disadvantage of everyone else.
These monopolistic policies limited the number of Malay seafarers engaged in shipping
goods to and from Singapore and exacerbated local trading conditions. According to the
Singapore Free Press, “…these articles [gold dust, tin, and pepper] of its produce [East Coast of
Malaya] are almost entirely imported by Chinese pukats-- a comparatively small portion of the
trade being in the hands of Malays themselves.” The paper ascribed the cause of this loss to the
“wretched policy which prevails in all these petty native states, where the Rajah himself is
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generally the principal trader, and almost always a monopolist.”147 The monopolistic policies set
by the various Malay kingdoms limited the opportunities for Malay seafarers and damaged their
abilities to find work at sea by trade. Instead, Chinese seafarers and merchants took advantage of
the Malay monopolistic system to make up for the trades left unexploited.
Without a powerful naval force to enforce the demands of the kerajaan as in the Malacca
Codes and the impracticality of any kerajaan controlling the shipping industry, the Malay
kingdoms had difficulty in coercing or persuading shipping to come to its ports over others. The
Singapore Free Press goes on to explain the problems of implementing such policies during the
1830s without backlashes. Kelantan adopted a “more liberal system of trade” that attracted
nakhoda and shipping from elsewhere. Their sultan probably likely realized the need to attract
commerce given how Siamese tribute demands left him under financial duress. This policy
placed pressure on other states to change their economic policies. The bendahara of Pahang
tried imposing a strict personal trade monopoly on his state but such an effort backfired with
Chinese miners going on strike with most of them later fleeing. Such policies damaged his
interests to the extent that he imposed heavy duties in lieu of such an extensive monopoly.
According to one report, duties on opium increased to $100 per chest.148 Without sufficient
power, the Malay kingdoms failed to enforce monopolies as was the case with Pahang. Instead,
lowering duties or liberalizing trade attracted commerce effectively.
If a foreign merchant wished to conduct trading in the Malay states during the mid-19th
century, they usually conducted their trade with the local ruler. In traveling to the Malay states,
American merchants occasionally encountered difficulties in conducting trade with locals. On 5
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June 1850, the bark Ceres from Salem in the United States arrived in Siak for the purpose of
purchasing pepper. When Captain Silver and George F. Putnam went ashore, Putnam observed,
“They were very kind and obliging to us we had a long talk with the Rajah [sic] but he had no
Pepper to sell us.” With the Raja of Siak not able to sell the Americans pepper, they possessed
probably no other options to conduct significant business in Siak. He also recorded, “The men
flocked around us and they seemed very glad to see us. The men go well armed they carry a
[keris] … and a small dagger in their sash around the waist.” The locals even provided Silver
and Putnam with coconut milk.149 The local Malay men had no fear of foreigners in this instance
but rather greeted them with generosity and kindness. The account suggests the prevalence of
violence within Siak by the number of armed men but they did not direct violence against
Western traders during their visit usually. The lack of pepper suggests the limitations of the
Malay economic system in meeting foreign demands for the good.
In 1870s Perak, the system of granting privileges to royal favorites was in full force with
large sections of the economy and territory going to them. The descendants of royalty or anak
raja who bore the title “raja” demanded the state provide for their lifestyles for which they
usually received authority over territory or industry that enabled them to collect taxes.
Sometimes the raja received rights over a mine from which he received a portion of the tin or
other metal from the miners. They often squeezed as much wealth as possible from inhabitants
of their lands. High-ranking officials based their political support of family members and others
by doing their bidding in exchange for access to wealth and the aforementioned economic
privileges. Less powerful individuals employed similar systems of providing support for
retainers, debtor bondsmen, and slaves. Wage labor was a rarity in the Malay economic system
149

Phillips Library, Journal from New York to Sumatra-Canton, George F. Putnam, Log 656 1850C.

75
and taxes were quite irregular, which distinguished the Malay system of the time from colonial
models.150 Perak operated as a LAO, which resulted in the diversion of economic assets for the
purpose of political stability. The system of economic privileges enabled the functioning of the
state in the place of a wage system employed in colonial governments.
The Malay kingdoms developed economic problems during the 19th century that
disrupted its maritime political economy and forced them to rely more on land-based enterprises.
The development of economic liberalism and the introduction of new organizations, particularly
Chinese ones, threatened to unravel the status quo in the Malay Peninsula. According to
Anthony Webster, free trade policies created many economic problems within the Malay states.
British commerce in the Malay states had a destabilizing effect on the local economies because
of free trade policies and the British merchants’ unwillingness to pay high prices in Malay
markets caused by local monopolies. Such practices exacerbated unrest in these states, resulting
in internal conflict.151 Merchants played the states off each other in attempting to obtain lower
prices in commercial dealing with rulers. Ultimately, the maritime character of the Malay
kingdoms diminished for a variety of reasons not yet fully understood despite being the subject
of research for a number of historians.
With the establishment of free trade in Singapore, monopolistic policies became more
difficult to implement in Malay states because of the increased independence of merchants.
During the 1860s, in Tanjung Puteri, currently Johor Baharu, the temenggung created a policy
that all maritime traffic heading from Johor with produce from his lands had to go through that
port for the purpose of registering cargoes. These policies likely intended to give enterprises in
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Tanjung Puteri with storage facilities for gambier, people likely with connections to the ruler, a
virtual monopoly over trade and made conducting business significantly more inconvenient for
producers. Under pressure, almost certainly from the Straits Settlements government and
merchants, the temenggung rescinded the order and established six ports for the registration of
cargoes in his territory.152 The establishment of free trade policies in Singapore and its
establishment as a base for Chinese merchants were largely independent of Malay authority,
which weakened the Malay rulers’ ability to maintain monopolistic policies in the mode of
kerajaan economics.
Malay states found themselves in competition with the free trade policies of the Straits
Settlements and elsewhere, which made them uncompetitive economically. Despite the
advantages of free trade policies, the Straits Settlements found themselves unable to capitalize
enough on their commerce to balance the colony’s budget. The Supreme Government in India
subsidized the Straits Settlements, which permitted them to maintain free trade policies at the
expense of other states in the region that lacked such deficit-spending capabilities.153 Free trade
worked through minimal taxation of commerce, which made financing the government
extraordinarily difficult if not impossible without outside assistance. Malay rulers suffered
because they found themselves in a race to the bottom concerning revenue, lacking the ability to
maintain large deficits without the expectation of them paying back.
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Malays, Political Power, and Oppression

For certain Malays, rather than the early Straits Settlements run by the British East India
Company as being a model for the liberal notions of fairness, equality, and justice, the colonial
government at times continued aspects of the Malay system of governance or provided them with
an alien form of governance which they poorly understood. Province Wellesley near Penang,
rather than being an oasis of good governance on the latest European models, operated as a
fusion of the Malay kerajaan and European state structure. The corruption and overall economic
system in Province Wellesley revealed the resilience of the kerajaan economic system even
when the nominal ruler was European. Many Malays had great difficulty in petitioning for the
addressing of their grievances because they lacked the funds or social status to gain the attention
or the action of the state, either the Straits Settlements or a Malay kerajaan, in many
circumstances.
The governance of Province Wellesley in the early years of its existence showed the
resilience of the Malay political economy despite being under British authority. Malays often
took a different perspective on British authority by ascribing more power to the women within
the elite circles than Europeans usually did. According to Oamut, a Malay friend of Thomson,
“The government of the English is odil [sic] (just) their judges neither take bribes nor flattery;
but here it is only an English government in name. The nonia is real rajah (ruler) [sic].”154
Oamut once held some power within the backrooms of the East India Company as a constable in
Province Wellesley for helping capture a notorious pirate named Che Mat at Sungai Seakup.
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However, he resigned from his post after his son-in-law committed a grave offence against the
nonya or native mistress of the official155 in charge of Province Wellesley. 156 Oamut proclaimed
the existence of a shadow government in Province Wellesley where Malays in the backrooms of
power circumvented the supposed structure of colonial rule, where governance looked more akin
to the kerajaan system than that of an ideal British colonial system.
Despite the presence of British rule in Province Wellesley, Malays managed to gain much
power through the manipulation of the local official. In doing so, the province appeared in
certain ways much like the Malay state that existed beforehand. The nonya gave her relatives
throughout the government and judicial offices who acted as her spies and received their
adequate compensation for their comfortable lifestyles through bribes and abuse of power. Such
actions resulted in the unjust removal of people from the richest lands in Penaga, Province
Wellesley, and their replacement with the nonya’s brother. Thomson verified Oamut’s
observations and added that permitting officials to take native mistresses reduced their stature in
the eyes of Malays and resulted in the cruel oppression of people living in the lands they
administered. However, eventually these practices disappeared in attempts to deal with
corruption.157 Such actions created many grievances with the local Malay population, who had
few options in turn. Corruption and unlawful displacement of locals through the powers of the
nonya showed how Malays managed to gain power in the colonial system through unjust means.
In certain instances, Malays had great difficulty in peacefully resolving the issues
concerning their welfare and offences committed against them. Siami wrote of how even a
nakhoda, wronged by a Chinese merchant, lacked the means to address to resolve their dispute.
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Even though the nakhoda brought the merchant to court and received a favorable ruling from the
magistrate, he lacked the financial means to keep the merchant in debtors’ prison even if the
government returned funds to him on the payment by the Chinese merchant. The magistrate
instructed the nakhoda to pay for the merchant’s living expenses until he paid him or else the
court would discharge the debt. The nakhoda preferred accepting the Chinese merchant’s goods
such as cloth rather than wait indefinitely and put the funds in hopes that the merchant would
somehow pay him. The police magistrate agreed and dismissed the case, which ensured the
nakhoda no longer had the right to gain a hearing on the case or an appeal.158 The nakhoda
lacked the means to send the merchant to the debt prison to obtain the debt owed to him for the
sale of his goods. Therefore, he found the justice system in Singapore as lacking for achieving
their ends. The nakhoda had no real means to rectify the situation further through the legal
channels available in the Straits Settlements.
Malays and others living in Province Wellesley in its early years under unfair
circumstances concerning the corruption of East India Company officials in the Straits
Settlements often had little recourse for their grievances. The anonymous colonial official
mentioned by Thomson even seized the beachfront to monopolize his private ferry service to
George Town. In response to oppression and corruption by the East India Company officials
through the illicit seizure of land or taxation, Oamut merely sighed, “Apa b[ole]h buat?” or
“What can one do?”159 J. T. Thomson, a colonial official, attempted to redress the corruption by
having his Malay associates appeal to Sir George Bonham but failed because the government
peons kept away the ragged Malays from him. They failed to obtain a redress through the courts
158

Siami, “Market Forces,” in Ian Proudfoot, “Abdullah VS. Siami: Early Malay Verdicts on British Justice,” The
Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 90, 1 (2007): 6-9.
159
Thomson, Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East, 107, 109.

80
because they were too poor to afford a lawyer and could not plead forma pauperis. According to
Thomson, the local official assimilated into the ruling culture of the Malay rajas after remaining
there for thirty years with the checks and controls within English society.160 Without adequate
checks and balances or the removal of individuals in office too long, particular officials became a
less brutal version of the Malay raja because of the resilience of Malays’ acceptance of kerajaan
economics. Malays in Province Wellesley found peaceful petitioning to the Company useless
because they lacked sufficient funds or personal clout.
Malays found few ways or knew of little means to receive justice at the hands of the
corrupt official because of their unfamiliarity with British governance. Malays returned to their
land after the insurrection of Tunku Kudin to find it confiscated by the state or came to Province
Wellesley as refugees only to find later their certificate of occupation revoked by the same
official who granted it once Jahiah, a Malay refugee, already cleared it. Malays knew little by
which those of particular Europeans petitioned their remonstrance against an offender during this
time. Instead, the Malays there were accustomed to violent resistance as a means to redress their
grievances, which were ineffective against the military might of the East India Company and
Siam.161 Malays found themselves unable to resolve peacefully the injustices they experienced
in large part because of their unfamiliarity with the company’s political system and their lack of
access to resources required to gain attention from higher authorities.
Given the limits of British authority in Malaya, Malays had the ability to extract
retribution if need be and retreat beyond the borders of the East India Company. The hamlet of
Kota, outside British territory, operated as a base for robbers who swooped down on Province
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Wellesley and retreated to Kota with stolen goods. There they sold their stolen materials and
indulged the Malay pastimes of gambling, watching cockfights, and smoking opium.162 If
Malays desired, they had the ability quite often to steal goods in British territory and quickly
retreat into areas outside colonial authority. Such operations meant any British authorities
would have great difficulty in dealing with bandits because even with the loss of a base such as
Kota, they could merely set up a new base.
Thomson revealed how the officials of the East India Company often neglected certain
aspects of their duties and how the isolated official became much like the Malay raja in the
territory under his jurisdiction. After discovering the extent of an unnamed official’s land and
the ownership of another ferry, Thomson asked, “Your official has everything, and nobody
anything. Who can have any interest in supporting the State?”163 He wondered why the colonial
officials of the Company were so derelict in their duties and how colonial officials in George
Town remained so ignorant or indifferent to the plight of the people living in Province
Wellesley. Thomson with Oamut encountered a Malay family eking out an existence and yet
they seemed content with their poverty. According to Oamut, the governor never inspected the
province for wrongdoing and rarely heard appeals concerning justice, except in cases of
murder.164 Province Wellesley during the 1830s became a territory that the colonial officials
outside of it neglected and the administering official, James Low, governed without much
outside interference.
In governing Province Wellesley, James Low became much like the Malay raja in that he
adopted kerajaan economics, which in turn limited the economic abilities of the people living in
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the territory. In associating with local Malays, who expected governance within the kerajaan
framework, a colonial official residing and administering the territory became much more likely
to assimilate into Malay political culture. Isolated colonial officials who remained in Malaya
became vulnerable to cultural assimilation in which they no longer acted like officials in England
because they adopted the governing model of kerajaan economics in which they monopolized
much of the economic activity of the region. The Malays who resided in Province Wellesley
expected and submitted to such administration because they had accepted such rule possibly for
centuries. Living at subsistence levels as mentioned in Thomson and Earl seemed acceptable. In
not expecting any success for appeals, not being able to execute an appeal, or being unaware of
the right to appeal to higher authorities, oppressed Malays often either accepted their status or
found illicit ways to redress their circumstances. However, residents of Malaya addressed their
problems, resolving many of which were beyond the capability of the Straits Settlements
government, through illicit ways that expanded the general misery of the populace.
On the surface to European observers, the Malay people outside the ruling elite or midlevel officials appeared to accept the overall structure of authority in Malay society during much
of the 19th century. Most Malays likely disliked or perhaps even hated the structure but found no
effective way of resolving the problems they faced. However, their desires for changing the
system was likely more in line with the Court of Directors in London, who were probably
ignorant of James Low’s estate and adaptation of monopolistic economic policies much akin to
kerajaan economics. Thomson’s indignation of the Malays’ treatment likely reflected the ideals
of most Britons, but Great Britain was thousands of miles away. Many Malays simply lacked the
means and potentially even the awareness to petition London for assistance.
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Diplomacy and the Kerajaan

Effective diplomacy for centuries was a great asset for the various kerajaan, which
enabled them to survive in a highly competitive environment. Over the centuries, Malay rulers
such as those of Kedah, the Shah Dynasty of Malacca and later Johor-Riau-Lingga, and others
negotiated with a plethora of states and empires ranging from Ming China and Siam to Portugal
and the Dutch East India Company to maintain various levels of sovereignty over their subjects.
Military force alone was inadequate to support the state because Malaya’s neighbors were
usually more powerful. Diplomacy played an important role in political economy, not only to
promote trade deals as examined in the previous section, but also as a means for the Malay elite
to remain in power by convincing foreign powers to support their political power and, as
mentioned in another chapter, to prevent European powers from punishing suspected pirates.
Malay states employed diplomacy and flattery as means to obtain friendly relations with
British officials and acquire desired objects. Captain Parker of His Majesty’s Schooner Cochin
sailed to Perak in July 1830 while on an anti-piracy patrol and found himself on a diplomatic
mission. While in “Perak Town,” Parker met with the leader of the place called “Lesmanas,”
possibly the laksmana, to engage in the formalities of diplomacy. On entering the house of the
leader, he received a sixteen-gun salute while the leader politely and courteously received him.
Parker recalled of the visit, “They rejoiced at our appearing among them.”165 These
circumstances reveal that coastal chiefs and officials knew how to deal with foreign governments
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by showing necessary diplomatic courtesy. The desired effect of such formalities was to
persuade the visitor, eventually, to agree to favorable terms with the local authorities concerning
whatever the problems were of that time in that particular state or polity.
Food played an important role in the diplomacy of the Malay states because rulers served
food to envoys and merchants as part of their efforts to charm the foreigner into moving toward
their positions. George Putnam received food for his attempted negotiations concerning trade,
but the concept applied to politics, too. While in Perak, the diplomatic procedure required that
the Kapitan China, Tan Ah Hun, prepare rice, ducks, and other fowl for Captain Parker in any
way he desired.166 While Captain Quin of H.M.S. Raleigh visited Lingga during August 1836 in
an attempt to communicate with the sultan’s government, a minister named Encik Line requested
Quin wait several days for a proper ceremony to receive the letter of an important official to the
Sultan of Lingga. While heading to the negotiation tables, flags and pendants flew from the
boats in the vicinity and bands serenaded the visitors with music. During the ceremony, the
Malay hosts offered “a variety of hot dishes” and Raja Abdullah hosted a comedy performance
much to the enjoyment of the locals while they partook in the meal.167 Food diplomacy
permitted Malay leaders to please their guests and help disarm their suspicions such as Captain
Quin and others. Food, along with other aspects of Malay culture such as entertainment, played
an important role in the diplomatic and mercantile negotiations of the Malay states.
The single most enduring component, materially speaking, of Malay diplomacy were the
letters from chiefs and governments from throughout the Malay World. Figure 3 shows the
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detail and intricacy not only of the calligraphy of the Jawi script but the decorative manner in
which the scribe wrote them. Of course, the chop or seal indicates it bears the approval of the
ruler. The beauty and detail of aesthetics showed the importance of the sender and perhaps the
message itself. When Captain Quin arrived at Lingga, the ceremony revolved around the letter
as if it were a living thing. Before formally reading the letter for the sultan, they wrapped the
letter in a scarlet cloth embroidered with gold and placed on a silver salver. Only once at the
negotiation table did Raja Abdullah remove the letter and “perused the address” after which Raja
Abdullah proclaimed, “…it was a very proper letter.”168 The official ceremony revolved around
the reception of the letter, which apparently met with the raja’s approval for its style and
appearance rather than the actual content of the message. Letters played a critical role in
kerajaan diplomacy not only for the practical concern of conveying information from ruler to
ruler, but also as a ceremonial tool.
Diplomacy permitted the Malay kingdoms to protect the interests of rulers from foreign
powers, along with appeasing the local inhabitants through ceremony. Such ceremonies
extended to not only foreign government representatives but also merchants seeking to negotiate
a trade. Diplomacy fit into kerajaan economics because it permitted the ruling elite to remain in
power as an attempt to charm foreigners into agreeing to their terms concerning issues of
economic and political security. The armed forces of the Malay kings often paled in comparison
to the mighty navies and armies of Asia and Europe, forcing them to employ diplomacy as a
means to protect their vital interests.
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Figure 3.
Letter of the Sultan of Pontianak to Thomas Stamford Raffles, February 1814.169
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Entrepreneurial Malays and the Kerajaan

The various economic restrictions imposed on Malays resulted in problems for the
development of Malay entrepreneurship. Finding sources from Malays directly is quite difficult
and therefore requires some broader searches. However, a few first-hand accounts reveal the
difficulties for Malays in establishing shipping-related or maritime-themed enterprises. These
businesses ran into political problems with local Malay elites because either their interests did
not line up or they proved too valuable as assets to leave alone. Once the elite interfered with
Malay commerce run by those outside a ruling coalition, there was little or no recourse for
individuals to retain their enterprise.
The travails of Po Adam, a merchant near Kuala Batu, Sumatra, began shortly after an
incident that had large repercussions for himself and his neighbors. American merchant vessels
frequented the Acehnese harbors of eastern Sumatra during the first half of the 19th century for
the pepper trade. Even though such territory remains outside the general area of investigation for
this study, the incident reflects the general problems concerning the relationship between local
rulers and merchants.170 Furthermore, given the dearth of sources from merchants or seafarers,
such an anecdote remains an important part of the history of commerce and piracy in Southeast
Asia. The arrival of Americans, among other nationalities, from halfway around the world
shows the commercial importance of Insular Southeast Asia and that locals adapted their state
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structures to that commerce. Such economic activity allowed individuals such as Po Adam to
adapt to these circumstances and profit from them.
An independent trader ran into risks because of the necessary separation from the local
ruler and the political processes there. Po Adam or Po Qualah, the son of a Pedir raja, engaged
in commerce as a merchant with employees to follow and board foreign vessels if possible for
peaceable trading purposes. He operated his business on an island two miles from Kuala Batu,
which Pedir and Acehnese rajas governed jointly. Captain Charles Endicott stated, “…my old
and tried friend, Po Adam, a native well-known to traders on this coast, came on board in a small
canoe from his residence at Pulo Kio….” 171 Even though Po Adam was of royal blood, he
engaged in business with foreigners on his own accord from his private island. Local merchants
such as Po Adam developed personal relationships with the various foreign captains who sailed
to Insular Southeast Asia as a critical part of their business. Maintaining professional and
personal contacts independent from the local governing coalition permitted merchants to
circumvent the standard monopolies of the ruler and form their private enterprise with autonomy.
Merchants such as Po Adam needed to maintain these important relationships even at the
cost of personal loyalty to the ruler or risk losing business with the foreigners. When it became
apparent to Capt. Endicott and his crew while onshore that the local ruler and his people intended
to kill him and his crew so that they could steal the cargo of the Friendship, they found
themselves in a nearly impossible position. However, Po Adam proclaimed in their darkest hour,
“You got trouble, captain, if they kill you, must kill Po Adam first.”172 Po Adam supplied
Endicott’s landing party with weapons as he boarded their boat, which permitted the Americans
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to pass the Acehnese without harassment.173 While in the ship’s boat attempting to get clear of
attackers, Po initially suggested they stay at his fort until he realized that such a place was
indefensible. He continued to advise the Americans until they were safe.174 Afterwards, he
assisted four Americans who escaped the attack by swimming to shore by clothing and
protecting them.175 Even when practically the entire town of Kuala Batu rose up to capture the
American vessel and the crew, Po Adam decided (likely for a combination of personal and
professional reasons) to help Captain Endicott and his crew. As an entrepreneur, Po Adam
operated outside of the political boundaries and monopolies, which allowed him to develop
relationships with foreigners and develop a business separate from the fortunes of the rulers.
However, operating against the will of the local rulers had devastating consequences.
When the people of Kuala Batu seized the Friendship and the cargo, they also plundered Po
Adam’s property, including gold ornaments and money worth thousands of dollars, which he
never recovered. Furthermore, the local ruler absolved his debtors of ever having to pay him
back and confiscated his fishing boats and other property. While absent from home, the ruler
sent a small schooner to his fort and ordered the crew to remove anything of value from it. They
even removed jewelry from his wife while she wore it. In a petition to Congress, Po Adam
stated, “…the last of my property was set fire on and destroyed, and now for having been the
steadfast friend of Americans, I am not only destitute, but an object of derision to my
countrymen.”176 The piracy of the local ruler placed Po Adam in an extraordinarily difficult
position in which he stood to lose his Western friends and reputation as a merchant or lose his
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enterprise and possibly his life. In opting for the latter, he showed that regardless of the ability
of such an individual, he stood to lose everything for which he worked because he lacked
absolute loyalty to the ruler. Yet, absolute loyalty to the ruler effectively meant the loss of
business interests. In working to save the lives of his friends and business associates against the
will of the raja, Po Adam suffered grave consequences for obstructing the will of the ruler.
Kerajaan Malays not born into the ruling elite had a distinct disadvantage in comparison
even to Malays in other territories. Although some states in Southeast Asia allowed the
peasantry to engage in private enterprise, the Malay kingdoms prevented such competition
because the ruling elite were also the merchants. The destruction of any commercial
development independent of the ruling class convinced many of the Malays to live at subsistence
level. However, in Singapore, Malays found themselves able to profit from their efforts because
they lived under the British ruling elite there. Without the Malay rajas preventing them from
obtaining wealth, they engaged in the most honorable of trades, maritime commerce.177 While
living in a kerajaan, non-elite Malays found little purpose in working in private enterprise
because they simply lost their assets. Without the severe economic restrictions of the kerajaan,
Malay entrepreneurs gravitated toward maritime industries given the importance of that industry
toward Malay culture and economics.
George Windsor Earl noted the great changes experienced by the Malays who resided in
Singapore outside the authority of the traditional leadership. For many Malays not directly
involved in shipping or boating, other related industries were options, such as cutting timber for
use as lumber in the masts of maritime vessels and other materials for use by shipwrights. In
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completing such work, Malays showed vigor and great industry. The number of Malays running
amok fell greatly and their involvement in crime was substantially less than the Chinese
population in Singapore. Under such new authority, Malays decided against working enough to
merely subsist and instead work for the sake of improving their economic circumstances.178
Once outside the structure of kerajaan economics, non-aristocratic Malays found themselves
having greater social mobility and improved chances of obtaining wealth, which reduced the
necessity of addressing their humiliation through running amok or other acts of crime and
violence.
The development of Malay boating in Singapore showed the economic potential of the
Malay shipping industry. In response to Europeans placing wagers on which boats were the
fastest in Singapore, Malays developed and even perfected boat racing through construction of
progressively faster vessels. Oftentimes, when the losing team felt the bitter sting of defeat, they
built an even faster boat to win the next race. When five Malays manned such racing craft, they
became unbeatable by those of any other ethnic group.179 Their speed even exceeded that of
steamboats. When the government’s medical officer of Malacca so severely fractured his leg
that it required amputation, the government sent a steamboat to Singapore and back to acquire
another surgeon. The passage for the steamboat took two days; whereas John Cameron
estimated that a Malay boat with an adequate complement could have made the approximately
200-mile trip in thirty-six hours.180 The Malay boats were so advanced that they could
potentially sail the same distance as a British steamboat in three-quarters of the time. Malay
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marine technology became so sophisticated that it showed potential for the enrichment of the
Malays who developed it.
Singapore became renowned for its Malay boats, which served various functions because
of their great speed. These boats, known as sampan panjang or “long boats,” were usually
twenty to thirty feet in length and possessed a beam of four feet. There were two masts with
spritsails composed of two large mats rather than cloth. An outrigger added stability and
sometimes a crewman stood on it to prevent the vessel from capsizing. A steersman managed
the boat and added propulsion if necessary. These vessels were ideal for conveying letters to
Pinang from Singapore, which cost a rather high price of $30.181 These sampans proved quite
effective in providing marine services to the merchant community by sailing out ten to twenty
miles to signal an incoming ship and later providing transportation services if needed.182
Singapore provided a space for Malays to develop a distinct and highly effective boat capable of
competing even with the fastest boats in the world. These boats show the capability of the Malay
entrepreneur when operating outside the world of kerajaan economics and the tyranny of the
ruling class.
However, the Malay rulers worked themselves into the sampan business through their
wealth and prestige. For instance, the Sultan of Lingga purchased a sampan panjang of his
design in 1849 to defeat the Maggie Lauder in a fourteen-mile race for the New Year’s annual
regatta. Of course, the Malays crossed the finish line with the Maggie Lauder only at the seven-

181

Earl, The Eastern Seas, 380; C. A. Gibson-Hill, “The Orang Laut of Singapore River and the Sampang Pajang,”
150th Anniversary of the Founding of Singapore, ed. Mubin Sheppard (Singapore: Malaysian Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society, 1973), 125. Postage from Penang to United States cost $1.66 US in comparison. Crocker, Sale, and
Warren, New York to John Currier, Hopkinton, NH, 25 Jan. 1842, Phillips Library, Charles Currier Papers, MH 73
Series 2.
182
G. F. Davidson, Trade and Travel in the Far East (London: Madden and Malcolm, 1846), 48.

93
mile mark and won the prize. Although orang laut built some as passenger boats, their economic
purposes waned with the development of more sophisticated steamers and improved docking
facilities in Singapore. Eventually, these vessels lost their commercial functions and became
almost entirely racing craft.183 By 1885, the sampan panjang became the racing craft of the elite
to a significant extent with the brothers of the Maharaja of Johor, Engku Khalid and Engku
‘Abdul Madjid, racing each other with their respective crews and vessels.184 Although the
sampan panjang started as a means for Malays in Singapore to exert their economic
independence through their knowledge of seafaring and boatbuilding, the trade eventually fell
into the hands of the ruling elite that they supposedly escaped.
Maritime commerce remained a centerpiece for the economies of the various Malay
kerajaan for much of the 19th century. Malays generally considered maritime commerce as
honorable and a core part of their overall existence. According to John Crawfurd, “To engage in
commerce is reckoned no dishonour to anyone…, among the maritime tribes especially, one of
the most dignified occupations even of the sovereign himself, and of his principle officers.” He
considered the more prominent merchants as remarkable for their “fairness, spirit, and
integrity.”185 The Malay kingdoms differed from many other forms of governance in that it
embraced commercial activity as a means to obtain wealth, even for elites, which contrasted
greatly with other Asian commercial systems in which governing ideologies scorned the
merchants’ livelihoods as unproductive. Honorability extended the way in which merchants
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traded, not simply the act of trading itself. Therefore, we should account for declines in
maritime traffic for economic rather cultural reasons.
Austronesian maritime traders tended to dislike generally the bureaucratic machinery of
the customhouse and other government machinery. The dislike of state bureaucracy (their
arguments similar to classical liberal discourse with aversion to regulations, penalties, and
government inspection of cargo) fits with Siami’s discourse on the distrust of the British
judiciary. Aside from the displeasure of paying a percentage of the cargo’s value, merchants
feared trickery at the hands of government officials.186 The lack of a customhouse in Singapore
attracted merchants from throughout coastal Asia, including many Malays. In May 1856,
Governor Blundell explained Singapore became a popular destination for merchants less because
of the absence of taxes but rather that the “particularly grateful” Malay merchant “has no
apprehension of being meddled with, cheated, and perhaps ill-treated by the subordinates of a
Custom House... more for their own interests than those of the Public Revenue."187 Malay
merchants disliked the abuse of power by government officials and became a bastion of support
for free trade, which contradicted the essence of kerajaan economics.
The reason for such distaste of customhouses and government intervention in
international commerce derived from the corruption or the appearance of it in governments in
Southeast Asia. Previously mentioned examples included Siami’s mentioning of the nakhoda
frustrated with the British judiciary system, Abdullah’s disgust for the ruling Malay elite, and
Jadee’s hatred of the Dutch legal and tax systems. The imposition of regulation, different laws,
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and excessive taxes left many of the Malay shipping merchants and seafarers dissatisfied, if not
revolted, by the actions of various governments and bureaucracies in Insular Southeast Asia.
Nakhoda Muda experienced great difficulties with the V.O.C. bureaucracy even when
working from within it. He received the title of Kei Damáng Perwasīdana of LampungSamangka, which required him to superintend the commerce of that district.188 The governor to
whom he was subordinate held him responsible for failing to prevent two perahu sailing for
Bengkulu, known as Bencoolen, and fined him for $200, which gave the official much
disgrace.189 Kei Damáng and his people paid the fine, with the former paying a quarter of it, but
still the V.O.C. forced him to bring back four Dutch soldiers and one wife while requiring the
Malays to support them entirely. Not only did the Malays help build them a structure, along with
a fence, but also suffered the Dutch corporal’s “very the harsh language” and even hit four
different Malays.190 Afterwards, the V.O.C. sent eight Dutch soldiers and one wife for the
Malays to support. Si Talīb and the sergeant of the Dutch guard conspired against the Kei
Damáng by stating that he traded with an English vessel. Series of events led to a Dutch captain
detaining him and four of his sons while the captain confiscated his property. They escaped
detention on a vessel, attacked the Dutch in the house of Kei Damáng, and eventually killed all
the Europeans in the settlement. Three days later, Kei Damáng left with all the Malays for
English territory.191 The oppression by Dutch officials of the Lampung–Samangka Malays
sowed the seeds of mistrust of authority within the Malay community, which helped pave the
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way for supporting free-trade policies in the future. Memories of such events likely gave Malay
merchants skepticism of interventionist state policies.
Straits Settlements merchants cooperated across ethnic lines to influence the political
sphere, revealing that local Asian merchants, especially Chinese ones, had considerable
influence. European and American merchants relied heavily on local merchants to whom they
extended credit in exchange for local goods bought from Chinese and Southeast Asian seafaring
merchants because of the dearth of currency in the settlements. Attempts in 1835 to impose
systems with greater liquidity requirements had only limited success. Chinese middlemen’s
influence over the Western merchants during the first half of the 19th century often permitted
them to gain favorable negotiating terms.192 During the second half of the 19th century, retired
merchants lobbied on behalf of the Straits merchants and the Straits Settlements became a crown
colony, which permitted subjects in the Straits Settlements to petition London to address
grievances. The Straits Settlements Association formed in 1868 with formerly prominent
merchants and officials to advocate for the colony’s interests.193 The close association between
Asian merchants of various backgrounds with Western merchants showed that there were
potential channels for Malay and Chinese merchants for expressing their interests at times, such
as the desire for limited taxation and duties.
Malays residing in a kerajaan faced economic limits as a means by the elite to maintain
power when they wished to engage in maritime enterprise. Entrepreneurial Malays and
sometimes other Southeast Asians faced great challenges in gaining independence from the
government systems. If an entrepreneur wanted to create a business, he or she usually required
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permission of the sovereign to trade with foreigners. The establishment of domestic pursuits
perhaps required at least the tacit permission of the ruling elite, otherwise the entrepreneur might
find his or her business seized. The best way to escape such economic restrictions was to leave
the kerajaan altogether. However, moving to a colonial state did not necessarily mean escaping
completely from the vestiges of kerajaan authority. The entrepreneurial Malay not only
represented a threat to the political power of the kerajaan’s dominant coalition by threatening
their income and forming a rival power base but also by creating an avenue to question the
ruler’s authority. If subjects communicated and interacted with foreign merchants, they might
question their decisions and openly act against the ruler’s interests.

Hierarchy and Resistance in Malayan Politics

A Malay kerajaan required a ruler not merely of proper birth but also a specific set of
characteristics that attracted and kept followers. The failure to maintain dominance as a leader
potentially resulted in disaster for a ruler with the loss of a large portion of the power base. The
Malay kingdom’s political structure during most of the 19th century was quite decentralized,
which often meant that lower level chiefs possessed a fair amount of power. If rulers failed in
the eyes of local inhabitants or became too oppressive, they simply moved to another sovereign’s
or chief’s territory or possible went amok in the ruler’s domain.
The administration of a kerajaan required the assistance of middle to lower level
administrators and officials who kept the kingdom functioning. After the state or kerajaan, the
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next level of administration was the district or jajahan and daerah.194 Magistrates headed the
districts and during the Colonial Era both Europeans and Malays operated as magistrates. Below
the district level were the mukim and villages or kampung that penghulu or Malay headmen
administered. The penghulu maintained order and reported to the district magistrates or superior
chiefs.195 Although some chiefs and penghulu were of aristocratic origin, usually they were from
a prominent local family. The penghulu inherited the office usually from his father, who
belonged to the largest family. They were generally wealthy by village standards and had the
approval of their superiors in the hierarchy. The ruler gave the penghulu a surat kuasa or letter
of authority that granted authority to administer the village, but by the 1870s sultans became so
weak in Malaya that they received such letters from the district chiefs.196 The kerajaan
depended on lower level administrators to keep order who gained much power by the time Great
Britain established the residency system during the late 19th century.
Political leaders such as the village chief generally realized the limits to which they could
push their people without incurring deadly consequences. If a leader oppressed an individual too
much, there remained the possibility of the oppressed running amok and killing everyone in his
path, including family and friends, without restraint or discrimination. A chief and his retainers,
however, had to eliminate such threats and therefore not pushing someone to such a desperate act
was far preferable because someone who ran amok challenged the law and order of the society.
Oppressing the general populace remained unadvisable because chiefs depended on it for their
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status, although abusing individuals remained feasible. 197 The populace had various ways of
keeping chiefs in line with their general interests.
Although running amok for individuals was not necessarily a conscious effort to rebel
against the political system, taking up a weapon and slaughtering all before them undermined the
credibility of the local ruler. For Malays, there were two types of amok, one of which was a
desperate attack on the battlefield and the other happened during peace time when an attacker
killed all people indiscriminately until the person was no longer able to fight.198 A pengamok or
person running amok killed any person unfortunate enough to be within reach of the blade, often
because such a person felt intense dishonor and shame. A person running amok generally
intended to die at the hands of authorities or some other person.199 According to Malay tradition,
if a pengamok commoner or any other commoner committed treason, the ruler executed all the
traitor’s relatives and destroyed any trace of their existence with the destruction of their home.200
Running amok offered a fatal means of resistance against authorities if a person felt grievances
against the state or other oppressors. However, running amok against the state meant almost
certain death not only to the traitor but also to all those of relation to the traitor. The pengamok
quite often killed their family members anyway.
More commonly, however, if Malays strongly disliked the way in which a ruler governed
the country, they departed their home for a new land. Such a system had its limits, though.
Frank Swettenham observed that by 1874 Malays simply settled on an unclaimed plot of land
without paying anyone and cultivated it. Only rarely did a chief force others off a particularly
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productive piece of land. At times, rulers granted domain over some land through written
permission, but such grants were revocable and mostly offered to chiefs and the elite.201 The
abundance of land and lack of legal requirements during this time permitted greater ease of
mobility for Malay rakyat. Rakyat had the ability to pack up and move to another district or state
if placed under greater pressures without excessive losses given abundance of open and available
land.
The potential loss of subjects through migration was a serious threat to a sultan’s hold on
power and livelihood. In one such instance, the ruler of Perak complained in 1816 that the
Laksmana of Perak occupied Krean from Kedah without his permission or prior knowledge. He
complained of the laksmana, “Even already 80% of my people have fled to him and further if he
is allowed to settle at Dinding all my people will fly to him…” and requested his defeat at the
Dindings by British forces.202 This incident reflects the poor control of a ruler over his chiefs,
which became endemic throughout the century for much of the Malay Peninsula. Subjects at
times abandoned their leader if his people deemed him an improper ruler and such a ruler
possessed little means of preventing them from leaving to follow another ruler if necessary.
Commoner Malays had few options concerning land-based resistance against abuses of
authority other than leaving the domain of the oppressive ruler. However, the problem with this
strategy remains that it required finding a generous yet powerful ruler or chief. In all likelihood,
finding such a person remained quite difficult. The recent historiography, perhaps ironically
given larger trends, rarely focuses on Malay commoner resistance against the ruling elite during
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the 19th century. This is likely because doing so legitimizes colonial narratives concerning the
oppression of the Malay raja class. Perhaps then, maritime resistance, given the importance of
seafaring to Malay society, offered an opportunity for commoner Malays to deal a blow against
royal and elite authority. Malay commoners given sufficient reason had the means to resist royal
authority when it became too oppressive by fleeing and finding new land elsewhere.

Chinese Merchants and Kerajaan Economics

Works on the long, prominent role of the Chinese merchant in the Malay kingdoms in
Malaya are quite extensive but rarely, if ever, touch on the issue of kerajaan economics. This
work in later chapters will discuss with greater thoroughness the relationship between piracy and
political economy in the Straits Settlements. Concerning kerajaan economics, sultans and other
rulers often preferred the business of Chinese merchants during the 19th century because of their
apparent lack of political ambition. However, note that the lack of political ambition did not
mean isolation from politics but rather a general disinclination toward seizing the crown. The
idea of a full-blooded and culturally Chinese sultan was quite implausible in the Malay world,
but the notion of politically powerful Chinese leaders was a potent reality for the residents of
Malaya by the mid-19th century.
Malay politics played an important role in the rise of a new Chinese merchant class
during the 19th century. Chinese merchants had the advantage that unlike their rakyat
counterparts, the rulers generally saw them as non-threatening to their political power. The
rulers permitted Chinese communities to enforce their own laws and accumulate independent
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wealth, whereas Malay merchants potentially lost their wealth to rulers to prevent political
competition.203 Crawfurd stated, “The peaceable, unambitious, and supple character of the
Chinese, and the conviction on the part of the native governments, of their exclusive devotion to
commercial pursuits, disarm all jealousy, and make them welcome guests everywhere.”204 Such
practices gave them a great advantage over other merchants, of which Crawfurd learned in
Batavia while speaking with the crews of two 120-ton junks trading on behalf of the Chinese
emperor.205 The apparent lack of desire for political power allowed the Chinese to enter into
markets closely guarded by the rulers throughout the archipelago who feared political
competition from merchants. Such practices allowed Chinese seafaring merchants to gain
important advantages in Southeast Asia within the carrying trade over the local seafarers.
However, Chinese merchants possessed political interests and intervened in Malay
politics but took on a different strategy than other actors. Another report from colonial records
agrees with Crawfurd that in early years of British colonialism in Malaya, “The Chinese [were]
generally considered to be a peaceable race in all the countries to which they [had] emigrated—
yet several examples to the contrary are not wanting in the History of European Settlements to
the Eastward.” Chinese merchants were perfectly willing to leave a particular country if the
local ruler failed to suite their mercantile interests. However, the report added, “they do not
seem at all averse to intrigue with one of two contending parties or [ensure] with both so
whatever be the result their interests may continue unaffected.”206 Chinese merchants in Malaya
intervened in local politics in a limited matter to ensure minimal risk to their socio-economic
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position. The Chinese merchants had fewer problems leaving a country or resisting directly if
the ruler acted adversely to their interests than their Malay counterparts. Furthermore, they
potentially conducted political intrigue with more than one party simultaneously.
The lack of political loyalty concerning kerajaan factions in Malaya showed the desire to
benefit from politics and warfare while maintaining a low profile politically and acting
pragmatically. The same report stated, “It need not be added that the real leaning in such case
will be the strongest party although the weaker will be cajoled by promises and aided by supplies
and arms. The sale of which at high profits they can easily effect.”207 With dubious political
loyalty, the Chinese community sided with the most powerful political faction to ensure victory
and the ability to maintain and grow their industries. They often profited off both sides conflicts,
showing an indifference to political loyalty during times of unrest and war. Chinese merchants
found themselves able to conduct their business in Malay countries and in turn Malay rulers
benefitted from “their luxurious habits which they swell the revenues by the consumption of
taxable commodities.”208 Kerajaan leaders and the Chinese community established a
relationship based on practical interests in which they mutually benefitted.209 The Chinese
community expanded its industry and commerce while the kerajaan found new taxable income
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from a peaceful community, albeit of dubious loyalty, that contented itself with some political
influence protected by an alliance with the strongest political party.
Malay leaders often treated Chinese in their domain as lacking any inherent value, which
perhaps helped the Chinese by leading the elites to underestimate them chronically. A Malay
chieftain, Raja Haji Hamid, slit the throat a Chinese gambler who cheated him out of his money
and sent his body drifting down the river. Feeling extreme guilt for killing him, Hamid cried
“Kasih-an China….210 I am sorry for the Chinaman.” “Why are you sorry for him?” Raja Haji
questioned and stated he deserved death for cheating, along with proclaiming, “…he was a
Chinaman, and we counted not their lives as being of any worth.”211 Raja Haji also recalled how
he and others played Main China where they gambled on whether a Chinese man they planned
on robbing had an odd or even number of coins. After robbing him, they killed the Chinese
largely for the pleasure in it.212 In another instance, Captain Shaw recalled an incident when he
chastised Malays for shooting Chinese habitually. A Malay man responded, “Why not shoot
Chinamen? They've no religion,”213 suggesting religious differences helped form bigotry against
Chinese. Despite the systematic discrimination against Chinese by the Malay states, some
Chinese migrants managed to become prosperous. Such incidents suggest that broad, statesanctioned conceptualizations of ethnicity existed prior to British colonialism in mainland
Malaya. Bigotry against the Chinese in Malaya likely gave them an economic advantage by
leading the elite to underestimate the Chinese as a political threat to the ruling elite.
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Overall, the pragmatic relationship between the kerajaan and Chinese communities had
reciprocal benefits. The Malay kingdoms had a reliable tax base and subjects who generally, for
the first few decades of the 19th century, avoided openly opposing them. The Chinese
communities found new homes where they practiced their industries without excessive
interference. In the long run, Chinese communities employed the economic advantages of a fair
degree of independence from the Malay leadership. Such independence in time transformed the
economic and political relationship with the Malay and British elites concerning maritime issues.
The former perceived timidity of the Chinese community disappeared and it became a force to be
reckoned with by any established political institution on the Malay Peninsula. In a following
chapter I will show how Chinese organizations, sometimes mixed with Malays, challenged
existing authorities as a means to establish themselves economically.

Conclusion

During the 19th century the Malay kingdoms reached a series of crises resulting from a
combination of its own and colonial policies. Perhaps if the various Malay states organized a
customs union or some other unifying political union, they might have resisted the devastating
effects of economic liberalism. However, such was not the case and the rise of new powers on
the peninsula meant the old system became unsustainable. The collapse of the maritime
commercial systems so critical to the kerajaan and the sovereignty of the Malay world remains
an understudied topic ripe for future research. The ruling elite in the Malay kingdoms developed
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monopolistic policies, as a type of rent in an LAO, which granted them a series of economic
privileges designed to provide income for the state and inhibit political competition.
Malay nakhoda and other leaders often loathed the old monopolistic policies as
mentioned in this chapter and the previous one. Indeed, Malay merchants became the backbone
of the free trade movement in the Straits Settlements. They had help from British merchants of
mutual interests, such as the man who published the aforementioned editorial, who knew how to
gain influence within the political system. Malay shipping interests and seafarers possessed
divergent political and economic interests with the Malay states’ leaderships. Kerajaan
economics pushed Malay merchants away from traditional relations with the elites by the early
19th century, which was of greater mutual interest with other merchants. Malay merchants,
frustrated by the corruption of various governments, supported the free trade movement and
helped keep custom duties at minimal levels.
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CHAPTER 3:
PIRACY AND KERAJAAN ECONOMICS IN MALAYA

Historical piracy in Malaya constituted an important aspect of Malay society and politics
neglected by various historians throughout the 20th century who did not write in depth on the
links between the Malay elite and piracy. Employing the advantages of geography and maritime
skills honed over centuries, Malay seafarers made ideal pirates who exercised great power over
those traversing their waters. The 19th century, especially during the 1830s, saw an explosion of
Malay piracy in an era when Great Britain’s East India Company asserted its influence in the
wake of the Napoleonic Wars; meanwhile the Netherlands’ government sought to preserve Dutch
prestige in Southeast Asia and expand from the vestiges of the old company’s power. Malaya’s
kerajaan for centuries depended on the implementation of sea power by the various states in a
manner others often perceived as piracy. For the Malay states during most of the 19th century,
state-sanctioned piracy served as an extension of kerajaan economics until it no longer served
the interests of the Malay elite. Malay elites shifted away from plunder-based trade when new
economic opportunities emerged, along with increased pressure from Western powers that the
victims of piracy readily exploited.
This chapter will explain the piratical aspect of kerajaan economics, along with its
impact and decline particularly in the former Johor-Riau-Lingga Kingdom because of its political
influence and the propensity of its successors to support piracy. The first section will explain
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how piracy fit within the kerajaan economics structure developed ultimately from various British
and Dutch reports on piracy. The next two sections focus on Johor’s and Singapore’s role in the
continuation of Malay piracy and its decline through changes in policies and ministers. Galang
and Panglima Awang, the subjects of the next two sections, became notorious for piratical
activities during the 1830s and became largely successful through the development of a slavetrading network sustained by the pirates’ captives from throughout the archipelago. The final
section discusses aspects of the pirate economy, along with the ways in which ex-slaves exacted
revenge on their former masters. Rarely have recent historians attempted to explain extensively
how historical Malay piracy fit within Malay political systems with plausible explanations. This
chapter aims to ameliorate such circumstances by examining piracy through the kerajaan
economics framework.

Piracy within the Kerajaan Economics Framework

Historians for decades have neglected the links between piracy and Malay political power
during much of the 19th century. Piracy usually stemmed from the internal Malay politics during
the early 1800s. The Malay elite of the Malay Peninsula and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago
employed piracy as a critical component of the kerajaan economics system to gain wealth and
maintain the socio-economic and political status quo. Pirating rights worked in concert with the
monopolistic trading system by providing rents, which entrenched the elite’s position within
Malayan society. Malay residents took advantage of their strategic geographic position along
crowded waterways to improve their economic prospects.
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The orang laut of Johor-Riau-Lingga followed peaceful segments of kerajaan economics
in addition to conducting piracy; therefore, they would be peaceful or warlike actors in the
region. Orang laut, usually referred to as the “rayat” or “rakyat” in modern parlance, collected
agar-agar, a type of seaweed, throughout the Straits region from February to April and began to
shift away from its collection in May because they exhausted their supply from the rocks of the
region. With the onset of the Southeast Monsoon in June, they prepared for piratical expeditions
that usually lasted until late October.214 M. H. W. Muntinghe’s 1818 report on Straits piracy,
which he based entirely on the information of Raja Akil, observed that the orang laut lived on
fish and sago in preference to cultivating rice.215 The orang laut of Johor-Riau-Lingga subsisted
through the collection of various Straits produce including agar-agar, sea cucumbers, tortoise
shells, and even birds’ nests. Although the market price in the 1820s for agar-agar ranged from
$30 to 40 a bahar, the collectors sold it at a “very inadequate rate” to an official appointed by the
sultan or his family member who in turn sold it to Chinese often at European settlements.
Despite the considerable production and demand of agar-agar, Presgrave reported, “…Orang
Rayat are scarcely better than Slaves, and at the same than time professional pirates.” 216 Orang
laut, according to the reports, followed the principles of kerajaan economics that enriched their
political leaders and reinforced the ruling coalition even though they lived in squalor and often
acted as pirates.
The political hierarchy within Malay society, even for the orang laut, aligned under the
sultan or other high Malay officials the early 19th century. Rakyat under a sultan lived in small
214
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communities throughout the islands generally under the charge of two officials appointed by the
sultan when the community was important enough. According to Presgrave, the orang kaya was
more powerful, while the subordinate official was the batin. In less significant places, only a
batin commanded the local rakyat.217 Van Angelbeek reported orang laut disliked strong chiefs
and followed a batin and jurutua, with the latter subordinate, and that the orang laut selected a
batin from within the ranks of their panglima. Piracy served as a means to connect the people
through various chiefs and van Angelbeek implied that the orang laut’s work and fellow
crewmembers were more important as the basis of loyalty than ethnicity. 218 The decentralized
political system of the Johor-Riau-Lingga Kerajaan likely varied in the way leaders administered
it depending on the various communities’ traditions and size. Keeping together a decentralized
kingdom required economic and political incentives aside from the powerful force of tradition.
The relationship between the royal household and the various orang laut communities depended
on a series of chiefs appointed by the royalty, along with those determined autonomously by
orang laut communities. These mid-level chiefs and officials were the linchpin of the Malay
kingdoms because they kept the rakyat under Malay royalty.
The legitimization and acceptance of killing and plunder by Malays came through
hereditary privilege and coercion. Sultan Husain’s belief about plunder as his birthright was
common in the Straits because Presgrave wrote that Malays “…consider piracy their birthright
and inheritance.”219 They derived their right to plunder not from religion but because of their
hereditary lineage. At times, the Malay leadership coerced people into a life of piracy. In one
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instance, an imprisoned pirate pled before a Singapore judge, “If we do go a pirating, you cause
us to be hanged; if we refuse to go, we are killed by the Malays and by our own tribe.”220 One
pirate convicted in Singapore recalled how he became embroiled in piracy through debt despite
running a plantation at Riau for seventeen years before he departed for Tanjong Surat, Johor, to
cut wood. The infamous pirate of only eleven months testified:
I afterwards became indebted to… this man to the amount of 80 reals
copper, in consequence of which he desired me to pirate and to pay off the
debt. I at ﬁrst refused, saying that I was afraid of the English
Government… [and so he] threatened to take my child if I would not
consent.221
The confessed pirate who had considerable wealth in Riau became a pirate because he found the
threats of this man credible and therefore must have been quite powerful. The men at Tanjong
Surat and Booi bought the privilege to engage in piracy and their panglima was a former
jurumudi for the government gunboat.222 Malay naval seafaring often had a highly mercenary
mindset. Many Malays believed piracy was their right and plundered as they wished, while
others became pirates because other threatened them or their loved ones. By the 19th century,
piracy was a core aspect of Malay society that tradition and necessity entrenched in it.
The distribution of wealth from plunder followed a structured system that entitled to the
political leadership and commanders specific shares of plunder nearly identical to the kerajaan
economics system for peacefully obtained goods. Pirates by custom went to the orang kaya and
temenggung who “supplied to them in advance, provisions, arms, and all that is necessary for the
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rigging of their vessels…” before setting out on an expedition.223 The commanders each took
out loans to outfit their vessels and repaid the loans at exorbitant interest rates as high as 50 or
100% or sold to their patron the captured goods at 100% taxed rates if unable to repay them. 224
In financing pirate expeditions, Temenggung Abdul Rahman “usually found the artillery and
ammunition and for there [were] certain parts of the plunder were reserved as his portion…”
such as captured perahu hulls, guns above a certain weight, blades of certain descriptions, and a
percentage of the captured women.225 In the Riau-Lingga Kingdom, pirates sold all unneeded
goods at much reduced prices to the sultan, who then sold the plundered goods to merchants at
higher prices for a large profit. The sultan received all Western artillery captured by pirates
under him.226 Malay officials, both in Johor and Riau-Lingga, commonly participated in the
state-sanctioned piracy system, which they generally deemed as acceptable but kept their actions
secret to avoid punishment by Europeans and causing embarrassment to the leadership in the
Malay kingdoms.227 Plunder formed a core aspect of kerajaan economics that remained an open
secret for those living in the Malay world at the time. Both plundered and peacefully extracted
goods found their way to Malay elites at deflated prices who then sold them at market prices as
part of a strategy to remain in power by denying wealth to any potential challenger.
Malay royals almost certainly commanded its subjects to attack nearly any vessel so that
they might receive plunder directly. On 31 May 1836, five Royal Navy boats from H.M.S.
Andromache set out on a patrol to find pirates and encountered three unidentified boats while in
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the Straits of Malacca near an island. A skirmish occurred between the boats resulting the
destruction of two war perahu that had numerous swivel cannons and at least one hundred men
aboard. The Malay interpreter, Thomas Garstin Mitchell, reported that “Malay prisoners stated
that they were acting under the orders of the Sultan of Ling[ga] at that time. They said that the
Sultan had sent them for plunder, and for the purpose of piracy.”228 Malay pirates, according to
Mitchell, attacked any vessel worth the risk, including those of the same nation. These pirates
received orders, however, not to attack vessels owned by their patron. The sultan dispatched
other vessels to plunder the vessels in the waters off Malaya.229 Malay royalty, in this case the
Sultan of Lingga, ordered their subjects to attack and plunder the vessels of any vessel worth
seizing. The result of state-sanctioned piracy was greater concentration of wealth and power
within the Malay elite at the expense of most others in the region.
Pirate crews had their own conditions on working under commanders concerning the
division of plunder and captives. When pirates captured a prize, tradition permitted them to
seize what they could carry, but there were exceptions. The panglima received all women
captured and certain weapons. If a pirate seized silver or gold, he could keep all of it up until the
value of $100 and then the seizer had to share half of the rest with the commander. If a
crewmember seized more than one captive, tradition required to give one to the panglima. The
pirate crew divided the cargo separately by giving one share to the panglima and one to the crew,
the latter of which included the officers such as the jurubatu and jurumudi who received a bit
more than the rest of the crew. In celebration of a successful expedition, the pirates had a
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cockfight where they gambled their shares of the plunder.230 The economic opportunities from
piracy had potential for greater profit than the collection of Straits produce because pirates took
captives whom they sold for significant prices. The panglima received a large portion of the
goods and people captured as part of the privileges of leadership. These unwritten rules dictated
the manner in which crews divided plunder that encouraged participation in piracy.
The size of crews varied among vessels but the relationship to authorities followed a
similar framework to Undang-Undang Laut. James Low wrote of Johor pirates coming to
Penang in fleets of ten to thirty each with crews of about fifteen to thirty pirates.231 According to
Presgrave, Malay pirate perahu usually ranged from forty to eighty crewmen, but sometimes had
as low as thirty people and the median crew size was between forty and sixty men. If a crewman
needed a loan to participate in the expedition, the panglima offered it without a charge of
interest. The three officers were the panglima, jurumudi, and jurubatu; the first had the power to
execute a crewman. If commanders came into a dispute over a prize or other issue, they brought
their case to the sultan.232 Undang-Undang Laut, having similar aspects, likened a vessel’s
structure of authority akin to power relationships on land with the nakhoda as the sultan and the
helmsman or jurumundi as the bendahara. The code set a specific chain of command from
nakhoda to awak perahu. Authorities punished disobedient sailors with lashes whose number
depended on the rank of the person who disobeyed and the persistence of disobedience. Such a
tradition had similarities to Undang-Undang Laut, which gave a nakhoda the right to execute a
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crewman for violations as vague as “bad conduct.”233 The authority of the commander at sea
held a long tradition within Malay society dating back to the Malacca Era, the violation of which
potentially resulted in severe penalties.
Malay pirates employed varying vessel types depending on the tasks required and were
supremely adapted for use in the waters of Malaya. Penjajap, long vessels specialized for
combat, used both square mat sails usually hoisted on two masts and twenty to thirty rowers for
propulsion. Longer versions usually accelerated more slowly and therefore commanders
reserved them for important attacks while smaller versions engaged in piracy more frequently.
The bow usually had an apilan or a five- or six-inch thick wooden bulwark to protect gunners
operating a long gun or two. These vessels usually carried smaller swivel cannons in different
places depending on their size. They ranged from thirty to sixty feet long and drew three to five
feet of water that crews potentially disguised as peaceful traders by adjusting the rigging. The
crews armed themselves with a variety of small arms such as muskets, blunderbusses, spears,
and various types of swords.234 Malays designed these vessels for offensive purposes capable of
hunting and capturing prey, along with deceiving their enemies through disguise. They
possessed sufficiently low draft to allow escape into shallow waterways while maintaining
sufficient firepower to take on most local Asian vessels.
Lighter, more general-purpose vessels also engaged in piratical activity in Malayan
waters. Kakap were single-sail boats no longer than twenty-five feet, usually with an oar. When
acting as scouts for a larger fleet, the crew came from a penjajap and usually eight or ten of the
bravest men sailed them. They usually operated in groups and their crews often sailed along the
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coast and inlets that allowed them to escape into the jungle when in danger. Their simple build
of wooden planks held together by pegs and reeds enabled a comparatively easy construction for
Malays.235 The commonness of kakap enabled pirates to use them to blend in with the local
population or switch from piratical activities to peaceful enterprises with ease. Thomas
Horsfield described them as serving both piratical and fishing purposes. People lived and even
slept in them because they were so important to the orang laut way of life.236 Malays, especially
orang laut, employed kakap boats to sail in waterways for both peaceful and warlike purposes,
which made counter-piracy missions exceptional difficult because naval forces had great
difficulty in distinguishing between pirate and peaceful vessels.
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 4 suggest the relationship between shipping and piracy had no
clear correlation and that therefore piracy was not fixed to total shipping like with regular
taxation. Pirates focused much of their attention on Asian vessels rather than the more rigid and
larger Western square-rig vessels that sailed through the waters because Asian vessels were
usually much more vulnerable to attack from penjajap, kakap, and other types of vessels
frequently used by pirates. The lack of any correlation between the number of vessels visiting
Singapore and pirate attacks suggests the number of attacks resulted from a complex set of
variables rather than a single policy dictated by authorities. The steep decline in piracy that
occurred after 1836 was almost certainly because of the radical policy measures taken by the
authorities of Dutch and British colonial governments and coincided with a rise in the number of
vessels entering and leaving Singapore. Therefore, a collapse in Malay maritime trade because
of the counter-piracy mission was far less likely than the notion of piracy weakening overall

235
236

De Groot, “Piracies in Indian Archipelago,” 88.
Teitler, van Dissel, and à Campo, Zeeroof en Zeeroofbestrijding, 38-39.

117
shipping numbers. The cyclical ebb and flow of piracy rates was independent of shipping rates
from 1824 to 1851, meaning the cycles had different causes for their existences.
Piracy was a vital part of kerajaan economics during the early 19th century in that it
permitted the Malay elite to protect their statuses within the Malay world. The trade of pirated
goods fit a similar pattern to that of peacefully obtained goods in that members of the Malay elite
bought them at deflated prices and then sold them at market prices. The Malay elite usually
benefitted from piracy and many of the organs of the Malay state somehow fit to that purpose to
the point where any thorough investigation of the political economy of Malay states of the period
should at least touch on piracy. Many aspects of Malay economic life, such as the mobility of
the orang laut, enabled the society to continue acts of piracy without colonial authorities
uncovering them.

The Straits Settlements and Malay Piracy

Even with the establishment of company control over Singapore in name, the existence of
piracy continued to thrive on that island despite the efforts of the local authorities. Singapore
became a refuge to many, including those deemed pirates in other lands, under the banner of
liberal policies laid forth by Stamford Raffles. The policies of free trade also made effective
piracy suppression extraordinarily difficult by depriving revenue from the treasuries of the Straits
Settlements and indirectly the Malay states by pulling maritime trade away from them.
Furthermore, British ally Temenggung Ibrahim, finding the Straits Settlements government too
weak, supported piracy for the enrichment of himself and his supporters.
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Table 1
Malayan Piracy Rates237

1824-1825
1825-1826
1826-1827
1827-1828
1828-1829
1829-1830
1830-1831
1831-1832
1832-1833
1833-1834
1834-1835
1835-1836
1836-1837
1837-1838
1838-1839
1839-1840
1840-1841
1841-1842
1842-1843
1843-1844
1844-1845
1845-1846
1846-1847
1847-1848
1848-1849
1849-1850
1850-1851
237

Western Square Rig
Vessels Engaged by
Pirates
1

Asian Vessels Engaged
by Pirates
2

1

1

2
8
1

1
1
3
11
12
3
14
22
3
5
3
3

1
1
1

10
6
2
1
5
5
2
8
10

From Appendix A. This table excludes pirate attacks on fishing vessels and stranded vessels. This table only
examines pirate contacts per commercial vessel heading to or from Singapore. “Several” has been interpreted as
meaning “three.” I selected Singapore because of its importance as a trading port and the more readily available
numbers concerning commerce. The lack of official data on the number of pirate attacks has resulted in my attempt
to count the total of attacks myself, which may mean more pirate attacks may have been recorded. The total number
of recorded pirate attacks is significantly lower than the actual total, but this is less relevant when addressing the
issue of trends.
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Table 2
Commercial Vessels Arriving and Departing Singapore238

Year (1 May to 30
April)

Square-Rig Vessel
Importers to
Singapore

1824-1825
1825-1826
1826-1827
1827-1828
1828-1829
1829-1830
1830-1831
1831-1832
1832-1833
1833-1834
1834-1835
1835-1836
1836-1837
1837-1838

279
292
357
384
398
403
441
445
420
475
517
539
541
520

Square-Rig
Vessel
Exporters to
Singapore
280
290
361
382
389
383
446
443
429
474
515
533
537
514

Asian Vessel
Importers to
Singapore

Asian Vessel
Exporters from
Singapore

2856
2149
1705
1743
1743
1566
1599
1484
1444
1684
1880

1670
1570
1398
1495
1480
1418
1399
2065
2094

(Continued on following page)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Year (1 May to
30 April)
1838-1839
1839-1840
1840-1841
1841-1842
1842-1843
1843-1844
1844-1845
1845-1846
1846-1847
1847-1848
1848-1849
1849-1850
1850-1851

Square-Rig Vessel
Importers to
Singapore
574
552
762
774
870
791
744
737
790
802
827
856
981

Square-Rig Vessel
Exporters to
Singapore
570
538
753
741
814
783
746
742
797
788
757
841
935

Asian Vessel
Importers to
Singapore
2090

Asian Vessel
Exporters from
Singapore
2136

2,754
2548
2490
2577
2404
2461
2304
2479
2372
2161
2396

2869
2534
2514
2890
2332
2713
2667
2847
2905
2520
2572

1824-1825
1825-1826
1826-1827
1827-1828
1828-1829
1829-1830
1830-1831
1831-1832
1832-1833
1833-1834
1834-1835
1835-1836
1836-1837
1837-1838
1838-1839
1839-1840
1840-1841
1841-1842
1842-1843
1843-1844
1844-1845
1845-1846
1846-1847
1847-1848
1848-1849
1849-1850
1850-1851

1824-1825
1825-1826
1826-1827
1827-1828
1828-1829
1829-1830
1830-1831
1831-1832
1832-1833
1833-1834
1834-1835
1835-1836
1836-1837
1837-1838
1838-1839
1839-1840
1840-1841
1841-1842
1842-1843
1843-1844
1844-1845
1845-1846
1846-1847
1847-1848
1848-1849
1849-1850
1850-1851
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Figure 4. Piracy attacks and shipping.

122
The Straits Settlements at times became the homes of people deemed pirates in other
lands such as the Malay states. Raja Bey, a chieftain with connections to the royal house of
Indragiri, resided in Singapore until he departed on accusations he murdered someone while
working for a Westerner. Hitherto, Raja Bey earned a reputation in Singapore as a slender yet
courageous individual as demonstrated when within forty-eight hours he apprehended some
Malays who killed their Chinese passengers in exchange for a small bounty in 1823. He sailed to
Kelantan where some of his companions landed and informed the locals they worked for Raja
Bey. Being infamous for his depredations, the merchants of Kelantan declared him a pirate.
Hearing of this, Raja Bey landed to assist his followers and drew his keris to gain redress for the
insult. A skirmish ensued resulting in the death of Raja Bey and eight of his followers, along
with five or six people from Kelantan. The local ruler gave them proper funerals despite the
accusation. In response, the Straits presses decried the violence of the Malay states.239 Raja
Bey’s life and death showed the complexity of relations between the various states within
Malaya and the subjectivity of piracy. In this instance, Singapore harbored a reputed Malay
pirate for years and even employed him in the service of hunting pirates.
Singapore remained an important port for Malay pirates because it acted as an excellent
place to sell stolen goods. In 1855, colonial forces arrested Tuanku Putra, the ruler of Bukit
Batu, at Singapore for plundering the property of British subjects. The authorities arrested him
and detained his boat and the alleged stolen property. India’s Supreme Government took interest
in the proceedings of this case, probably because of the Putra’s status as a Sumatran prince.240
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Malay pirates sought to dispose of their plunder at Singapore because it offered more potential
buyers and likely higher prices than if the pirates sought to dispose of the plundered material
within their own territory. However, selling stolen goods, especially goods from British subjects
presented its own risks because the government in Singapore possessed the ability and willpower
to arrest suspected pirates for their crimes.
Piratical incidents during the 1859 to 1860 year show Malay pirates brutally attacking
other vessels near Singapore. On 2 June 1859, Malay pirates brazenly attacked a police vessel
containing a “native officer” and six other crewmen. During the fight, the pirates killed the
officer and three peons, along with forcing the remainder to abandon the boat. The pirates
displayed their power and courage by attacking armed colonial policemen, perhaps as resistance
or to seize their weapons. There was a high risk for both the pirate and pirate suppressor during
this time. Other attacks concentrated on Chinese vessels with an attack on a Chinese sampan of
15 July resulting in the death of one crewman. On 7 October, Malay pirates attacked two
Chinese tongkang, killed three crewmen, and left one severely wounded on one vessel despite
showing no resistance. Although police arrested five Malays on suspicion of committing the
crimes, there were no convictions. 241 For that year, petty piracy numbered four cases while junk
piracy at sea numbered two and both instances received convictions.242 Petty coastal piracy near
Singapore remained prevalent during the 1850s and was particularly difficult to eliminate
because of problems concerning gaining sufficient proof of the pirates’ identities.
The piratical activity of Daing Ibrahim, the Temenggung of Johor who routinely engaged
in or supported piratical activity, was common knowledge during the 1830s in Singapore and the
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surrounding region. British authorities knew of his connections to piracy and protected him
anyway because of his support for them, along with his prominence in the Malay world. Various
survivors from piratical attacks by the temenggung’s people reached the police offices in the
Straits Settlements, confirming their involvement.
The temenggung’s men gathered intelligence in Singapore harbor from the various
vessels passing by to determine which vessels were worth attacking and how best to intercept
them. Nakhoda Bayer with his six-coyan243 burthen vessel and ten-person crew waited in
Singapore to take on goods and two passengers. About four days before their departure, two
men in a boat, recognized as men from Telok Blangah, asked for betel and water, along with a
variety of other questions concerning “the arms on board, the number of men when they were to
leave Singapore.”244 Pirate organizations operating in Singapore developed a system to collect
intelligence to determine what vessels to attack and plunder by asking the crews of vessels about
their departure plans and capability to resist. The questioners, coming from the neighborhood of
the temenggung, likely worked for him by gathering intelligence and then relaying it to their
superiors.
Only one day and one night after the departure did pirates attack the aforementioned
vessel near Batu Pahat. Three vessels obscured another three as they approached their prey
during the early morning hours, requesting tobacco and rice from Nakhoda Bayer. After sending
some tobacco, they began questioning the crew by asking what cargo they carried and from
where they came. Once all eight vessels came within range, including six as large as the East
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India Company gunboats, they commenced firing. Unable to resist the musket and gunfire, the
crew used their sampan to escape to shore. During the course of their conversation before the
shooting, Nakhoda Bayer learned the names of the pirate panglima, Ahmat, Nian, and Mat, all of
whom he recognized as working for the temenggung. He even knew Ahmat quite well.245
Pirates working for the temenggung at Singapore attacked vessels leaving the port and plundered
them, which the local authorities knew of well. Even when the pirate commanders knew the
victims, they attacked anyway, even at the risk of being identified. The temenggung’s pirate
vessels were quite formidable against perahu and in certain respects rivaled those of the Straits
Settlements Marine.
The temenggung’s men attacked specific vessels for a combination of political,
economic, and personal reasons but were not always successful in their attacks despite their
prowess. Nakhoda Lee Leng Hong of the Hogue Guan, a tope that sailed from Singapore to
Malacca on 15 October 1835, deposed to a colonial official on a sophisticated pirate attack
conducted by the temenggung’s men. On the 16th, off the Straits of Kukup, Lee watched three
large perahu with apilan, along with a small vessel, row up to his vessel and proceed to ask
questions about the cargo and if the tope was destined for Malacca. Upon Lee’s refusal to
anchor, the perahu fired on the tope, hitting the waterline. “The four boats then pulled around on
our other side and hailing us and asked where Abdul [K]adir was… and immediately fired three
shots to our sails,” according to Lee.246 Abdul Kadir, as mentioned early, was an enemy of most
Singapore-Malay elites, including the temenggung, who loathed him and wanted him dead.
Perhaps the temenggung sent the fleet to track down the Hogue Guan and gain intelligence on his
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whereabouts. In any case, the pirates followed a typical modus operandi for hunting larger
vessels by attacking when becalmed after attempting to gain some idea of the vessel’s cargo and
destination. This case of piracy likely involved political motives emanating from the political
vacuum in Singapore at that time.
The targeting of Hogue Guan also likely involved motives of revenge against the tope for
past actions. The perahu continued their attack and fired from both sides for three hours during
which time the tope fired around thirty shots. The nakhoda confirmed that those who attacked
his vessel worked for the temenggung because he had seen them before in Singapore. The
Hogue Guan was a popular target for pirates because pirates attacked it three times before. The
alleged reason for such repeated attacks was that the crew killed a panglima from Kampong
Gelam in one of these encounters.247 Malay pirates from Singapore under the command of the
temenggung repeatedly targeted a vessel despite their failures as a means to avenge a fallen
commander, steal the cargo, and ascertain more information concerning a political enemy.
Another attack that occurred the same year, likely perpetrated by the temenggung’s
people, was more successful. Lim Ham, formerly of Singapore, sailing on a vessel headed from
Singapore to China, fell victim to a pirate attack. On 9 April 1835, pirates attacked his vessel off
Johor, killing most of the crew and setting fire to the vessel. Lim and another person faked their
deaths until the pirates left. The pair jumped overboard and drifted on planks of wood for half a
day until they reached Pulau Riau. Having lived at Singapore for ten years, he recognized three
of the pirates who attacked as ferrymen from Telok Belangah.248 Malays working for the
temenggung at times had other maritime-related professions that enabled them to keep and
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employ their skills as seafarers. Singapore Malays established a piratical network that operated
effectively under a chief of somewhat unclear claim to authority who redistributed wealth from
the cargoes leaving and entering Singapore to pirates and the Malay community.
Within the Straits community, it was common knowledge that Daing Ibrahim partook in
piracy while residing under British authority at Singapore, which followed the pattern of
kerajaan economics. The Dutch resident at Riau remarked how even the Singapore Chronicle
reported the young temenggung’s involvement in piracy with the assistance of boatmen and
others in the harbor of Singapore to gather intelligence. He complained, “…the booty made by
them is taken there [at Singapore] and sold at a low price or bartered for the stores required by
them.”249 By 1833, the Singapore Malay community accepted Daing Ibrahim as their new
leader who was born only in 1811 and who maintained his power base until installed formally as
the temenggung in 1841 by the bendahara of Pahang. Yet, the Straits Settlements needed his
abilities to fight pirates and therefore ignored his own participation in such activities to keep at
least some sense of order even though the public knew of his connections to piracy.250 The
temenggung employed kerajaan economics with the piratical aspect to maintain political power
and keep his followers content. The general public knew of his involvement, but the Straits
Settlements government did little for years because of their own ineffectiveness in fighting
piracy in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.
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The Temenggung, Singapore, and Piracy

Abu Bakar inherited not only the prestige of his father Ibrahim’s office but also its
obligations and tradition of naval warfare. Abu Bakar became renowned for his cooperation
with British authorities in Singapore and developing Johor into a powerful Malayan state.
However, in the years before his ascension to the office of temenggung, some evidence suggests
his involvement in piratical activities despite his cooperation with British authorities on
suppressing pirates. Johor, like other Malay states in the region, continued with the double game
of suppressing piracy at the behest of colonial authorities while also partaking in state-sanctioned
piracy.
Singapore’s authorities arrested Wan Abu Bakar on suspicion of piracy even though his
father was the ruler of Johor and an important British ally. With the sworn testimony of
Ahmad251 and Lamat, two refugees from Pahang, Mr. Vaughan, a Singapore magistrate, issued a
warrant for the arrest of Wan Abu Bakar, the oldest son of Temenggung Ibrahim, along with two
of his associates in 1858. The Straits government dispatched the steamboat Hooghly with
Singapore’s deputy commission of police to apprehend the suspected pirates. The vessel’s crew
successfully brought the prisoners before the magistrate. According to Captain Wright of that
vessel, he had orders, albeit not from the governor, to destroy the vessels belonging to Wan Abu
Bakar “and other boats in the event of resistance to the execution of his orders.”252 Singapore’s
magistrate and likely its resident councillor initially possessed sufficient reason to arrest an
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important person within the temenggung’s inner circle under a charge of piracy. The threat of
punishment through the destruction of boats, vital for the functioning of a government in Insular
Southeast Asia, for the refusal of compliance and the presence of a high-ranking police officer
showed the seriousness of the charges and the resolve of Singapore’s resident. The arrest of
Wan Abu Bakar showed that, if Ahmad and Lamat’s sworn testimonies were truthful, he and his
compatriots engaged in piracy.
In spite of the testimonies, the magistrate threw out the case against Wan Abu Bakar and
his associates under highly peculiar circumstances. Mr. Vaughan dismissed the case against
Wan Abu Bakar and the other suspects on the grounds of “lack of evidence of the same informer
Ahmat that he was not a British subject [when] in his original information he had stated himself
to be such.”253 Although perhaps the court suspected him of lying and therefore making his
testimony worthless, they failed to ask Ahmad’s mother who lived in Singapore concerning his
status. The magistrate received information concerning Ahmad’s dual residences before issuing
the warrant. The governor expressed confusion over why the magistrate seemingly failed to
notice this sooner. Furthermore, the other witness stated in his deposition that he was a native of
Pahang and his testimony was still viable. In the report to the governor, there lacked an
explanation concerning “why the case was removed from the ordinary Magistrates’ cognizance
and placed under that of the Marine Magistrate.”254 These irregularities reveal problems in the
case that arose after the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Wan Abu Bakar rather than before.
The letter from Governor Blundell strongly suggests a cover up of Wan Abu Bakar’s
actions against Pahang refugees. The government in Singapore, while the governor himself was
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absent, charged Wan Abu Bakar and his associate with piracy, only to realize, in all likelihood,
afterwards that sending for the son and heir apparent of a chief Malay ally in the Straits of
Malacca to charge him with a crime punishable by hanging was an exceptionally bad idea.
Realizing this in retrospect, the magistrate or the government probably concocted some means to
dismiss the case by employing some apparent inconsistency in the case without truly examining
it to dismiss the case. The stated reason of dismissing the case indicated a cover up by the Straits
Settlements government to protect Wan Abu Bakar and the alliance with the temenggung of
Johor.
Governor Blundell criticized the resident councillor’s handling of the case, less in that the
magistrate failed to convict the suspected pirates, because it interfered in the way in which the
Singapore governments enforced their authority. Blundell gave Wan Abu Bakar and Tunku
Syed permission to sail toward Pahang and criticized his subordinates for obtaining an arrest
warrant for them on the “the mere information of a refugee from Pahang, one of a party hostile to
this Tunku Syed…,” that was insufficient in the eyes of the governor for “the very serious charge
of Piracy.”255 Blundell argued that the Straits police ought not to have arrested Wan Abu Bakar
and Tunku Syed in the first place, especially the word of potentially politically biased refugees of
lesser social status. The Straits Settlements’ relationship with the temenggung of Johor was
sufficiently important to forgive minor acts of piracy committed by his son and other officials.
Furthermore, a conviction for piracy almost certainly meant the prisoner would swing from the
gallows and severely damage the relationship with Daing Ibrahim.
In light of the incident, the governor criticized the resident councillor for the manner in
which he employed the vessel Hooghly to arrest Wan Abu Bakar and his associates. Blundell
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suggested retrospectively the resident councillor ought to have “refrained from these Judicial
Proceedings” and instead dispatched “the Honorable Company Steamer ‘Hooghly’ with an
Officer such as Mr. Cluff on board, to enquire into these complaints and if necessary, to bring
Wan Aboobaker and his companions.” The governor predicted that such actions would have
redressed the losses of the complainants and prevented the loss of face for “these men of rank
and position” arriving in Singapore as prisoners. 256 Later sources indicated that the arrest
concerned merely the seizing of spears, something certainly not worth such trouble of arresting
him if true.257 Making accusations against such a powerful figure as Abu Bakar represented the
willingness of Southeast Asians to use the colonial state’s anti-piracy mission to better their own
interests or get revenge on the Malay elites. Blundell set a higher standard for arresting highranking Malay officials of piracy and permitted redressing losses of victims of such officials’
actions through compensation as sufficient instead of criminal prosecution. These actions show
respect for Malay societal rank within the colonial government. The Johor government received
a certain amount of legal protection from the colonial government because of its importance as
an ally.
The governor found the Johor government erred in its conduct of naval patrols through its
assumption of British authority rather than confiscating goods and seizing people on vessels.
Blundell commanded the resident councillor to address the temenggung on the issue of stopping
the Johor government vessels from flying the British flag while patrolling the waters off Johor.
Furthermore, the governor took issue with Wan Abu Bakar and the bendahara of Pahang
accompanying Mahmud, the former Sultan of Lingga, on a voyage to Pahang. The Johor patrol
256

Ibid.
W. Linehan, “A History of Pahang,” The Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 14, 2
(1936): 72.
257

132
vessels taking prisoners and cargo from vessels whether in Johor or Singapore territorial waters
was less of an issue than the use of the British flag in such patrols.258 The letter reveals the
governor was clearly more concerned about international issues from this incident over piracy.
The unlawful use of the British flag by the Johor government threatened to create a
misunderstanding between Great Britain and a foreign government, along with potentially
damaging the honor of the flag. The issue of unclear jurisdictional divide required the Straits
Settlements government to work with the Johor government on patrolling the nearby waters and
potentially gave pirates room to operate in these waters.
The Straits Settlements had great difficulty patrolling the waters near Singapore and other
settlements because of the inadequacies of their marine patrol vessels. The Hooghly suffered
from engine breakdowns and returned to Calcutta in 1851 for repairs during the junk trading
season when Chinese vessels needed protection from pirates. The two small sailing gunboats
proved ineffective against the pirate vessels that used their low draft to sail into shallow rivers
and inlets. The gunboats often had too heavy a draught to chase them. In 1852, the Straits
Marine proved inadequate to protect the numbers of Cochin-Chinese vessels from pirates.259
Without sufficient naval and marine patrols in the Straits of Malacca and the southwestern South
China Sea, pirates flourished in the rich trading waters with inadequate political guardians.
Faced with pirates causing so much trouble in the waters of Malaya, along with the
inadequacies of the Straits Marine, the Johor and the Straits Settlements government devised
reforms for the Straits Marine to combat petty piracy more effectively. By late 1860, the resident
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councillor of Singapore and the temenggung concurred in making permanent the agreements
concerning piracy suppression. They fully agreed on “the unfitness of the present Gunboats to
cope with the fast sailing well manned Sampans in which the greater portion of the petty
depredations was carried on…,”260 and therefore the Straits Marine was inadequate for the task
of maintaining peace and order in the waters of Singapore. The governments realized the
hopelessness of employing these gunboats in the waters off Singapore in search of small, less
organized thieves in low-draft vessels and worked with Johor’s ruler to develop a new strategy in
dealing with the piracy crisis.
Sophisticated technology was not always practical in piracy suppression because simpler
potentially meant giving the Straits Marine more effective means to counter piracy. The resident
councillor considered placing a dredge steam engine on a vessel 100 feet long with a draught of
three feet but found the $3,300 cost and that of maintenance in excess of the budget for fighting
piracy. The temenggung suggested, with the police commissioner agreeing, “to substitute for the
two gunboats four fast, well manned and armed Sampans of the same description as those used
by the Pirates, each with a Crew of eight men, at a cost of $200 for the four boats.”261 In fighting
pirates, the Straits government assumed for two decades that steam technology and gunboats
were the most effective means for combat. Though likely true for engaging large vessels or even
pirate fleets in favorable winds, such vessels proved inadequate for fighting the petty pirates of
the 1850s. Increasing the number of patrol vessels permitted the Straits Marine to patrol more
space, while the build of the vessels similar to that of the pirates permitted them to chase the
pirates into waters previously inaccessible to the gunboats. These vessels proved far more cost
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effective than the construction of a new steamboat, which were previously vulnerable to
breakdowns.
The temenggung made additional recommendations on counter-piracy operations
showing quite a different approach. Throughout the Straits Settlements’ early history, the
colonial authorities consulted former pirates to gather information on other pirates. The
temenggung offered to pay half of the expenses for the deploying of counter-piracy vessels. He
advised the Straits government on what “stations for boats ‘Tannah Merah Besar’, ‘Changee’,
‘Serangoon’ and ‘Tanjong Marawong’ and that they should constantly be on the move in their
neighbourhood.”262 The Straits government depended on the temenggung for his consultation on
the mission to suppress piracy throughout the waters of Singapore. Therefore, turning a blind
eye to the excessive use of force and shakedowns by Johor’s leadership proved a minor cost to
the overall picture of employing his assistance against piracy in the region. With tight budgets in
the Straits Settlements and high prevalence of piracy during the 1850s, turning to more costeffective measures made sense.
The governor, however, decided that a gradual change in anti-piracy policy, even
concerning forces partially funded by the temenggung, was necessary. Although the governor
agreed with the plan to switch from the gunboats to smaller craft, he decided that a gradual
transition was preferable to an immediate one. He proposed “at first that two Sampans be built
of the description required at a cost of $140, to which the crew of one of the gunboats should be
transferred [.]”263 Instead, the governor ordered the transferred gunboat, the Singapore, to work
for the master attendant in supplying the lighthouses, along with communicating with and
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assisting police outstations. He ordered one sampan attached to the police station in Pasir
Panjang and another in Changi while the police gunboat patrolled the Straits of Singapore and
assisted the sampans when necessary. Of course, the governor thanked the temenggung for his
assistance and advice in the matter of piracy suppression.264 The police stations of the island, on
the southwest and eastern coasts, respectively, of the island overlooked strategically important
waterways. Changi station protected commerce heading through the South China Sea and likely
limited the establishment of pirate bases in the Cape Romania vicinity. The temenggung
influenced heavily the governor’s orders on the Straits Settlements’ anti-piracy mission. A
change in policy from employing larger gunboats and the steamboat to smaller sampans also
suggests a change in the pirates themselves to focusing on the use of smaller vessels.
The installment of Wan Abu Bakar as temenggung set a change of course for Johor
without many of the piratical elements often associated with the territory. In the years before
Temenggung Ibrahim expired, mainland Johor had little in the way of towns and settlements.
Once Abu Bakar ascended to his father’s rank after Ibrahim’s passing on 31 January 1862, he set
out to reform the state by reducing the influence of his father’s lawyers and commercial agents.
To prevent greater British intervention in his territory, he brought Johor’s administration more to
Governor Cavenagh’s liking, while holding on to some useful European advisors such as Simons
as an agent, Abraham Logan for legal counsel and public relations purposes, along with Thomas
Braddell as an advisor. He reformed the Malay bureaucracy by gradually removing the former
pirates left over from his father’s regime and replaced them with Singapore-educated Malays.
Reading and writing his own letters greatly diminished the authority of the Malay scribes who
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previously wrote Ibrahim’s foreign correspondence.265 Abu Bakar’s reforms helped remove the
historical link between Johor and a plunder economy sustained by maritime commerce flowing
through the Straits of Malacca, a global trade chokepoint. Instead, he developed Johor along a
fusion of British and Malay political economies.
The changes in policy by the Johor with the assistance of the Straits Settlements
government likely contributed to the decline in reported attacks. Shortly after the adoption of
sampans for anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of Singapore and the death of Temenggung Ibrahim,
the number of reported pirate attacks from Singapore more than halved. Other factors
contributed to such a dramatic decline. Attacks also dropped significantly around Pinang and
Province Wellesley (Shown in Table 3 and Figure 5) and such a dramatic shift suggests a major
change in events from 1860 to 1862. Temenggung Abu Bakar pursued a policy against piracy
through a legal system by prosecuting suspected pirates in Johor with the assistance of
Singapore’s commissioner of police as demonstrated by a particular case tried in May 1864. The
failure to obtain a conviction against the prisoner revealed that the trial was substantive and not
merely for show.266 Perhaps having fairer trials lowered discontent of the populace, which
increased the legitimacy of the government. Evidence does not state how his own piracy arrest
affected Abu Bakar, but regardless of this, his government cracked down on piracy, both inside
and outside of its own ranks. Statistical evidence supports the notion that cooperation between
the colonial and Johor governments during the early 1860s reduced the amount of reported pirate
attacks in the waters off Singapore and Johor. By 1864-1865, the numbers of reported pirate
attacks diminished significantly throughout the Straits Settlements.
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Table 3267
Reported Pirate Attacks

267

Singapore

Malacca

Total

1855/1856

Pinang,
Province
Wellesley
1

8

1

10

1856/1857

9

9

0

18

1857/1858

-

-

-

-

1858/1859

5

9

1

15

1859/1860

7

6

2

15

1860/1861

7

10

0

17

1861/1862

3

4

1

8

1862/1863

2

5

0

7

1863/1864

1

8

1

10

1864/1865

1

0

0

1

Jarman, ed., Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements, 40-41, 98-99, 173, 238, 292-293, 364-365, 440-440, 514520, 632-638. Statistics for the year 1857/1858 are unavailable. These numbers should not be seen as accurate
representations of the piracy that occurred during this time, but rather depicting the trends for attacks.
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Figure 5. Reported Straits Settlements pirate attacks.
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The plunder aspect of kerajaan economics continued into the 1850s for various Malay
states, but differentiating between the petty piracy of poor Malays and the organized, statesanctioned piracy of chieftains remains challenging. Singapore’s liberal political economy and
weak authorities permitted its harbor to function as an important pirate base while the Malay
kingdoms enacted policies that often blurred the lines for their naval patrols between pirate
hunter and pirate. However, in the case of Johor, a new leader moved against the plunder aspect
of kerajaan economics because he determined that it no longer served his interest or those of his
subjects. Kerajaan economics also had a counter-piracy component in which Malay
governments hunted pirates and protected trade to enhance their legitimacy and reputation in the
Malay world. The interests of peaceful trade counterweighed the old pirate regime while the
various Western governments became increasingly powerful and assertive in pressuring their
allies to refrain from supporting or participating in piratical activities.

The Rise and Fall of Galang as a Political Power

The Galang Island group centered on Pulau Galang mysteriously rose and fell as a locus
of pirate activity during the 1820s and ‘30s. Contemporaries of the pirates and historians alike
focused on the mighty pirates of Galang, but their relationship within the larger context of
Malayan political economy usually still remained unclear. The people of Galang occupied an
ambiguous space between the worlds of pirates and the enforcers of the Riau-Lingga Kingdom,
resulting in their mixed depictions by historians. The Galang pirates emerged from mediocrity to
become a critical part of the kerajaan economics system by receiving economic privileges, the
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right to plunder vessels, in exchange for their military services on the behalf of Riau-Lingga
Kingdom until they no longer provided a net benefit to the Malay elites and the Galang pirates
found themselves cut astray.
In the early 1820s, Galang remained an outpost known for economic output, along with
its piracy. Temenggung Abdul Rahman of Singapore received the fealty of the Galang residents
who sold him agar-agar at the customary fixed rate of six Spanish dollars for a bahar of twelve
pikul. The temenggung then sold the agar-agar at the market for prices ranging between thirty
and forty dollars. This sort of trading exemplified the strong grasp of elite-centric kerajaan
economics over the orang laut. Galang, though a noted pirate stronghold, was only of moderate
strength in comparison to other pirate bases with twenty war perahu. Though a greater number
than other places such as Trong, Sugi, and Buru, it paled in comparison to Temiang268 and
Muppah, which had thirty each. The Sekana orang laut had forty war perahu or double that of
Galang. Presgrave wrote of the temenggung’s pirates, “…they consider piracy their birthright
and inheritance.”269 Galang operated during the reign of Temenggung Abdul Rahman as a
Straits produce collection center, along with its role as a pirate base among a series of others.
The people of Galang maintained a traditional economic and political relationship that long
ceased to favor them. Perhaps the agar-agar prices were once fair but inflation gradually eroded
any economic advantage to the ruler’s monopoly. However, the ancestral right to plunder
vessels in their waters provided a potential positive aspect for the orang laut within the kerajaan
economics system.
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A combination of events led to the transfer of Galang from the territories of the Britainsupported temenggung to a new master that ultimately proved critical for its rise. The Dutchsupported Yang di-pertuan Muda of Riau, Jafar, occupied the important island of Karimun Besar,
which resulted in the transfer of Galang along with Trong, Sugi, and Moroh to that leader from
Singapore’s orbit.270 Two other events ensured Singapore’s permanent loss of those territories.
The British and Dutch governments negotiated over the Straits of Malacca region to prevent the
outbreak of conflict, resulting in the 1824 Treaty of London that made it unlawful for the
authorities in Singapore to intervene in various islands to the south. This created a difficult
situation for Abdul Rahman, who risked British support if he intervened too strongly in his
southerly territories. The temenggung passed away in 1825, ensuring that he was unable to
reinforce his territorial claims.271 Galang received a new master without an invasion of its shores
but rather through the annexation of a larger island. Perhaps other islands in the temenggung’s
domain remained more independent of Riau given that the 1824 treaty did not involve the Malay
powers, but such is immaterial for this work. Such a transfer of power removed direct influence
the government in Singapore had over Galang because the temenggung no longer held sway
there. Instead, the Dutch gained influence over the place through their ally, the yang di-pertuan
muda, who made good effective use of the Galang orang laut.
The fall of Karimun Besar resulted in a power shift away from the Malay leaders friendly
with Singapore as part of a broader power struggle between Sultan Husain, backed by Great
Britain, and Sultan Abdul Rahman, backed by the Netherlands. Temenggung Abdul Rahman
employed the Karimun islands as pirate bases while Sultan Husain also regarded them as an
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extension of his territory with the Dutch resident at Riau disagreeing with the former. Seeing
that Karimun Besar contained a considerable amount of tin, he directed the Raja Jafar, Yang dipertuan Muda of Riau, to occupy the island in large part to weaken the legitimacy of Sultan
Husain. On 17 September 1827, the resident at Singapore received word that Raja Jafar ordered
twenty vessels to seize Karimun Besar, but Syed Akil prevented their complete occupation of the
island. By 22 October, fighting broke out when Malay-Dutch forces led by a Dutch schooner
fired on Husain’s stockades. Another invasion force included fifty European Dutch soldiers
under the command of two officers, and the Riau resident built their own stockade after their
arrival on 8 November. The island fell to the joint forces after an extensive blockade and
siege.272 The battle showed the willingness of Dutch forces in combination with their Malay
allies to attack forces loyal to Sultan Husain. Dutch and Riau-Lingga forces had a willingness to
cooperate to dominate of the Riau Archipelago even at the expense of bringing European soldiers
and committing to a lengthy siege.
The yang di-pertuan muda and the Dutch resident formed arguments to legitimize their
occupation of the islands by declaring the inhabitants pirates and that the Sultan of Lingga’s
authority was more legitimate. The resident responded to Singapore’s objections over the attack
on Karimun on 17 October and stated that he planned to protect his vassal. Furthermore, he
promoted the legitimacy of the Lingga sultan by stating that the sultan’s reign over the island
would be better and that piracy would decrease. The invaders further legitimized their actions by
declaring the residents of the island to be pirates supplied by and in the service of Husain in
Singapore, citing an incident two years earlier when Raja Endoot captured a Dutch-flagged tope,
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which Husain sold in Singapore.273 When chronicling the history of Riau-Lingga, Raja Ali
placed responsibility for the conflict on Husain’s wife, Tengku Yahya over Husain. He
described the roots of the conflict were an argument over jurisdiction of the tin-rich island
between Husain and Yang di-pertuan Muda Jafar.274 Even though Yang di-pertuan Muda Jafar
ordered the assault on Pulau Karimun Besar, Ali blamed Tengku Yahya for the conflict to
legitimize Jafar’s efforts. Power did not automatically equate to legitimacy and further it
endorsed the notion that to portray your enemy as a pirate or a supporter of pirates in the Malay
world was an effective propaganda tool that delegitimized their power.
The fall of Karimun rearranged the political circumstances of the day by placing the
Galang people firmly within the domain of Raja Jafar. Upon the capture of the island, Raja Jafar
of Riau farmed out a tin monopoly to a Chinese man and placed it under the military command
of the batin of Galang.275 However, the forces of the Sultan of Matam killed him in a raid in
1828 and took the Dutch flag as their prize, but in an ironic twist, the Dutch deposed the sultan
and placed Syed Akil in his place.276 Galang’s chiefs, along with those from three other
settlements, two of which, Moroh and Sugi, also were formerly loyal to the temenggung,
received orders from the yang di-pertuan muda and sultan to sail to Batavia and confess their
involvement in piracy.277 The exact nature of how the batin of Galang came to command
Karimun Besar remains unclear. The people of Galang probably either betrayed the temenggung
to fight for the Yang di-pertuan Muda Riau and occupied the island as part of the spoils of war

273

Presgrave, “The Sultan of Johor,” 56, 58, 59.
Ali al-Haji Riau, The Precious Gift: Tufat al-Nafis, 255.
275
Presgrave, “The Sultan of Johor,” 60; J. P. Cornets de Groot, “Piracies in Indian Archipelago,” Account and
Papers, Piracy: Slave Trade, vol. 56, Part 1 (1851), 80.
276
De Groot, “Piracies in Indian Archipelago,” 80.
277
Ali al-Haji Riau, The Precious Gift: Tufat al-Nafis, 243, 391.
274

144
or, less likely, had a feudal tie to Karimun that bound by its occupation. In either case, the
Galang orang laut became an important component in the military of the Riau-Lingga Kingdom.
The orang laut of Galang played an important role as the de facto navy of Riau-Lingga
by attacking the enemies of the kingdom while maintaining a role as pirates. When pirates under
Raja Merkung and Raja Merasan from Reteh began attacking shipping in the waters of RiauLingga, they employed penjajab armed with heavy guns that were more powerful than the
Galang kakap and lancang. The pirates under Raja Merkung and Iranun princes humiliated the
sea peoples of Riau-Lingga by capturing vessels owned by locals and evading them at sea. Once
Raja Merkung’s raiding became no longer tolerable, Sultan Muhammad Syah and the yang dipertuan muda ordered an assault on the Reteh forces. They assembled thirty penjajap, a Dutch
vessel, and officers of Galang to attack them, resulting in a decisive victory for Riau-Lingga with
the assistance of the Yang di-pertuan Muda of Indragiri.278 The war with Raja Merkung and
Reteh required the full mobilization of the royal forces with the forces from Galang playing a
prominent role in the war. Galang forces operated as a naval militia rather than a professional
navy in that they came to the aid of their sultan when needed.
The Galang pirates reached the peak of their power during the 1830s when no one it
seemed had the power to defeat them. The local Iranun faltered before them and they had the
protection of the Yamtuan279 Muda of Riau, who shielded them from Dutch influence. The
Dutch government attempted to rein in the piracy of Galang among other powerful islands by
paying them off, but that strategy proved insufficient. The aggression of the Galang pirates
proved to be their undoing in the long run because their actions left a trail of victims desirous of
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their punishment and potentially restitution. A shift in power within the Straits of Malacca
region meant that receiving the tacit acceptance of Dutch authority was no longer sufficient for
protection from European powers. The array of British authorities in Singapore, Calcutta, and
London lost patience with the authorities in Riau and Lingga.
Throughout much of the 1830s, Galang pirates devastated the waters off Malaya by
attacking a variety of enemies, both strong and weak. Galang pirates allied with other groups
within the Riau Archipelago for raids. In September 1832, a fleet of thirty or forty perahu
attacked an 80-ton vessel owned by the Sultan of Terengganu sailing to Singapore with tin,
coffee, and pepper. Pirates from Galang, Temiang, and Pahang overtook the royal vessel off
Pulau Tinggi, killing the crew and nakhoda, and sailed it to Kemaman to divide the plunder.280
Kemaman’s raja had a reputation for assisting pirates and probably gave them permission to stay
there knowing their goals.281 The pirate coalition was composed of crews from distant locations
working closely together to defeat a powerful opponent. It divided the plunder at particular
locations sometimes with permission from the local leadership.
Galang became of an important slave-trading market from which slaves captured in raids
and pirate attacks found purchasers and suffered transportation to other locations throughout the
Malay world. In January 1833, twelve kakap boats attacked a vessel with three men from Pulau
Pinang onboard named “Alleeang, Allang and Awang,” which resulted in their capture. The
pirates took them to Galang and sold them as slaves in another location but they managed to
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escape to Riau where the Dutch resident sent them to Singapore.282 Galang pirates operated in
the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea in search of plunder and slaves. Willing to ally
with pirates from other Malay polities, they attacked even the formidable Malay vessels.
However, their desire for slaves proved their weakness as they brought them back to their home
base before selling them elsewhere. When slaves escaped, they reported the attack along with
the pirate base location to the colonial authorities who became determined to eradicate these
bases.
The Straits Settlements received the complaints of pirate attacks against Singapore’s
shipping during the 1830s because many of the residents of the island suffered losses. Residing
in places such as Singapore permitted them to petition the government on dealing with piracy
without fear of violent repercussions. In May of 1833, the residents of Singapore, particularly
merchants and traders, petitioned Governor Robert Ibbetson and drew attention in a letter to the
numerous piracies in nearby seas that caused people residing in the Straits Settlements to “have
suffered many severe losses.”283 The local Asian shippers suffered, even though many defended
their cargoes with their lives, from losses to pirates, along with the European merchant
community that received payment for goods sold to Asian merchants and shippers only after they
sold them in ports throughout the archipelago. Although the shippers were responsible for the
cargo, the European merchants decided to absorb some of the losses rather than seizing the assets
of the local merchants. Survivors reported a number of the pirate attacks to the local police
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station but still many went unrecorded.284 The petition showed the joint interest of the Asian
shippers of various ethnic backgrounds and the European merchants in limiting the effects of
piracy through a system of credit created because of a lack of available liquidity in Singapore.
The Indian and British governments noted the effectiveness of the Galang pirates, among
others, with the complaints of the Straits commercial community. Singapore merchants also
petitioned the Supreme Government in India and the king to protect the local shipping from
pirate attacks by giving the Straits Settlements the necessary resources and authorities without
delay. They pleaded, “…that if this species of depredation be not immediately and effectually
checked, it must very shortly altogether drive the native trade of the Settlement into other
channels where more efficient protection is afforded.”285 The British merchant community in the
Straits Settlements acted as the mouthpiece for the various ethnic groups in Singapore and Pulau
Pinang concerning the problem of piracy in the waters off Malaya and the Riau Archipelago.
Various orang laut groups, including Galang, and other organizations involved in piracy finally
pushed too far for the merchants of Singapore, and ultimately the British government, to accept.
The aggressive raiding and piracy of the Galang orang laut caused a blowback for which
the islanders were ill-prepared. Their new opponents, the officers and men of the Royal Navy,
tested the limits of the Galang seafarers. The officer in command of the 1836 expedition,
Captain Henry Duchie Chads, dispatched the boats of the 28-gun HMS Andromache, usually
under the command of First Lieutenant Archibald Reed, to destroy the suspected pirate
squadrons. The Malay seafarers in Malaya and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago earned the respect
of their adversaries through their handing down of tradition, along with their “consummate
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skill,” “very fast and formidable prahus [sic],” and intimate knowledge of “the vast labyrinths of
creeks and islands” in the region.286 The Malay seafarers had immense advantages in dealing
with the newcomers in that they had the ability, largely, to determine the time and place of
combat because of their superior speed and knowledge of the local waters. Perhaps the wiser
course of action was to decline any battle with Royal Navy boats and wait for Andromache’s
departure, but the Galang orang laut took an aggressive stance instead.
A series of engagements between Royal Navy boats and perahu of the orang laut in the
Riau Archipelago resulted in a series of tactical British victories in 1836. On 13 June of that
year, the boats of HMS Andromache engaged five Galang perahu near Point Romania. When
the boats reached three miles distance from the perahu, the latter pulled and sailed for shore,
along with consolidating crews from two small perahu to a large one. During the chase, the
Malays hit their gong and brandished their weapons to the oncoming vessels. The large perahu
opened fire on the British pinnace first between two and three miles, while the British squadron
waited until within pistol shot to open up on the Malays’ largest and nearest perahu, resulting in
an exchange of fire. Ultimately, the large guns, swivels, and small arms raked the largest perahu
and the latter’s crew dove into the water rather than surrender. The crews of the remaining two
perahu beached and ran into the jungle, leaving five Cochin-Chinese prisoners behind. Unable
to capture any enemies, the Britons liberated the prisoners and destroyed the perahu.287 Galang
pirates operated in the waters off Cape Romania to intercept commerce heading to Singapore and
were apparently already successful in their venture. The larger vessel was too slow to escape the
onslaught of British firepower but the smaller ones proved more successful in evading the patrol.
286
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These Malays, like many others, had few qualms about firing first in an engagement and
possessed heavy enough-artillery at this point to fire at a distance. However, despite their sailing
abilities, Malays’ shooting abilities remained inadequate and the Royal Navy boats defeated even
the most powerful of the orang laut pirates.
This engagement proved devastating for Galang in that it devastated their ability to fight
back. The loss of vessels proved less important than the devastation wrought on the crews and
leadership of the vessels. Lt. Reed later returned to Cape Romania to speak with the locals living
ten to twelve miles upriver who reported hearing the conflict and that forty-nine men fell in
battle, including three chiefs. The most important Galang military commander, the batin, was
among the fallen, which likely led to the sluggish resistance at Galang itself.288 Lt. Reed later
estimated between fifty and sixty pirates fell in battle and later heard that fifty-two had died.289
Regardless of the precise number of Galang pirates who died in that incident, the remainder
became weakened and dispirited with the loss of their highest military commander without
inflicting any serious casualties on their enemy. Even the most powerful of the orang laut tribes
were little match for the power of comparable Royal Navy boats. The proud warrior lost the
battle and yet worse was still to come.
The fall of Galang eliminated the means by which Galang orang laut fought and
plundered their enemies, revealing the massive capacity of those people to fight. Lt. Reed and
the boats struck at Galang harbor, formed from various islands, on 26 June 1836, along with the
three villages up the narrow creeks feeding into it. British boats “chased on shore about 10
piratical boats.” This small skirmish for Galang entailed that their “crews were evidently panic
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struck and only sought to escape…” while inflicting only two British casualties.290 Afterwards,
British forces systematically wiped out any trace of the Galang armada, including fourteen large
perahu, some of which the gunboats’ chief officer recognized from a fight between them and
H.M.S. Wolf in March of that year. They also destroyed thirty to forty smaller perahu armed
with small guns and swivel cannons. The Galang orang laut already loaded some of the vessels
with gunpowder and shot for another expedition, the destruction of which resulted in injuries to
Lt. Reed and a seaman.291 Six hundred orang laut fled their vessels for the jungle, experiencing
few losses, but leaving behind their villages, boats, and possessions. Their vessels numbered
eighty to ninety armed in a variety of ways including some with stockades and large guns, while
others merely contained swivels and small arms.292 Galang was an incredibly powerful island
base for Malays with large weaponry usually not granted to orang laut by the sultanate. Despite
their superior numbers, fierce reputation, and abundant weaponry, the Galang warriors fled.
Perhaps a series of defeats broke their will to fight or that circumstances did not dictate their
need to fight to the death because they were on the defensive and had the means to escape into
the dense jungle.
In previous years, the Galang people evaded the vengeance of the Dutch forces through
their connections to the Malay elite, particularly the yang di-pertuan muda. At some point in the
mid-1830s, an expedition set out from Riau, on Dutch authority, to eliminate the nearby
settlement of Galang. However, by the time the vessels neared the settlement, the crews
witnessed the escape of a fleet of perahu and arrived at a ruined village with all valuable items
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already removed. Geography protected Galang by forcing incoming vessels to make a circuitous
route that slowed them down. Political patronage protected the Galang pirates in that the
Yamtuan Muda of Riau and his subordinates likely informed them of any incoming attacks given
the yamtuan’s interest in the success of the Galang pirates.293 Although the orang laut at Galang
perhaps saw the incoming fleet before setting off, they must have received word in advance from
Riau of the impending attack in order to remove so thoroughly everything of value before the
arrival of the fleet from only a short distance away. Galang’s political connections and
geography to lesser extent with the Riau-Lingga elite enabled it to evade responsibility for
piracy.
The most direct evidence available of cooperation between Malay elites and the orang
laut at Galang presently available remains a letter captured by British forces. Raja Ali, the
younger brother of the yamtuan muda and brother-in-law of the Sultan of Lingga, ordered the
batin of Galang and Raja Alling to prepare two perahu fully equipped and crewed so that Raja
Ali may cruise in May and Raja Alling to sail to Lingga on receiving the letter. The writer of the
letter, Encik Ammun, only sent it rather than going himself because he was presently in company
of a Dutch gunboat.294 The Dutch resident at Riau likely knew of Galang’s piratical character
because of the island being within sight of the fort there.295 A direct line of command existed
between the military leader of Galang, the batin, and the Malay elite. The continued success of
the Galang pirates depended on the patronage of the sultan and his family, who at times joined

293

W. Montgomerie to Murchison, National Archives, United Kingdom, Admiralty Records, Piracy in the Straits of
Malacca, ADM 125/144, 145.
294
Inchi Ammun to Raja Alling and Batin Galang, National Archives, United Kingdom, Admiralty Records, Piracy
in the Straits of Malacca, ADM 125/144, 195.
295
“[Ship’s Journal],” 29 June 1836, National Archives, United Kingdom, Admiralty Records, Piracy in the Straits
of Malacca, ADM 125/144, 195.

152
the Galang pirates to hunt for plunder. The relationship with the Dutch authorities was more
complex. The elite avoided engaging in piracy overtly in front of the Dutch officials, who must
have known of Galang’s role in the pirate economy anyway, because of the island’s proximity to
the Dutch headquarters for the Straits of Malacca region.
The destruction of Galang, though costly, was recoverable, but the breaking of the bonds
between Galang and the Malay elite devastated Galang’s function as a pirate base. The loss of a
village was of negligible consequences because Malays’ “domiciles [were] little more than of
leaves and therefore being able to be rebuilt with trifling labor and the same with any other less
accessible spot.”296 According to Resident Goldman of Riau, the yamtuan muda, quite possibly
in compliance of the wishes of the Dutch East Indies government, ordered the Galang leadership
to come to Riau and explain why the Galang orang laut were building large boats, presumably
for piracy because of their size. Learning this, the Dutch began implementing a policy of exile to
Batavia for pirate chiefs throughout the Malay World. Galang orang laut realized this and fled
to Singapore to beg for asylum, where Governor Samuel Bonham granted them asylum in April
1837 without knowing they had been constructing large boats. Dutch authorities wanted three or
four Galang leaders who fled to Singapore.297 The Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland,
approved of Governor Bonham’s decision to keep the Galang leaders in Singapore in order to
gather all necessary intelligence from them. Furthermore, he ordered that any extradition of the
leaders must follow regular procedure and that the Dutch needed more evidence of wrongdoing
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to justify extradition.298 In an ironic twist, one of the men responsible for the destruction of
Galang received pleas for asylum from the people who fought them only in the previous year.
The yamtuan muda severed his relationship with the Galang leadership once they became a
liability.
Political factors fit into the decisions by the Malay elite to phase out support for large
piratical operations that caused drastic changes in Malay politics. The Yang di-pertuan Besar of
Lingga decreed on 24 January 1836 the establishment of a pass system to regulate shipping and
prevent piracy. He also made piracy and supplying piracy punishable by death. Purchasing
captives from pirates meant either death or the loss of the purchased captives and all goods
without compensation.299 Resident Kommandant Goldman and D. H. Kolff, Jr., an officer
experienced with Insular Southeast Asia,300 played important roles in setting up the pass system,
along with convincing the sultan to set up a register of vessels entering his port and sending four
Malay perahu to hunt pirates. Resident Goldman wanted to find a way to establish a more
peaceful alternative to piracy to make a living, minimize violence, and prevent reprisals from
attacking pirates. British and Dutch authorities agreed that the former’s warships had the right to
land in foreign territory without permission and the right to chase pirates at sea, so long as they
did not excessively weaken local rulers.301 Dutch officials worked with British and Malay
authorities to develop a system that outlawed piracy and attempted to form greater cooperation
between the various nations.
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The Dutch East Indies government attempted a strategy of mass bribery to put an end to
state-sanctioned piracy through a new treaty signed in asylum July 1836 that placed the RiauLingga Kingdom under greater Dutch influence. While the yamtuan and sultan maintained two
war perahu apiece, Batavia paid 14,400 florins annually to various chiefs to work in concert with
Dutch forces. The sultan received 20,000 florins annually from Batavia to defray his expenses of
fighting pirates. In addition to an increased Dutch military presence, authorities banned all
vessels with piratical characteristics, namely those with an apilan or bulwark near the bow of
vessels. The sultan requested from Batavia that they give him funds to pay various chiefs 150
florins a month for resisting the temptations of piracy, which Batavia granted but ordered the
resident of Riau to ensure the chiefs “received their just pay.” The sultan included Galang within
this list, among other islands formerly under the control of Temenggung Abdul Rahman
including Sugi, Sekana, and Temiang. In return, Dutch authorities received the right to review
ministerial appointments and the Malay elite suppressed piracy. Dutch officials believed that
British military actions inhibited greater successes.302 Batavia quietly gained more influence
over the Riau-Lingga Kingdom through more cooperative means than employed by the British
Royal Navy in Riau waters. The mass bribery incentivized a movement away from a piracybased economy and placed the sultan firmly under the influence of Batavia. Regardless of
whether the Royal Navy’s expedition ultimately inhibited piracy suppression or merely Dutch
expansionism, Galang’s power waned significantly.
The Galang orang laut became the most prestigious of Malay pirates and then fled their
homes as exiles within a decade. Their success, inextricably linked to the Yamtuan Muda of
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Riau who needed to support his political base and the demands of Dutch authorities, lasted in
large part through elite patronage. While the Galang pirates shared wealth with the Malay elite
who even led such actions, they were subordinate to the elite. Galang pirates shifted their roles
from a naval militia to pirates depending on the circumstances. Royal patronage permitted them
to become the most prestigious marine raiders in the Riau-Lingga Sultanate through the granting
of special privileges that likely included the carrying of heavy guns. However, when the Dutch
authorities reacted to the alarming rise in piracy and the later intervention of the British Royal
Navy, they decided to persuade the royal family to abandon their vassals in exchange for a more
favorable arrangement. Perhaps the Dutch officials offered an amount sufficiently close to losses
the elite made from the piracy aspect of kerajaan economics, along with greater security.
Already reeling from a series of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Royal Navy, the Galang
orang laut decided to escape to Singapore, a place outside of the authority of Riau-Lingga or
other states more vulnerable to Dutch pressure, rather than have its leadership face exile in
Batavia. The once mighty Galang orang laut shattered and became refugees.

Panglima Awang: The Unlikely Pirate

Aside from those in the Malay elite, little information remains on individual pirates and
their careers. Unlike their counterparts in the Golden Age of Piracy in the Americas, the names
of pirate commanders have yet to become household names like Edward “Blackbeard” Teach or
Bartholomew “Black Bart” Roberts of the Atlantic. Individual Malay and Chinese pirates of
Malaya commoner background became forgotten soon after their deaths. A lack of sources
consistently naming specific pirates prevents us from identifying the era’s notorious pirates.
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Paradoxically, the most notorious Malay pirate was of Chinese ancestry. Malay
conceptualizations of identity at the time permitted outsiders to become Malay under particular
conditions. This pirate, Panglima Awang, became quite infamous in his own time. Despite his
exceptional effectiveness, his career demonstrated the vulnerabilities of even the most powerful
pirates. His career displayed the expendability of pirates, regardless of their fame, and
subservience to the elite.
The origins of Panglima Awang remain unclear but he somehow made the transition from
a Chinese merchant to a pirate.303 Although remaining unnamed, a source described a man
fitting his description leading an assault on a sampan pukat containing $10,000 to $12,000 in
cargo near Pulau Tinggi on 3 November 1832. The sampan pukat with a crew of thirty-three
Chinese armed with seven lela fended off a pirate fleet of fifteen or sixteen perahu for two hours
while en route from Singapore to Pahang. In the course of the engagement, the powder
magazine of the sampan pukat detonated, resulting in the sail catching fire. Exploiting the
confusion, the pirates closed in on the vessel and attacked with spears. The surviving crew
jumped overboard under the cover of darkness where a number drowned, but the nakhoda and
twelve others survived by clinging to wood until Malay fishermen plucked them out of the water
and placed them onshore. The pirates, likely wishing to conceal their identities, attempted to
find the survivors but failed because Malays sent them overland to the Johor River and
ultimately Singapore. The nakhoda recognized two of the panglima as originating from
Timian304 and Galang who were Riau Chinese who converted to Islam and dressed like
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Malays.305 These Chinese essentially became Malay by adopting their customs and religion.
Pirates from different islands joined forces to attack rich merchant vessels and fought, in this
instance, to eliminate any survivors as to protect their identities. The depositions from the police
station confirming the identify remains lost, but regardless of whether the panglima was Awang,
it shows how Malays made outsiders leaders regardless of the origins if they adopted their
culture.
Panglima Awang appeared in the Singapore papers by name for only a few months but
left quite an impression. One particular pirate attack confirmed the notoriety of Panglima
Awang. Four perahu and 160 crewmen attacked the brig Samdunnee of Nagore sailing from
Penang to Singapore in around October 1835, which contained thirty-eight people including
passengers. The two larger pirate vessels had four lela and the smaller had two, but their use was
unnecessary with the crew offering no resistance. The capture of the brig’s cargo of
manufactured piece goods, ebony, rice, and other goods represented a major success for the
pirates because of the type of the vessel, being of Western origin, and for the distance from it had
come. Below Panglima Awang were four other commanders, presumably for each of the
perahu. Awang seized a woman who was a passenger, resulting in her husband apparently
throwing himself overboard.306 This attack gave Panglima Awang a reputation for piracy in an
era when the names of individual pirate commanders remained unknown by the authorities and
Westerners because he attacked and captured a square-rig vessel sailing from India to Singapore.
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Panglima Awang’s personal characteristics indicated he seemed unlikely to become a
legendary Malay pirate, but he still managed to navigate the local political systems. Survivors
reported that Awang was a mix of Chinese and some other, probably Malay, background.307 He
was “slender,” had a height of five feet nine inches, and possibly had vision difficulties. His
presence in Lingga showed that he felt comfortable enough to profess his goal of sailing to Java
in April 1836.308 Such actions indicate confidence, if not arrogance, on the part of Awang and
his ability to move within the politics of Riau-Lingga. Although sailing to Lingga does not
prove a connection to the royal house there, it shows at least indifference on the part of the
government to prevent their home from being a supply point for the area’s most infamous pirate.
The publicity for Awang perhaps came back to haunt him in the coming weeks. Panglima
Awang became quite notorious by 1836, even getting into the Singapore papers and unabashedly
proclaiming his own upcoming campaign to attack Java, the center of Dutch power in Asia.
Awang, despite his unlikely characteristics, managed to make peace, at the very least, with the
important political figures in the Riau-Lingga Kingdom.
Panglima Awang and his commanders operated from an island base near a larger pirate
base but their base was minor and they relied on other bases as places for buying and selling.
Formerly captured prisoners of Awang’s group reported that they stopped at Pulau Kayu Arang
of the Galang island group, the home of the families of the four subordinate commanders.
Instead, Panglima Awang divided the plundered cargo at Galang and sold his share to a Chinese
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merchant on the island. The pirates also stripped the rigging and sails of the captured brig. They
probably sold them later. The serang of the brig found himself sold to a visiting Malay selling
sago and shipped off to Pulau Bangka.309 In another account by China Pilli, a boy between ten
and twelve, recalled from almost certainly the same pirated vessel, arrived at Pulau Kayu Arang
and sold the plundered goods there to Chinese from Singapore. Awang reportedly burned the
brig to the waterline at the water’s edge.310 However, China Pilli was probably mistaken on the
location of the brig because of other reports state an English brig off Galang.311 It seems
unlikely the pirates would keep a British vessel’s hulk so near the secret home of the
commanders’ families. Panglima Awang worked within the existing Galang piracy network and
sold his pirated goods to various merchants from throughout the Riau-Lingga Archipelago.
By the middle of 1836, the fortunes of Panglima Awang eroded rapidly. In June 1836,
Panglima Awang and Panglima Jamil sailed for Java on a piratical cruise in search of slaves and
plunder. During a nighttime raid, the pirates swooped onto shore, killing five men and capturing
a woman and her child, which resulted in the fateful decision of sending Panglima Jamil’s
perahu back to Galang while Panglima Jamil and a portion of his crew stayed on Panglima
Awang’s vessel. Two Dutch steamers off Java attacked Awang’s vessels, destroying a boat. 312
Awang’s expedition set out during a time of increased security in search of slaves to sell at
Galang. In this instance, either the crews focused on capturing women and children or the men
resisted too heavily for capture. Regardless, the presence of patrolling steamers made previous
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raiding routes less feasible with the increased naval might of the Dutch authorities. A golden age
of Malay piracy had peaked.
“My father is dead, my grandmother was Javanese and taken by Panglima Awang. My
mother resides at Timiang.313 Panglima Awang took me away some time ago.”314 Such was the
statement of Ular, a boy aged between ten and twelve years old. Having failed to secure captives
off Java, Awang’s perahu headed for Batu Bara, Sumatra, with commanders Tugging, Baba,
Boolat, and Assim and over forty men.315 Just before dawn on 1 August 1836, six piratical-style
perahu fought boats under the command of Lt. Reed, resulting in a battle causing numerous
pirate deaths, along with a Malay seafarer killed and another wounded from Reed’s boats. The
pirates attacked the British boats because they mistook them for trading vessels and only realized
their mistake when it became too late.316 Ular claimed all but three pirates perished in the fight,
including Panglima Awang. Panglima Assim and Panglima Boolat, lying wounded in Awang’s
cabin, lit up the perahu’s magazine, blew it up rather than surrender.317 Awang’s fleet displayed
fierce resistance against the onslaught of their enemies but to no avail. After years of raiding,
slave trading, and tearing families apart throughout Maritime Southeast Asia, the illustrious
career of Panglima Awang ended in a blaze of glory.
Panglima Awang represented an unusual case in which a nakhoda of Chinese descent
became a pirate commander by adapting Malay customs. The Malay elite offered safe harbor
and almost certainly benefitted in some way from his activities. Awang operated by selling
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pirated goods and people at Galang, Riau-Lingga’s premiere pirate mart at that time, and
establishing a secret residence nearby. He became infamous through his attacks on shipping,
especially on square-rig vessels usually ignored by Malay pirates. Rarely did specific pirate
commander names enter the pages of local English-language newspapers. Hardly ever does the
name of a specific pirate from early 19th-century Malaya survive within the historic record
multiple times. The manner in which Awang, the other panglima, and his crew fought against
British forces was a radical departure in the manner by which most Malay pirates fought at sea,
who usually attempted to flee an unwinnable battle. The intentional detonation of the powder
magazine was virtually unheard of in battles against Malay pirates during this period.

Piracy, Slavery, and Malay Women

Although Malay women rarely participated in piracy, women throughout much of
Maritime Southeast Asia fought in defense of their homes and villages against attackers,
especially when the men went on expeditions, while slaves formed an important part of kerajaan
economics by reinforcing their masters’ social statuses. Women made skilled fighters but piracy
appears to have been almost exclusively outside engendered notions of warfare during the 19th
century in the Malay culture, along with much of Insular Southeast Asia. Particularly in
desperate circumstances, Southeast Asian women fought in battle. Malay women and slaves
likely played a supporting role within the overall pirate economy through industrial support and
thereby playing an important role within kerajaan economics by supporting the Malay social
order.
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In a various conflicts during the 19th century, Maritime Southeast Asian women fought in
land battles against Westerners and Asians alike. When the crew of U.S.S. Potomac fought the
inhabitants of Kuala Batu in 1832 in retribution for the piracy of the Friendship, women urged
the men to resist American forces continually. In the course of the battle, “a woman at Mulah
Mohammeds [sic] fort” nearly severed the hand of an American with a sabre.318 During the
Selangor Civil War, circumstances became quite miserable from 1867 to 1873. Frank
Swettenham informed Isabella Bird afterwards that women used deadly weapons against each
other during the conflict.319 Iranun women in Borneo remained with their children in their
territory while the men sailed on their raiding missions. They had reputations as being “nearly as
warlike as the men, and understand the use of fire-arms,” along with being “sufficiently powerful
to beat off the Dyaks….”320 Women tended the remaining perahu and booty. Women of coastal
Malaya, Borneo, and Sumatra fought in land conflicts to an extent with a familiarity with
weapons in combat sufficient to inflict casualties. Engendered military roles for Insular
Southeast Asian women during the 19th century generally gave them more of a defensive role
than offensive within society rather to permit men to conduct systematic piracy.
Insular Southeast Asian women became pirates during the 19th century, but quite rarely.
Usually, there was only one woman in a pirate crew when it happened. In June 1846, a Malay
perahu with seven men and one woman attacked a five-crew Chinese boat coming back from
Singapore to a local island.321 Authorities charged four individuals with piracy and murder, three
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men and one woman, and sent them from Labuan to Singapore, the government of which handed
them over to the Dutch Consul.322 This may have been because women were much less
expendable than men to Malay society in the Riau-Lingga-Johor area and that piracy was quite a
risky venture. Johor Malays had a tendency to “…seldom spare any but women” and
occasionally Muslims such as hajis.323 During the 19th century, Malay women pirates were a
rarity and usually there was only one female pirate crewmember when they existed at all in a
vessel. Perhaps women were too socially valuable to risk on pirate missions that entailed high
risks for casualties and Malays at this time viewed such activities as the men’s domain.
Although orang laut women lacked any qualms about living at sea, 19th-century Malay
women of status had societal expectations that prevented their travel by sea. Abdullah Munsyi’s
wife decided against joining her husband in Singapore by sailing from Malacca, which forced
him to sail back and forth between the settlements for decades. Malay social conduct, more so
than the prospect of piracy, prevented a Malay woman of status from making a sea voyage
without serious repercussions. Instead, the respectable income from his skills as a writer enabled
him to pay for repeated trips to visit his family in Malacca.324 Malay women of repute rarely if
ever became pirates during the 19th century because doing so violated entrenched social norms in
Malay society and therefore left the tasks of raiding and naval warfare to men.
Malay women played a role in a supporting economics within the pirate system that
enabled its practice. A common practice along coastal or downriver Malay women was weaving
mats for various purposes, including for their use as sails. Furthermore, vessels throughout the
archipelago required a variety of materials including rattans used for holding planks together,
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hauling the anchor, and various lines or ropes onboard.325 Orang laut women worked in the
maritime economy by sewing and maintaining nets and sails for vessels.326 Weaving mat sails
involved much labor and played a vital role within the maritime economy of Southeast Asia. In
the aftermath of an assault on Galang with its three villages with 3,000 to 4,000 residents,
Lieutenant Reed reported in an admiralty court, “There was no appearance of cultivation on the
islands, nor was there apparently any fishery.”327 The Galang people during the pirate season
adapted a plunder economy when women played a supporting role within the plunder-based
economy. Perhaps they played important logistical roles in ensuring the voyages had sufficient
supplies. Malay women almost certainly played an important role in keeping the piratical system
going that sustained the political and economic order throughout much of the Malay world.
In the often-blurred distinction in the Malay world between warfare and piracy, women
played a supporting role much of the time. Although records indicated women acted as pirates
during the 19th century in Malaya and the wider Malay world, they generally confined their
combat roles to land warfare and the vital economic support structure necessary to maintain a
seemingly perpetual war footing. Surviving records suggest women played a critical role in the
dismantling of the piratical system ignored by many historians on Malayan and broader
Southeast Asian history. Along with male counterparts abused by an abusive slave system,
women escaping to freedom played a vital role in the gradual destruction of the state-sanctioned
slave system rife in Malaya during the early 19th century.
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During this golden age for Malay piracy, human chattel became a critical aspect of statesanctioned piracy within kerajaan economics. Slavery, through Malay elite policy, shifted the
labor force from the skill-intensive maritime sector to that of agrarian economies and other forms
of gathering of natural resources. The slave trade embodied systemic ethnic bias but also a hint
of humanitarianism. Escaping slaves, men, women, and children not only sought freedom but
also became critical sources of intelligence for the destruction of pirate strongholds and slave
marts. Slaves were freed by a combination of their own courage and the presence of authorities
willing to break the system of slavery.
Omar, a resident of Penang, deposed to Samuel Bonham concerning life as a captive at
the hands of pirates. While on a boat loaded with rice belonging to Nakhoda Jenie with twentytwo crewmembers in 1830, twenty piratical perahu captured the vessel near the Kedah River that
included Omar and twenty others became prisoners while the nakhoda and Cheh Din, a
crewman, escaped by swimming ashore. The pirates seized the rice cargo and divided the
captives as slaves with Yusoof, another crewman, becoming the slave of Panglima Charang.
Che-Lah bought Yusoof for $9 and Omar for $12 and forced them to collect ebony from the
jungle for eleven months.328 The capture and sale of Omar and Yusoof by pirates was a part of
an organized effort to relocate labor from seafaring professions to agricultural work and natural
resource collection. The commanders and crews of pirate vessels seized vessels and sold the
prisoners to people who needed labor as part of a larger system. Previous historians have
ignored the influence of the slave trade on the decline of Malay shipping despite its prominence
in the historical record for the sake of more Eurocentric reasons.
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Omar’s deposition supports the notion of systematic discrimination against Chinese
prisoners by Malay pirates resulting from the lack of their demand by Malay elites, who greatly
preferred Malay slaves over Chinese ones. While in captivity by pirates, Omar witnessed attacks
on eight Malay vessels and five Chinese topes but never saw an instance where the pirates kept a
vessel. Instead, they destroyed or set adrift any captured vessel. The pirates slaughtered most of
the Chinese they captured, but they freed seventeen Chinese on Pulau Beda, near Pulau Pinang,
and sold two for a measly three dollars each. They kept Malays alive, however, because slave
traders bought them more readily. Panglima Charang kept a home and family at Pulau Galang
and therefore was a Galang pirate commander. Omar and Yusoof escaped slavery together, with
the former corroborating Omar’s testimony.329 Galang pirates, despite the incorporation of
Panglima Awang into their system, discriminated against Chinese captives because they fetched
lower prices. This was likely because of cultural and religious differences, but we should not
entirely ruled out differences in appearances. The disinterest in Chinese slaves perhaps gave
Chinese seafarers some breathing room in the early days of Singapore. The vessels themselves
had insignificant value as opposed to Malay captives.
Pahang contained an important slave mart linked to piracy that the Indian and local
governments desired closed. Bendahara Ali330 and the elite of Pahang justified the slave trade as
a tradition, a part of their laws, and that Britons had no right to interfere concerning their slaves.
Pirates sold their captives not near the mouth of the Pahang River but elsewhere and usually
Pahang Chinese purchased Cochin-Chinese as slaves. When representatives from the Royal
Navy, speaking on behalf of the governor general, “advised” Chinese slave owners to release
329

Ibid.
W. Linehan, “A History of Pahang,” The Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 14, 2
(1936): 60.
330

167
those named, they responded that they would release them under the command of the raja and
that saving the lives of the captives by paying $2 to $8 was an act of humanity that entitled them
to their labor.331 Pirates in Pahang targeted the South China Sea trade, especially preying on
Cochin-Chinese seafarers, to sell usually to Chinese merchants who bought Cochin- Chinese
slaves at low prices because they did not need them for labor. Therefore, a certain sector of the
pirate economy in Pahang existed to extort wealth from Chinese merchants.
When the commissioners from the Indian government met with the bendahara of Pahang,
they were not the only ones to place pressure on the system of slavery that was a critical
component of kerajaan economics. The commissioners threatened to blockade the river if the
raja failed to comply in sending slaves to Singapore for their emancipation. Aside from a man
who early swam to freedom by climbing aboard a British vessel, the bendahara freed seventeen
men, along with a woman and her child, all but three of whom were Cochin-Chinese. These
prisoners, who formerly belonged to the bendahara, the chiefs, and some Chinese, informed the
Britons of the whereabouts of the slave mart at Endau. The next day, Andromache reached
Endau and Lt. Reed received the orders that any resistance “must be treated as Pirates and their
property destroyed.”332 The possession and maintenance of slaves was a status symbol reserved
for those within the elite at Pahang, who handed over their slaves to avoid a blockade and
potential military confrontation with superior firepower. The emancipated slaves, having little if
any loyalty to their former masters, immediately turned on them to see the slave trading system
in Pahang destroyed.
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Destroying the slave mart had merely limited consequences, but the newfound potential
for freedom placed the system of slavery in Pahang at greater risk. Lt. Reed partially destroyed
the village reputed as a slave mart by selecting houses with powder and shot in them and
confirmed the presence of two abandoned Cochin-Chinese vessels not worth salvaging. One
Javanese man reached the party to gain his freedom, but the Pahang Malays moved the captured
Cochin-Chinese slaves to another location to prevent their emancipation.333 H.M.S. Raleigh
arrived in Pahang in September 1836 to secure the release of more slaves, resulting in the
liberation of twenty-eight men, four women, and a child, some of whom fled into the boats of the
British forces resulting in Lt. Michell granting them protection. Some warned that the next time
boats visited to free slaves, the response from Pahang would be more violent. On 29 October,
Syed Abdullah requested, by reading a letter to Bonham, compensation for the loss of slaves.334
The loss of slaves by the elite because of the demands by the Indian government placed great
pressure on the political structure of Pahang and threatened to spill into open warfare because
slaves wanted their freedom and were willing to risk their lives to reach the British boats to gain
it regardless of the consequences of failure.
Slaves’ quest for freedom was hardly limited to Pahang as Andromache and Raleigh
found others fleeing their former masters. On 8 September 1836 while patrolling for boats, the
two sloops-of-war found boats containing four men, two women, and a child waiting for strong
winds to take them to Java after escaping slavery at Reteh. Pirates had already captured one
woman off Lampung seven years ago while pirates had captured a man three times, once off Java
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and twice off Malaya, before arriving at Reteh.335 The system of piracy was incredibly pervasive
during the 1820s and ‘30s in which people found themselves plucked from the shores and seas to
serve new masters. When given the opportunity to speak with those interested in eliminating the
system that ripped them from their homes and families, they often provided valuable information
that contributed to British authorities gaining a greater understanding of the piratical system.
Perhaps the former slaves believed that such information would help the Royal Navy and other
authorities cause great devastation to their enslavers. Regardless of their motives, men, women,
and children struggled to flee the clutches of their former masters regardless of their ranks and
titles to seek a life free of bondage.
The Straits Settlements pressured Pahang for at least another decade on the issue of
freeing slaves and ceasing human trafficking. Systematic slave trading continued, particularly in
slaves captured from Bali and the eastern archipelago and then sold throughout the archipelago.
The Straits government repeatedly sent its vessels, such as the Diana, to Pahang to secure the
freedom of captured persons. Apparently, Arabs became the main purchaser of slaves there by
the 1840s. In 1845, the Straits government ordered the gunboat Charlotte to demand the release
of slaves brought recently by Bugis slave traders. The gunboat returned to Singapore with fortytwo Balinese. Later, the Diana brought back six Bugis women, a child, and a Javanese man
shortly thereafter. One reason for so many Balinese slaves was that the elite sold their people to
various slave traders in the archipelago, who then distributed them to places where countries
needed labor or the prestige of dependents.336 British Indian policy involved continual pressure

335

“[Ship’s Journal],” 8 September 1836, National Archives, United Kingdom, Admiralty Records, Piracy in the
Straits of Malacca, ADM 125/144, 227.
336
“Slave Trade in the Indian Archipelago,” The Singapore Free Press, 8 November 1845,
http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa18451108-

170
on Pahang and other Malay states to end their participation in the slave trade through gunboat
diplomacy. Untold numbers of slaves trafficked there made their way to Singapore. Even
though Malay piracy waned during the 1840s, the slave trade continued through less violent
means.
Hardly any evidence of ideological underpinnings of opposition to kerajaan economics
survive, but rather some opposed the behavior of the elite class. Malay rulers possessed
extraordinary powers over the local populace. If a sultan wanted a girl or woman, he merely sent
a messenger bearing his sword with the command to seize her.337 According to Abdullah, the
sultan ordered the parents to bring their daughter to his house and forces her to marry his keris,
which makes her his mistress regardless of her consent or that of her parents.338 Yet despite this,
even Abdullah does not explicitly call for a republican revolution or some vast ideological
change. He supported a greater role of Islam but was not a theocrat who wanted clerical rule.
Even when a Westerner exposed some Malays in the early years of British colonialism to liberal
revolutionary idea, they showed little inclination toward them. Instead, Thomson witnessed
Malays accept that there was no point of a rakyat or common people without the raja and no
point of a raja without the rakyat.339 Even if many Malay rakyat despised the ruling elite and
even rejected or resisted them, evidence strongly suggests a lack of an ideological underpinning
to such actions even when the raja abducted and raped the daughters of their subjects.
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How did the kerajaan system of bondage survive for so long if people repeatedly
attempted to escape? The implementation of market-based wage labor systems globally in the
place of bondage and other systems created problems that revealed reasons for the old system’s
sustainability. Patrons often possessed the duty to support their dependents by providing for
them even though they were not providing a net economic gain to them. More economically
focused markets developed through liberal reforms that reduced the duties of patrons toward
clients.340 Malaya had similar client-patron relationships where the patron supported debt slaves
who did their bidding in return. Some people acquired debt voluntarily knowing it would lead to
servitude. On the abolition of slavery and debt servitude, some of the emancipated found
themselves unenthusiastic about the prospect of freedom.341 Other than fear, debt slaves
remained at their stations because their masters insulated them to a degree from the difficulties of
living in a wage labor market.
The kerajaan economics system required leaders to acquire followers, which involved the
capture of people, usually against their will, for sale to Malayan elites. Piracy was a critical
means by which rulers and the elites procured followers for economic, social, and household
purposes. Women had supporting and defensive combat roles outside of slavery that made the
kerajaan economics system viable. The slave system preferred Malays and other Maritime
Southeast Asians over Chinese and captives from many Mainland Southeast Asian communities
because they better supported the kerajaan political economy and they more easily assimilated
into Malay culture and its political hierarchy. Slaves escaping from throughout the various
kerajaan threatened political order by removing the followers leaders needed to remain
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respected. State-sanctioned piracy ensured elites maintained their precious supply of slaves who
bolstered their political power and entrenched their authority. The Royal Navy’s anti-piracy
missions threatened to undo the established order in Malaya.

Conclusion

This golden age of Malay piracy came to the attention of British policymakers who
worked in a time of peace for Great Britain relative to the seemingly endless wars of the French
Revolution and Napoleonic years. The sloops-of-war dispatched in the 1830s to fight the pirates
had a series of tactical successes that often inflicted heavy casualties on Malay pirates while
suffering comparatively few losses usually. On paper, the Malay war boats and their crews
seemed like more than a match for British boats, but that was not the case. The most plausible
explanation for such catastrophic Malay defeats was the inaccuracy of Malays’ shooting, who
generally fired from the hips with tin slugs and instead proved more effective with bladed
weapons.342 Strategically, the British government gained advantages through intelligence
gathered from the victims of piracy, who willingly offered the colonial police information on
their attackers and captors. Pirates from the Riau Archipelago operated with such impunity that
they attacked Royal Navy boats without identifying them first. Malay pirate organizations
discovered the advantages they hitherto enjoyed for years evaporating with European states
gaining more influence over Malay states.
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State-sanctioned piracy in Malaya acted as rents for the elite who attempted to benefit
from Malaya’s strategic location through violent means. Although each state’s piracy privileges
contributed to its domestic stability, the Malay states had to deal with their neighbors’ piratical
expeditions seizing their wealth, too. Economically, piracy ultimately added to costs of
production by raising transportation costs, even if the goods made it to market, because it made
trade less efficient and expended the lives and freedom of countless seafarers and passengers.343
Economically, piracy added to the cost of Asian goods sold in Singapore, becoming a stealth
indirect tax of sorts, without improving on or providing any additional value to a product and
therefore not directly adding any net wealth to humanity.344 However, in using the LAO
framework, piracy provided a political benefit to Malay states by maintaining stability through
satisfying potential political rivals and providing work for ordinary Malays. Pirating privileges,
either purchased or granted, enabled a degree of stability that paradoxically caused greater
regional instability.
State-sanctioned piracy served as a prominent part of kerajaan economics throughout
most of the 19th century in Malay states. Eventually, this system became unsustainable and
Malay elites found other ways to sustain their political systems. A combination of external
pressure from colonial powers and internal discontent with piracy and the slave trade made their
continuation less feasible. This golden age of piracy saw political alliances between
governments that sought the suppression of piracy with those dependent on it for their stability.
Infamous pirates, such as Panglima Awang, briefly achieved notoriety for their bravery while the
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Galang orang laut tribes became extraordinarily powerful, despite having moderate strength just
a decade earlier, and infamous in merchant circles.
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CHAPTER 4:
CHINESE PIRACY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN MALAYA

Wang Ta-hai, a Chinese merchant seafarer, exemplified a general lack of skill concerning
maritime fighting ability while sailing in Southeast Asia. In contrast, Southeast Asians were
quite often more skilled in the art of war. Most notably, Bugis men and women learned martial
arts, including the use of swords and spears, from the age of ten and up. Martial arts masters
taught them secret maneuvers, some of which involved springing into action against their
enemies. While on a voyage to Banjarmasin in southern Borneo, probably during the early 19th
century, pirates, far outnumbering the Chinese crew, attacked Wang’s vessel, sending his crew
into a panic. While the commander and crew fretted their seemingly inevitable capture or death
at the hands of pirates, Chang-choo, a Bugis slave girl, seized a spear and cried out “never fear”
as she readied to defend her companions. She prevented the pirates from entering the vessel’s
cabin, where the crew cowered. The pirates rushed her but she wounded several of them, upon
which the pirates noted that she knew the Bugis way of fighting. In response, she shouted, “I
also am a Bugguese [Bugis], come and let us have another round.” The pirates, however, wisely
declined and withdrew.345
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Between the final years of the Dutch East India Company and the formal annexation of
Singapore in 1824, Chinese seafarers and merchants possessed a reputation as being meek
fighters in Southeast Asia with minimal political ambition. Though Chinese pirates existed, their
small numbers made them much less of a threat than other ethnic groups in the Straits area. Yet,
within a few decades, Chinese pirates became among the most powerful naval actors in the
Straits area. Accounting for such a violent transition remains quite difficult given the scarcity of
Chinese accounts on the subject of Chinese piracy. However, statistical data, newspaper
accounts, and depositions concerning pirate attacks will help uncover why Chinese seafarers
gained a reputation for violence so quickly. Prior to the annexation of Singapore, Nanyang
Chinese lacked a strong base port in Insular Southeast Asia from which to develop their power,
leaving traders like Wang at the mercy of locals. The development of a powerful Chinese
community in the Straits Settlements allowed for its increased naval strength. Even though
authorities throughout Malaya repeatedly attempted to suppress them, Chinese pirates
maintained a significant presence in these waters for decades. The success of the Chinese pirates
and their patrons derived largely from their abilities to exploit the political economies of the
British Straits Settlements and the Malayan states to their own advantage and develop pirate
bases within these places. Chinese pirates exploited the Straits Settlements’ arms trading
policies and used those settlements as bases for attacking vessels.
Aside from his slave girl utterly shaming him and his crew in combat, Wang offered
other clues concerning the relationships between Chinese and other groups at this time in
Southeast Asia. To him the Malays were numerous and spread throughout the archipelago with
their language spoken by the other Southeast Asians, Dutch, and Chinese in the region. Of the
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Malays, he wrote, “Their dispositions are crafty and treacherous; they are very much addicted to
piracy, and they keep their nests in the Carimons, Lingin, and c.346 being such as we call in our
country boat-robbers.”347 Malay remained the lingua franca of insular Southeast Asia at the
beginning of the 19th century given the number and position of Malays throughout the
archipelago. Those Malays living in the straits area had a particular reputation for piracy, to the
point where Malays were almost synonymous with pirates to many Chinese trading within the
region.
Wang, like many other Chinese in Southeast Asia during the early 19th century, held a
negative view of the Dutch authorities in Batavia and elsewhere. The Dutch overlords in the
archipelago lacked the five virtues associated with a righteous ruler in China. They lacked
benevolence, oppressed the weak, separated husbands from wives, and had no rectitude.
Furthermore, the Dutch were self-indulgent, lacked wisdom, and failed to distinguish sufficiently
between superiors and their subordinates. Their one redeeming virtue, according to Wang, was
the possession of some sincerity.348 The administration by Dutch officials in the East Indies was
inconsistent for the most part with the governing values held by many Chinese.
In contrast to the Dutch rulers, Wang praised British governance in their occupation of
Java during the Napoleonic Wars. After Britons defeated the Dutch in Batavia, he enjoyed the
British policy of noninterference in commerce through elimination of the Dutch trade laws in
1814, which placed limitations on traders. According to Wang, “Every one renders them willing
obedience, and merchants from far and near carry on an uninterrupted intercourse. The spirit of
the English is really heroic; and in this affair we see how true it is, that artful plans are not to be
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relied upon, and that cunning trickery is of no avail.”349 The importance of such a statement
resides less in whether these statements were accurate or that British rule in Java was more to the
liking of merchants there, but that it rather gives an idea of why Singapore became a more
popular place for Chinese merchants to settle. Fewer obstacles to trade and a greater respect for
British governance helped persuade some Chinese immigrants to settle in the Straits Settlements
in the years to come.
This chapter will examine the development of Chinese piracy and use of Singapore, along
with other places in Malaya, as pirate bases during the 19th century. Chinese piracy became
prominent in the middle 19th century and shattered the peace at sea. The first section will argue
that Chinese pirates employed Singapore as a base without excessive interference from colonial
authorities. Singapore offered pirates supplies, intelligence, and land from which to operate at a
strategically important location. The next section observes how Malay kingdoms on the east
coast attempted to suppress Chinese pirates, thereby indicating the latter’s power. Some Chinese
pirates learned their trade from Malays residing in Singapore during a brief period when interethnic cooperation was common. The last section examines the means by which Chinese pirates
became extraordinarily powerful, along with how they operated.

Singapore as a Base for Chinese Pirates

Chinese piracy of the Straits of Malacca and the southern section of the South China Sea
in the 19th century emanated mainly from Singapore and other Malay Peninsula settlements to a
lesser extent. The rise of Straits Chinese shipping and the relative autonomy of Chinese societies
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in the Straits region gave Chinese pirates the means to attack commerce sailing through the
region. Pirates operating out of Singapore procured supplies, including firearms and other
weapons, and sold their stolen goods thanks to its liberal trade regime.
This work focuses on the economic factors concerning Chinese piracy through David
Starkey’s model established for Atlantic piracy because of the similar goals and political
structures their Atlantic counterparts faced. I will examine the economic roots of piracy through
the three production factors: land, labor, and capital, along with the three forms of the consumer
of pirated goods. These include the demand for goods desired for self-satisfaction and goods
sold to merchants. The third was the state consumer who used the services of pirates as a naval
force when weak.350 Despite the various differences between Atlantic and Asian pirates, the
fundamental components of piracy remained similar. Both activities were essentially economic
activity when surrounding states were weak. Production and consumption related to piracy may
explain why piracy became heavier during particular years and in certain places throughout the
Malay Peninsula.
Singapore, historically infamous for its role as a base for orang laut seeking plunder from
vessels forced by geography to traverse the narrow Singapore Straits, remained a pirate base
during its early decades as a colonial port. However, as the demographics of the island changed,
so did the ethnicity of the pirates themselves. As Chinese residents dominated the island, the
pirates in the surrounding waters eventually became Chinese, too. Singapore remained an ideal
base despite its role as the capital of the Straits Settlements and its supposed center of British
imperial authority in the region. The weak colonial state’s liberal policies enabled the residents
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of Singapore to operate as pirates, who took great advantage of the port as an ideal place to
operate.
Chinese pirates based in southern China preyed on trade arriving from Southeast Asia
before the mass arrival of Chinese immigrants in Singapore because of the desirability of vessels
arriving from that region. During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Chinese merchants
virtually monopolized the import of Straits produce to China. Hainanese pirates seizing vessels
participating in this trade had significant advantages because Hainan was located at a strategic
point alongside the sea-lanes between mainland China and Southeast Asia.351 Pirates preferred
attacking the junks from Southeast Asia because they usually contained enough valuable goods
to pay for the expenses of the operation, but a successful attack was difficult because pirate
vessels generally operated in the shallows. Seizing such ocean-going vessels meant overcoming
their numerous armament and high sides; many Kwantung oceanic junks were 150 feet long and
built of ironwood.352 Chinese pirates in later decades received the option of operating closer to
the distribution points for Straits produce where vessels carrying them were usually weaker.
Attacking Nanyang shipping proved quite desirable for Chinese pirates, but until the
development of Singapore as an entrepôt, they had greater limitations placed on their abilities.
Colonial records revealed that Singapore was a center of Chinese piracy during the
1850s. Tan Ah Ang was a crewmember of a junk with 17 souls aboard, two of whom were
passengers. He recalled a pirate attack to the resident councillor of Singapore in November 1855
during which pirates led by Tan Kye Soon “came aboard [his vessel] and murdered the Captain.”
The pirates ordered the surviving crew into their vessel while they removed all the cargo from
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the junk. The pirates sabotaged the vessel they plundered by removing the rudder and the sails.
However, two survivors managed to remain onboard the pirated vessel, managed to reach shore
the next morning, and eventually reached a boat.353 This attack exemplified a crew’s willingness
to surrender when boarded by pirates and the relative ease at times in which they boarded.
Survivors of pirate attacks at times managed their escape through a combination of hiding and
swimming away from their vessel to shore or some other vessel if feasible. Pirates had an
interest in ensuring no survivors reached authorities in Singapore because of the possibility they
might reveal their identities and put an end to their careers.
The sophisticated piratical system of Singapore had a hierarchy and a means to dispose of
stolen goods without the notice of colonial officials. Tan Ah Ang, who had lived in Singapore
for five or six years, recognized the leader of the pirates as someone he had known for a year
before the attack. He recalled Tan Kye Soon and two others as inhabitants of Singapore, people
he knew before the assault. Tan Ah Ang deposed, “Tan Kye Soon has a small shop at the New
Market, the other two I cannot say.” Around thirty pirates attacked him with their vessel of six
guns that had ten muskets and various other weapons such as swords and spears, which in turn
permitted the pirates to board the junk armed.354 Tan Kye Soon almost certainly used the stolen
cargo as merchandise for his Singapore store at New Market. Tan’s pirate crew was well armed
and capable of intercepting vessels within their reach. He likely employed his moderate social
status and ability to sell and obtain materials necessary for conflict as his reason for leading the
pirates. The incident illustrated the risks for many pirates in the region given Tan Ah Ang’s
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ability to report the attack to the authorities. Tan Kye Soon’s pirate crew showed the existence
of a hierarchy and the importance of Singapore’s markets to the sustenance of a pirate economy.
Singapore became a place where pirates sold their stolen goods to merchants who in turn
sold them to consumers. In another instance, Malay pirates with muskets in two sampans
attacked a Chinese sampan pukat that departed from Riau on 9 August 1840 with a cargo of rice,
sugar, and other goods off the north coast of Pulau Bintan. The sampan pukat fought the pirates
with their three guns until around midnight, when the Malays finally overtook them, killing two
of the ten crewmen. The rest swam overboard until rescued by Malay fishermen curious about
the gunfire. However, the local police traced the pirates to the Straits of Johor, where they
recaptured the sampan pukat and also detained the two pirate sampans, along with six pirates,
including the panglima. Police succeeded in seizing the cargo in Bukit Timah, Singapore, where
the crew had sold the goods to Chinese merchants. Even prior to the incident, the suspected
pirates possessed a notorious reputation for such activities and likely conducted such operations
before.355 Singapore was a market for pirated goods, where certain Chinese merchants
purchased goods from anyone regardless of their ethnic background or reputation. Singapore’s
status as an entrepôt permitted the merchants to sell the goods elsewhere without the authorities
knowing better because of the weakness of the state in this location.
The pirates in the 1850s overwhelmed Singapore’s law enforcement to the point where
the police lost the ability to contain the violence. Inspector Blundel observed the piracies
committed by Chinese in the late 1850s were “to an extent hitherto unheard of. The sea coasts
between this [Singapore] and Amoy seems covered with Piratical Junks.” These junks, which
were “known to have none but piratical objects,” frequented Singapore “to refit and obtain
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information regarding the sailing of the traders.”356 Despite or perhaps even because Singapore
was the British colonial center in Southeast Asia, Chinese pirates grew in unprecedented
numbers. These professional pirates with the superficial pretension for peaceful trade found
Singapore an ideal base from which to conduct operations because of the availability of
intelligence and supplies necessary to prepare for future attacks. These pirates primarily focused
on attacking vessels travelling through the South China Sea. The Straits Settlements government
found itself unable to contain the violence employing the previously used measures.
The Straits Settlements government lacked the means to suppress piracy effectively
because of a lack of vessels and crews or the necessary funds to pay for them. In the entire
Straits Settlements as of 1856, the colonial marine possessed only three gunboats and the steamer
Hooghly, the latter of which was 192 tons burthen and had a 50-horsepower engine capable of
steaming at five knots. Hooghly’s main purpose was ferrying the governor and other colonial
officials throughout the settlements because its high draft and inadequate speed made pirate
hunting unfeasible. Rather, the gunboats, one attached to each of the Straits Settlements, hunted
“petty pirates,” but even then the vessels required a strong breeze to chase them. The gunboats
patrolled the coasts and inlets of the peninsula, each with a gun and well-armed crews of twentytwo, to deter the presence of pirates.357 Regardless of the preparedness of the Straits Settlements
gunboats, one boat was wholly inadequate for patrolling the waters of Singapore with thousands
of vessels sailing into port every year. The presence of a colonial marine by itself was no serious
obstacle to Chinese pirates employing Singapore as a base during the 1850s.
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The Bengal presidency’s war steamer in the Straits of Malacca, though somewhat
powerful, usually lacked large numbers of heavy armaments found on Royal Navy ships. In the
1850/1851 fiscal year, Bengal ordered two steamers to patrol the Straits of Malacca named
Hooghly and Pluto. The Hooghly served under the government of India, which paid for the
naval patrols, whereas the Royal Navy took over the Pluto in the Straits in March 1851, which
had a 90-horsepower engine to power the 450-ton vessel. For arms, the Hooghly possessed two
long nine-pound guns located on rotating circles, while the Pluto had four brass six-pound guns
and a 32-pound gun on a rotating circle.358 Theoretically, these steamers could attack or
approach suspected vessels from astern at an angle that made it difficult for pirates to hit these
steamers with their shorter range guns. Large Asian vessels, especially junks, were almost
certainly slower than the steamers and would have difficulty escaping or outmaneuvering the
company’s steamers. The steamers, however, lacked the firepower of contemporary Royal Navy
warships that supplemented the steamers at times.
In contrast, suspected pirate junks quite often had more heavy guns than the company’s
steamers and posed a significant threat to most vessels in the region. An investigation by G. T.
Wright of the Hooghly in April 1856 concluded at least three junks in Singapore harbor were
heavily armed. Junk Number 171 possessed twenty-three large guns with most of those guns
mounted for battle, a “number of Chinese Spears and Swords,” and ammunition of various sizes.
Wright reported, “Junk No. 145 has thirty Guns, that is, eleven large and nineteen small, all well
mounted.”359 Another junk, Number 143, possessed fourteen large guns and forty kegs of
gunpowder, along with numerous spears and ammunition. According to Wright, he inspected the
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vessels three or four days before departure when they only had a few crew onboard but stated
that they would likely take on many more immediately before sailing out of port. He
recommended the removal of the rudders because of their potential threat to peaceful traders.360
These armed junks had more heavy weapons than Wright’s own vessel, the Hooghly, which
showed the firepower of pirate vessels and the ease in which Singapore acted as a base for
arming Asian vessels into formidable opponents for even European government vessels. Such
firepower made engaging these vessels at sea difficult.
The naval patrols of the company vessels against pirates lacked the desired effectiveness
in capturing or destroying them. Singapore’s authorities sent H.C. Steamer Hooghly in
September 1856 to intercept pirates reported around Pulau Tinggi. The Straits Times more
cynically suggested the voyage’s purpose was to scare away pirates rather than intercept them in
order to protect the trading perahu. The newspaper lamented the absence of any effective means
of defeating the pirates, except the warships sent from England carrying letters.361 Instead, the
Hooghly found greater effectiveness in escorting trading junks through local waters to places
such as Pulau Kundur without encountering pirates.362 Rather, the Straits Settlements’ flotilla
served to deny particular territory or vessels to pirates. However, the employment of this
strategy denied a highly limited amount of space to pirates because of the limited number of
vessels and crews available for such patrols. The Straits Settlements lacked sufficient resources
to hunt down and engage suspected pirates, which led it to depend on London and Calcutta for
the difficult task of clearing the seas under its responsibility of pirates.
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Despite the many difficulties in defeating pirates in Malaya, government forces
occasionally inflicted crushing blows on piratical vessels. Authorities responded slowly and
without decisive action against the new wave of piracy. Determining the actual number of pirate
attacks in the region remains virtually impossible. In 1854, the Singapore Free Press alleged
that only half the vessels sailing from the eastern archipelago reached Singapore. Even though
people reported “thousands of cases of piracy,” the Admiralty Court only saw seventy-nine
criminal cases presented before them from 1837 to 1857.363 Governments had great difficulty in
even counting the number of pirate attacks in the region let alone suppressing piracy. We may
never know the full impact of piracy on Southeast Asian commerce during this time.
However, the documentation concerning number of successful operations against pirates
helps us understand the connection between Singapore and piracy. Both of the battles mentioned
next against pirate junks occurred in May, a common month of operation for Chinese pirates in
Malaya. In both instances, the Straits Settlements sent the prisoners to the Queen’s Court
because of the gravity of their alleged crimes. Both resulted in convictions for the at least fifty
crewmen for each incident and their transportation to Bombay as punishment.364 Colonial
officials had great difficulty in distinguishing pirate from peaceful trader because of the
similarities in shapes and sizes of junks sailing the region and sometimes a junk might perform
both roles in a voyage.365 These operations show the power not only of the government forces in
Malayan waters but also the formidability of the Chinese pirates who had large crews of Straits
Chinese and substantial weaponry that outgunned most vessels in the Straits.
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Chinese pirates patrolling the waters of the South China Sea near Malaya attacked
victims’ vessels also operated by Chinese, showing little discrimination in selecting their victims.
A Chinese tope sailing from Singapore to Sangora halted near Pulau Tinggi to wait for opposing
winds to change. On Saturday, 25 March 1854, a black Macao junk with a crew of
approximately forty and with sixteen guns approached the tope. Some of the pirates boarded the
tope and informed the nakhoda and supercargo that they did not intend to kill them because they
only desired their cargo. The pirates searched the cargo and stole the most valuable and portable
of the cargo, including two opium chests, fifty muskets, gunpowder, cotton goods, and six twist
bales. One pirate proclaimed, “…you bought this in a shop near Guthrie’s bridge, we purchased
our guns next door!” After the pirates departed, the tope sailed back to Singapore.366 This attack
showed that Chinese pirates attacked vessels near the same place as Malay pirates decades
earlier, namely Pulau Tinggi. This revealed more about geographical constraints and possibly
how Chinese pirates learned, either as associates or victims, about how these locations gave
advantages to attackers. However, unlike the Malay pirates of the past, Chinese pirates of the
1850s had no interest in slave trading, which allowed them to show mercy on the crew. The
following incident confirms that Chinese pirates used Singapore’s weapons emporium for the
purpose of piracy, which suggests that the Straits Settlements’ liberal political economy
contributed to the proliferation of piracy. This instance shows the lack of hesitation in Chinese
pirates attacking their own countrymen and that heavily armed Macao junks originating from
Singapore participated in piracy.
Even with effective anti-piracy patrols, the Straits authorities had limited power in
dealing with suspicious junks, which likely committed piratical acts. On 29 April 1854, the
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Hooghly under Captain Stewart intercepted a Macao junk of 425 tons burthen off the coast of
Johor heading from Singapore to Annam or Vietnam. This vessel had eighteen sizeable iron
guns, ten swivel guns, 100 crew, and twenty pikuls of gunpowder onboard. The ship’s passes
indicated that the vessel had more cargo onboard than when departing Singapore. The junk’s
nakhoda proclaimed himself a stranger and that he brought on the cargo after clearing port.
Although the Hooghly towed the vessel back to Singapore, the junk departed Singapore again on
2 May.367 Chinese merchants were more aware of their legal rights and took advantage of
Singapore’s legal system to evade a piracy conviction.368 Even if intercepted by colonial patrols,
vessels and their crews still escaped punishment. This captured vessel was quite likely involved
in piracy because of the arms and crew size. The nakhoda’s seemingly plausible explanation
and likely assistance in Singapore from merchant associates helped him escape the hangman’s
noose through the favorable characteristics of the colonial judicial system.
In one instance on 19 May 1858, H.C. Steamer Hooghly, H.M.S. Niger, and their boats
detained suspicious junks off the east coast of Malaya. The naval patrol spotted the three junks
in the morning sailing north. The Hooghly chased one and fired upon the more isolated junk,
which only lowered sails once the Hooghly caught up. The Niger and Hooghly sent crews in
boats to examine the junk, which contained a small gun, stinkpots employed to throw on enemy
decks, and spears. Having this vessel in tow, the Hooghly chased after the distant junk, which
possessed stinkpots and arms hidden in rice bags. The Niger’s boat chased after the closer junk
or tope, which lacked the proper passes required for safe passage. While a boat came up to the
last junk, a man jumped into the boat in search of protection from the junk’s crew. The man
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proclaimed that while sailing to Singapore with a cargo of pigs and rice, along with a crew of 21
men, a pirate junk captured his vessel near Pedra Branca around 10 May. Learning of this, the
government crew searched for the remaining survivors. After removing the suspected pirates,
the survivors of the attack confirmed the horrific attack through a crying old man.369 The
Hooghly and British boats were fast enough to overtake Chinese junks and intimidate their crews
into surrender. Even when intercepted, there remained the chance that pirates had already taken
the vessel and either eliminated the crew or kept them too afraid to speak out about the attack.
Another witness confirmed the pirates sailed from Singapore and showed the stealth and
secrecy in which the pirates operated. On the 20th, a witness recalled that he and a companion
boarded the tope, one of the captured vessels, as passengers headed for China without realizing
they sought passage on a pirate vessel. Five days later, the pirates attacked a junk, which had
twenty-one crewmen, and separated the prisoners. Four days after that attack, the pirates
attacked and captured another vessel. The witness later heard from a pirate that they killed the
entire crew of eleven. The pirate demanded that the witness and his companion work the oars.
Furthermore, he identified a man who intentionally drowned himself before capture and the oneeyed pirate from the tope as the chiefs. The government crews found a Terengganu pass on the
first junk they captured issued to Nakhoda Sim Hap Sim on 4 May 1858 with a crew of
seventeen, along with a cargo of rice and bark.370 The witness and his associate failed to
recognize the pirate vessel even after boarding in Singapore, which showed the effectiveness of
the pirates in keeping their identity secret. Such an incident indicated the difficulty in identifying
a pirate vessel even when in port and granted permission to board.
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Identifying pirate junks was extraordinarily difficult because of their similarities to
trading vessels that frequented Singapore. Unlike in previous decades, the pirates kept their
prizes, the junks, rather than sinking them or casting them adrift. Furthermore, they kept at least
one crewman alive, unlike many other pirates who kept no prisoners or sold their prisoners into
slavery. Perhaps they kept the crew alive to operate the vessel. The pirates operated from
Singapore as a base where they posed as peaceful merchants and even took on passengers. The
headman who drowned himself perhaps feared greater retribution from those in Singapore, either
his superiors or the law, more than a miserable death by drowning. According to the government
report, the pirate vessels lacked significant heavy weapons such as large guns, which entails
pirate vessels were quite difficult to find from their appearance. In this instance, the
government’s pass system worked in that it permitted the detention of the vessels because of
their lacking of valid passes. This incident showed the extreme difficulty in determining what
vessels in Singapore were piratical because of the similarities in appearance, unlike many of the
Malay pirate perahu.
Chinese pirates operating out of Singapore employed large, powerful vessels to hunt and
overpower their victims. Singapore’s free port status permitted pirates to purchase weaponry and
warlike stores for the sake of committing piracy. During the 1858 junk season, colonial forces
detained six suspicious junks in Singapore for carrying an excess of arms under the authority
granted by Act XII of 1857, which enabled police to detain vessels if excessively armed. The
owners of the interned vessels, who were respected merchants and shopkeepers of Singapore,
proclaimed their innocence and that such weapons and ammunition were necessary for defensive
measures or to trade in China or Cochin-China. They explained, and the government writer
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agreed, “that every Junk in the Harbour had more or less such things onboard” and signed a vow
not to commit piracy to regain their junks.371 Regardless of whether all junks had such weapons
or if the proclaimed innocence of the merchants was true, the need for such powerful weapons
demonstrated either the necessity of defense against at least equally well-armed pirates or the
merchants lied and their vessels were of piratical purpose. In either case, the South China Sea
presented a grave challenge to the peaceful traders of Asia during the mid-19th century.
The six detained Macao junks were almost certainly piratical given the descriptions of
them by a colonial official. They ranged from 80 to 120 tons and each possessed a sizeable
arsenal of weapons ready for combat, with little mention of cargoes for peaceful purposes. The
vessels either had twenty to thirty men onboard when the official gave a numerical description
but also described the vessels as having “a great number of men onboard.” As for heavy arms,
the vessels generally possessed a dozen or more guns capable of firing nine- and six-pound shots.
Furthermore, there were small arms such as spears and plenty of shot ready for battle.372 We
may ascertain such junks were for piratical purposes regardless of the claims of their owners
because of the sizes and numbers of their guns, along with the lack of sufficient cargo necessary
to make a merchant’s voyage profitable.
The largest pirate junks were extremely formidable and outgunned even colonial marine
vessels, which meant they could seize all but the largest of Asian merchant vessels. One of the
two detained 120-ton junks mounted twenty nine-pound guns and eight three-pound guns. The
other detained vessel of that size was probably a pirate flagship because of a well-ornamented
stern and the presence of various carved symbols, including a trident in the central taffrail or
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stern rail. The vessel carried twelve nine-pound guns and six six-pound guns. One Macao junk
mounted six twelve-pound guns among other smaller guns, which shows the heavy firepower for
supposedly peaceful trading vessels. Some of the vessels carried sand as ballast to prevent
capsizing until the crew seized cargo from another vessel.373 Perhaps the vessels brought on
larger crews later because the expense of feeding them before sailing out of the harbor was great
and to keep the purpose of the vessels individually less obvious. The military purpose of these
vessels owned by rich Chinese in Singapore linked its wealthiest Asian capitalists to piracy.
Such vessels were more than a match for the various penjajap kerajaan or any vessel short of a
Western warship. These large Macao junks were highly likely effective in combat against
civilians and almost certainly used for offensive and piratical purposes.
The increases in Chinese piracy coincided with large increases in the Chinese male
population in Singapore, which indicated a much larger labor pool from which Chinese pirates
emerged. The Chinese population of Singapore increased immensely while the Malay
population shrunk and therefore an increase in Chinese pirates over previous decades becomes
quite possible. In 1850, Singapore had 12,206 Malays and 27,988 Chinese inhabitants, which
changed ten years later to 11,888 Malays and 50,043 Chinese. More specifically, the urban
Chinese male population of Singapore exploded during the 1850s. In 1850, the recorded male
population of Singapore Town was 12,862, which increased to 34,210 Chinese males by 1860.
These numbers represent an excess of 260% increase of Singapore’s urban Chinese males in the
span of a decade. In contrast, Singapore’s rural Chinese male population dropped from 12,887 to
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12,585 people.374 Singapore’s Chinese population had a large proportion of men over women by
mid-century, which explains the lack of Chinese female pirates in local waters as opposed to
their mainland counterparts (Table 4 and Figure 6). The vast number of Chinese migrants
arriving in Singapore substantially altered the demographics of Singapore with a large number of
Chinese males arriving in Singapore. The large population increase in the already-weak state
gave Chinese men the opportunity to join pirate crews without immediate state retribution.

Table 4375
Singapore Population Table
1850

1860

Chinese Males

25,749

46,795

Chinese Females

2,238

3,248

Indian Males

5,446

11,608

838

1,365

Other Asian Males

3,545

3,068

Other Asian Females

1,530

1,377

Indian Females
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Figure 6. Singapore population chart.

The overwhelming majority of the migrants from China were poor and vulnerable enough
to commit acts of plunder and robbery. Most of the laborers migrating to Singapore from China
were very poor and intended to remain in the Straits for three or four years. Seah Eu Chin, a
Teochew-Chinese born in 1805, estimated that only ten to twenty percent succeeded in such a
goal and even then only returned with a modest sum. Although some Chinese migrants returned
to China, staying in the region much longer than anticipated, a great many migrants died in
Southeast Asia with no hope of returning home. Seah argued that many Chinese laborers
became addicted to opium and spent or gambled their money until they lost their funds.
However, opium addictions often drove them to rob and plunder others with little fear of prison
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or transportation.376 A significant number of Chinese migrants became trapped in a region rather
different from their homeland. A number of the desperate migrants likely found opportunity in
becoming pirates even without significant seafaring experience because the professional
seafarers required additional, more expendable men to attack and board their victims’ vessels.
Singapore possessed a core of Chinese professional seafarers who sailed the local waters
off Singapore, along with the various islands and ports of Southeast Asia and China.
Singapore’s maritime industry included roughly 400 Macao or Guangzhou Chinese who built
ships and boats.377 Singapore had around 2,640 Chinese inhabitants who plied the rivers and
seas of Singapore and Southeast Asia more broadly around 1848 (Table 5 and Figure 7). This
represented around 9% of the Chinese population in Singapore at that time, which was a
substantial percentage. Although there remains no way of knowing how many participated in
illicit actions such as piracy and smuggling, there is a strong possibility that they provided pirate
chiefs with the cadre of the crew necessary to operate the vessels supplemented with extra hands
available from unskilled labor. Regardless of their susceptibility to becoming pirates, the
number of seafarers represents the importance of the maritime sector to Singapore’s economy.
The Teochew and Hokkien speakers of Singapore were critical for the functioning of the
maritime economy in contrast to other groups such as Chinese from Macao, Malacca, and other
places.378 The professional Chinese seafarers of Singapore played an important role in
Singapore’s open economy by providing valuable services in transportation and communication.
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The Teochew and Hokkien seafarers also probably involved themselves in piracy because of the
necessity for skilled seafarers in such a difficult profession.

Table 7379
Estimates on the Number of Chinese Seafarers in Singapore Circa 1848
Teochew Seafarers and
Watermen

379

Boatmen

530

Hokkien (including Ang
Chun) Seafarers and
Watermen
700

Fishermen

600

200

Seamen of Sampan
Pukats
Watermen

360

0

0

250

Total

1,490

1,150

Seah Eu Chin, “The Chinese of Singapore,” 290.
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Figure 7. Chart on the Estimation Number of Chinese Seafarers in Singapore Circa 1848

Figure 8. Bustling Singapore Harbor380

380

Cameron, Our Tropical Possessions, i-iv. The number of vessels visiting Singapore made identifying pirates in
the harbor challenging.
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Chinese operating from Singapore developed an important shipping industry that
permitted the island to sustain itself as a growing port. According to the Straits Settlements
government a year or so before 1859, Chinese owned 20,988 tons out of 29,573 tons of shipping
registered to Singapore. Chinese firms owned 96 out of 141 vessels registered in Singapore,
including nine ships, thirty-three barques, twenty-five brigs, and twenty-nine schooners.381 By
1866, that number increased to 120 vessels owned by Chinese out of 178 registered in Singapore.
Singapore possessed a number of Chinese shipping firms such as Lim Kong Wan & Son on
Malacca Street, Teo Kit & Company on Market Street, and Hock Eng & Company on Flint
Street. These firms and others owned vessels that sailed between Singapore and various
destinations within Southeast Asia.382 Singapore Chinese possessed the capital and expertise in
order to pursue piratical goals. This capital included junks that potentially served as merchant
vessels at times in one of Singapore’s mercantile firms. Although the colonial officials were too
discrete to reveal publically their names, probably because they did not want to be sued, we may
infer at least some business leaders were involved with piracy because of the cost of weaponry
on Macao junks owned by Chinese business leaders mentioned earlier.
By the 1850s, the government in Singapore realized its free trade policies, especially
concerning the arms trade, contributed to acts of piracy but maintained these policies regardless
of such costs. Singapore’s free trade policy especially concerning armaments collided with its
anti-piracy mission. An annual report from 1856 stated, “…there is no Law or Regulation to
prevent the unlimited importation of munitions of war into the Ports of the Straits’
Settlements…,” and arms shippers exploited such a law. The year before, Singapore imported
381
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3,659 iron guns383 from the British ports of London, Liverpool, and Glasgow, along with 8,945
muskets from Antwerp alone.384 In doing so, such facilities gave “every Native Vessel that
clears out of the Harbours in the Straits the means of committing Piracy or High Seas’
Robbery…” and that the ability to acquire these weapons in the Straits Settlements played a role
in the prevalence of piracy in the neighborhood of Singapore. In making such statements, Straits
Settlements Governor Blundell in May of 1856 acknowledged the connection between the
prevalence of piracy in the waters of Malaya and his government’s policies.385 The availability
of weapons, as an instance of capital, revealed how government policy made the formation of
pirate enterprises easier at Singapore. The Straits Settlements’ political economy contributed to
the existence of piracy by permitting the unlimited purchase of European weaponry for use
against vessels sailing in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.
The political economy of Singapore greatly influenced the power and activity of Chinese
pirates in Malaya during the middle of the 19th century by permitting them to accumulate the
capital and labor necessary to operate. Singapore’s lack of funding for anti-piracy campaigns
resulted from the merchant community’s ability to block new port dues. They repeatedly
prevented the government from instituting new port and tonnage duties designed to pay for
programs such as piracy suppression. Even in 1852 with the establishment of lighthouse fees,
Asian vessels did not need to pay any additional duties.386 Singapore offered a comparatively
safe base from which to operate as the colonial authorities lacked the resources and people to
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investigate the armed vessels that entered the harbor or engage them at sea effectively for quite a
few years.

The Hooghly and Chinese Pirates

Chinese pirate junks often carried numerous heavy weapons capable of attacking and
resisting most vessels in the Straits area. Operating from Singapore made access to heavy
weapons for Chinese ship owners easy in contrast to Malay ports because of the Straits
Settlements’ liberal trading policies. Such policies enabled Chinese to arm themselves
sufficiently that they outgunned even the most powerful Straits Marine vessel.
The firepower of the pirate junks from Singapore, thanks to the easy access to heavy
weaponry there, overwhelmed much of local maritime shipping. A Chinese passenger named Ah
Soo unwittingly boarded a pirate red junk with four others and later reported his story to the
Chief Officer of the I.N.S.387 Hooghly, George T. Wright. After departing from Singapore and
while sailing to Pulau Tioman,388 the pirates attacked a junk off Pulau Tinggi and then captured
its cargo of opium and long cloth. At Tioman, the pirates captured another junk with a similar
cargo of opium and cloth and engaged a Malay vessel. The latter possessed two masts and some
small brass guns. The Malays fired on junk “four or five times” to little or no effect. The junk
merely replied twice with gunfire until the Malay crew scuttled their vessel on the rocks and
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swam to shore.389 Near Pulau Brala, the pirates stole thirty dollars, opium, and long cloth from a
red junk. At no instance did the pirates kill anyone on the captured junks.390 The mercy on the
crews was a deliberate strategy to ensure their peaceful surrender and therefore require the junk
need not expend the ammunition and lives to seize the vessel. Such mercy was quite distinct
from previous years when slave raiding was ubiquitous and captured crews had little chance of
remaining free and alive. Virtually no local maritime traffic, other than other heavily armed
junks from Singapore, stood a chance against Singapore-based junks armed with more than a
dozen heavy guns.
The crew of the piratical junk had enough firepower and discipline to defend themselves
against colonial steamers such the Hooghly, which demonstrated their effectiveness in combat.
In the morning of 19 April 1859, the Hooghly came across one of the plundered junks near Pulau
Brala. The crew of the junk recalled how two pirate junks captured them and stole everything of
value onboard a day earlier. The Hooghly spotted the piratical junks in a bay and dispatched two
boats under the command of Mr. Wright. However, the pirates fired on the boats as they drew
near with a variety of shot such as grape and round shot from around sixteen guns, which
prompted the boats to return to the Hooghly. After the crews hoisted the boats, the Hooghly
returned fire with the two nine-pounders more than sixty times. Despite reportedly hitting the
pirate vessel several times and forcing them to bail water, they ceased fired around 3 p.m.
because the junk “was too heavily armed…,” but the Hooghly managed to put a captured junk in
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tow and pick up five men captured by pirates.391 The pirate junk successfully fended off the
most powerful vessel in the Straits Settlements marine flotilla. Despite the technological edge
with steam engines, the Hooghly failed to capture or destroy the pirate vessel. The pirates
displayed remarkable courage, discipline, and fighting ability in the battle.
A renewed attack with help from a friendly Siamese steamer the next day had equally
frustrating results for the crew of the Hooghly. The Hooghly at around 6 p.m. found the Siamese
steamer Chao Phya, whose captain volunteered to help defeat the pirates despite a lack of guns
onboard. He promised to use his two boats for the attack and to take a letter to Singapore for war
steamers if the attack failed. Casting off the captured junk, the Hooghly with the assistance of
the Chao Phya attacked the junk at daybreak. The plan to employ local seamen in the boats to
board the vessel failed because the guns on the junk manned their guns too effectively. The
boats withdrew to their respective vessels and the plan collapsed despite the efforts of Chief
Engineer Wiseham who kept the Hooghly’s engines running. The captain of the Chao Phya
refused to proceed alone to Singapore because an owner was onboard and refused to commit the
vessel to such an act without promises of compensation for damage taken. The Hooghly under
G. T. Wright’s command returned to Singapore with the captured junk and freed three Chinese
from Lim Feok Sin’s junk that the pirates captured.392 Despite modest reinforcements, the
Hooghly failed to capture the junk despite the best efforts of the Malay seamen in boats and the
crews on the steamers. The Chinese pirates had a sufficiently numbered and skilled crew to
operate the guns. However, their abilities were insufficient to inflict significant damage on the
colonial and Siamese vessels because of a lack in accuracy concerning their gunnery.
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Regardless, the pirates’ tenacity persuaded Commander Wright of the Hooghly to return to
Singapore and request help from more formidable steamers.
The headman of the junk, with an imminent battle approaching, showed some humanity
by disembarking the passengers before battle. According to Ah Soo, the pirate junk disembarked
him and four other passengers into the jungle where they remained all night. Seeing the two
steamers in the morning, they retreated into the jungle until the evening when the pirate headman
requested Ah Soo to embark again with the junk to Pulau Kundur. The witness reported a
steamer hit the junk once during the first engagement.393 Ah Soo’s account suggests the
Hooghly’s guns had perhaps a bit above a one percent hit rate, which suggests that either the
steamer’s crews were not that effective or that the guns of the pirate junk sufficiently deterred the
vessel to remain at a distance that rendered the nine-pounders nearly ineffective. The pirates had
some professionalism with the passengers by letting them hide in the jungle and picking them up
at the end of the battle, which suggests they had a legitimate business in some sense.
Despite the firepower of the junks frequenting Singapore and the inadequacies of the
Straits Marine, the Straits Settlements had one card to play that trumped the fighting abilities of
any Straits pirate during the middle of the century. In a letter from the senior officer for the
Royal Navy in the Straits of Malacca to Governor Blundell, Captain Robert McClure explained
how his vessel proceeded to Pulau Kundur because it was a generally recognized rendezvous for
supplies. Receiving intelligence from the people of Pulau Kundur through the translation
services of Mr. Warwick, the Hooghly’s senior officer, vessels usually called at the island around
that time of the year. Capt. McClure decided to wait in the bay with HMS Esk for the pirates to
emerge. The next day, 29 April 1859, a crewman in the masthead spotted two Chinese junks that
393
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quickly tacked to avoid the warship and head out to sea. However, by around 5 p.m., Esk fired a
shot across the bows of the junks, which compelled them to surrender. Receiving confirmation
from a Chinese witness who recognized some of the pirates, the Esk confined a majority of the
pirate suspects on the mess deck and towed the junks to Singapore with hopes of committing the
fifty-two prisoners to the local jails.394 The local Malays and the Chinese victims helped British
authorities in their campaign against pirates during by the 1850s, which proved invaluable.
Ultimately, the Chinese pirate junks stood little chance against the vessels of the Royal Navy and
their only real options were to withdraw or surrender. The Royal Navy, however, patrolled the
straits when available from the admiralty and operated separately from the Straits Settlements’
government, which could ill-afford the firepower of more modern and larger warships.
The Straits Settlements’ political economy gave Chinese pirates the opportunity to
acquire weapons capable of fighting all but the most powerful of vessels in the waters off
Malaya. One such vessel fended off the Straits gunboat Hooghly while sustaining minimal
damage. Therefore, virtually any Asian vessel that traversed these waters was vulnerable to
Straits Chinese pirates in large part because of the weapons policy of Singapore.

The Malay Kingdoms and Chinese Pirates

The Chinese pirates of the mid-19th century placed the Malay states and merchants in
difficult positions. Although circumstances arose where various Malay political factions sought
the potential benefits of working with Chinese pirates, the Malay states worked with the British
394
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Straits Settlements and Royal Navy to destroy pirates in their waters and preserve the established
political order of the seas. The alliances curbed the political effects of the vast demographic and
economic changes of the 19th century in Malaya. The willingness and ability of the various
rulers in the Malay states to hunt pirates varied depending on political circumstances. As British
power in Malaya grew, the rulers and rajas found themselves having fewer options concerning
plunder. The need for the east coast kingdoms with their naval forces indicated the significance
of the number and effectiveness of Chinese pirates operating in the South China Sea because
they threatened local commerce.
With the resurgence of piracy in the 1850s, the leaders of Terengganu and Kelantan
attacked pirates, word of which eventually reached Singapore. In around August 1851,
Terengganu authorities destroyed five pirates’ junks and, reportedly, Kelantan’s subjects
captured five pirate vessels. In one instance, they captured a pukat manned by both Bugis and
Chinese off Sangora. The Chinese and Bugis crew resisted fiercely with only one Bugis
crewman surviving the battle.395 The anti-piracy campaign on the east coast of the Malay
Peninsula had effective results. Kelantan’s forces sailed outside their own waters to fight pirates
while the governments of both Kelantan and Terengganu made no secret of their attempts to
defeat the pirates.
Chinese pirates threatened the vital trade route from the eastern Malayan states to
Singapore and elsewhere by patrolling the South China Sea. Though usually outgunned by the
Chinese junks from Singapore, circumstance at times permitted the survival of Malay crews from
such attacks. While sailing from Terengganu to Singapore, a Malay perahu came under fire at
around 6:00 a.m. on 27 March 1854 from a Chinese junk. Despite a hit from the junk, the
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perahu escaped because the wind died down. Despite this, the junk dispatched a boat with
around eighteen crewmen onboard who attempted to board the perahu. The seven Malay
crewmen fought desperately against the Chinese by throwing spears at them from around thirty
feet while using their shields to deflect deflected missiles thrown at them. After the pirates
sailed side-to-side with the perahu, they killed six Chinese and six more as they escaped. These
Malay seafarers were lucky. Despite throwing all twenty-two spears and receiving many
wounds, a stinkpot landed on their deck but failed to detonate because the fuse fell out.396 The
Chinese pirates of the 1850s in Malayan waters posed a large threat to the commerce of the
waters of Malaya because of their firepower, dedicated crews, and large numbers.
British and royal Malay forces attempted to suppress piracy in the waters off Malaya for
the sake of protecting commercial interests. According to a Malay-language letter called “Al
Mushrifah wal Mukazamah,” “…Chinese pirates have already started robbing sooner than last
year. The English and all the Malay kings should try their very best to drown Chinese pirates
because they have caused a lot of doom and destruction on the issue of business… and kill lots of
people.” He wished to resume trading with Terengganu once the British and Malay governments
dealt with piracy in those waters.397 Chinese pirates commenced their own “pirate season” by
May in 1855 that Singapore’s trade took a dive, but there remained sufficient trade sailing to and
from Terengganu and the east coast of Malaya. These instances also showed that the Malay
kingdoms on the east coast had little or no use for Chinese pirates as a consumer during the
1850s and almost certainly did not directly aid them. The destructiveness of the Chinese pirates
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had significant economic effects. In return, the Malay rulers with their British allies against the
pirates, especially in Terengganu, committed themselves to clearing the seas of Chinese pirates.
Statistics concerning the commerce and shipping of Singapore support evidence from the
letter that suggests strong trading growth to the east coast of Malaya with Singapore’s overall
commerce declining for the pirate season of 1855. Singapore’s square-rig shipping tonnage
decreased from 1 May 1854 to 30 April 1855 sharply from the previous year while the number of
square-rig vessels involved in Singapore’s trade remained stagnant. Asian vessel imports to
Singapore decreased by tonnage and the number of vessels. The tonnage of overall Asian vessel
exports from Singapore increased modestly according to these numbers but the number of
vessels that carried them decreased (Tables 6 and 7), which suggests a significant increase in the
tonnage of vessels. However, the commerce of the east coast of the Malay Peninsula grew
substantially over that same time. These prospects strongly suggest a large population relative to
the Malay Peninsula in Singapore found itself in a weaker trading situation with their neighbors’
commerce performing well. Such economic circumstances suggest that the Chinese pirates
mentioned in the aforementioned Malay letter became more aggressive sooner in the season
because of harder economic times in Singapore, with greater opportunities for plunder off the
east coast of Malaya.
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Table 6398
Shipping of Singapore and East Coast of Malaya (Tonnage)

Square Rig
Imports to
Singapore
(tons)
Square Rig
Exports from
Singapore
(tons)
Asian Vessel
Imports to
Singapore
(tons)
Asian Vessels
Exports from
Singapore
(tons)
Asian Vessel
Imports to
Singapore
from East
Coast of
Malaya (tons)
Asian Vessel
Exports from
Singapore to
East Coast of
Malaya (tons)

398

1852/1853

1853/1854

1854/1855

373,955

346,997

319,080

373,229

344,378

316,620

80,756

87,390

81,213

83,039

79,581

81,949

6,185

6,105

9,544

7,930.5

7,884

10,281

British Library, India Office Records, Tabular Statements of the Commerce and Shipping Prince of Wales Island,
Singapore and Malacca, 1850-1858, IOR/V/17, 4, 9-10, 85, 87,154-156.
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Table 7399
Shipping of Singapore and East Coat of Malaya (Vessels)

Square Rig
Imports to
Singapore
(vessels)
Square Rig
Exports from
Singapore
(vessels)
Asian Vessel
Imports to
Singapore
(vessels)
Asian Vessels
Exports from
Singapore
(vessels)
Asian Vessel
Imports to
Singapore from
East Coast of
Malaya
(vessels)
Asian Vessel
Exports from
Singapore to
East Coast of
Malaya
(vessels)
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1852/1853

1853/1854

1854/1855

1,058

1,028

1,030

1,068

1,025

1,029

2,366

2,595

2,401

2,528

2,655

2,519

343

357

454

421

409

491
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Chinese-Malay Cooperation in Piracy

The roots of systematic Chinese piracy in the Straits area remain somewhat unclear
according to the existing literature, but evidence strongly suggests Chinese piracy in part grew
out of the Malay piracy system. These instances differed from the Panglima Awang case in
which a seafarer of Chinese descent adopted Malay customs because the Chinese crewmen did
not assimilate into Malay culture. Instead, Singapore Malay and Chinese pirates at times worked
side by side in the early years of Singapore, which permitted a number of Singapore Chinese to
learn the art of piracy. Chinese pirates worked with Malay pirates when suitable to their
interests. Singapore’s Chinese pirates likely learned from Malays before becoming among the
most powerful naval actors in these waters.
Throughout the Straits newspapers and government reports of the 1830s, Malay and
Iranun pirates dominated the multitude of stories flowing from those accounts but they rarely
mentioned the existence of Chinese pirates. However, the next decade saw an unlikely change.
Filling the power vacuum created by a series of successful counter-piracy campaigns, Chinese
pirates emerged gradually and gained notoriety throughout the Straits Settlements and Malay
states. A virtually unprecedented phenomenon emerged in the first half of the 1840s. Chinese
and Malay pirates, likely operating out of Singapore, cooperated within the same vessels to
plunder hapless merchants.400 This was a radical departure from the reputation of Straits
Chinese, to whom the rest of the population hitherto saw as peaceful and uninterested in such
violent pursuits.
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The first reported instance of cooperation between Singaporean and Chinese pirates
involved a case of petty piracy shocked Singapore’s elite, not because of the scale of the attack,
by this time piracy seemed to be declining, but rather the suggestion that Chinese and Malays
worked together as pirates. In mid-1840, a small junk with a crew of twelve sailed for Hainan
from Singapore with a cargo valued at $1,000. While sailing off the entrance to the Johor Straits,
“seven or eight small boats, manned with Malays and Chinese (!)” attacked the junk with spears
once the junk fired small arms at the flotilla.401 The italicization and exclamation point express
the shock at which the newspaper authors had at learning of this development. The notion of
Chinese and Malays working together as pirates seemed foreign in segregated Singapore. The
ability to bring together “seven or eight” boats suggests a level of organization and planning.
After one of the crew fell in battle with a mortal wound, the junk surrendered, permitting the
pirates to plunder everything of value, right down to the cooking pot, but ceased harming the
crew. The Free Press suggested that these pirates were “vagabonds” who received intelligence
concerning the junk in Singapore and attacked them without an elite benefactor.402 If true, the
pirates worked on their own accord for subsistence or a demand-led attack unlike most of the
previous pirate attacks that usually involved some elite benefactor. These pirates accomplished
something unheard of: they established their own intelligence network and small fleet of boats,
overcame various linguistic and ethnic barriers, and then risked their lives to attack a Chinese
junk.
Another incident displayed inter-ethnic cooperation in piracy for operations around
Singapore, indicating that the previous incident was likely a part of a larger trend. In March
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1843, a perahu sailed apparently by Chinese and Malays attacked a Cochin-Chinese vessel off
Pedra Branca, near Singapore, at 11 p.m. but only managed to wound three of the CochinChinese crew.403 In another instance, a mix of Chinese and Malay pirates attacked a Chinese
fishing boat off Pulau Tekong in May 1844, but the crew escaped and later identified one of the
five captured suspected pirates.404 Another Cochin-Chinese tope heading to Singapore came
under attack from a combined Malay-Chinese assault on 15 May 1844 off Cape Romania with
two sampans with Malays and one with Chinese. During the engagement, the nakhoda and six
crew went in a boat to receive help from a nearby bark but failed and a junk eventually picked
them up. The remaining ten crewmen on the tope surrendered without a fight. The pirates
plundered the vessel of everything of value, beached it, and set it ablaze. To escape certain
death, the crew jumped overboard and swam for shore, where a Chinese merchant vessel picked
them up.405 These pirate attacks featuring both Chinese and Malays focused on Cochin-Chinese
or otherwise particularly vulnerable crews. They overcame the possibility of victims identifying
them by attacking Cochin-Chinese, who likely failed to identify their attackers by name or
possibly even recognition because they were foreign. These instances reveal a larger trend of
Chinese and Malays working together using small boats and low-capital assets to capture
vulnerable vessels. These two attacks were likely part of a larger trend because pirate attacks
often went unreported and pirates at this time ensured no survivors could inform authorities of
their misfortune.
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The cooperation between Chinese and Malays in acts of petty piracy seemed short lived,
with it petering out by the end of the mid-1840s. The last joint effort, at least before 1851,
involved an unsuccessful attack by two sampan pukat vessels crewed mostly by Chinese but also
a few Malays on a Cochin-Chinese tope in May 1846.406 As the decade progressed, Chinese
pirates became more powerful with larger crews and vessels. The first significant bump around
Chinese piracy from Singapore since 1824 occurred in May 1843, with Cantonese junks
attacking other Chinese junks. Chinese piracy ultimately became more prominent in relation to
Malay piracy by 1849.407 Some Chinese almost certainly learned the art of piracy from their
Malay counterparts. Although China had its own tradition of maritime piracy, evidence of any
substantive links between mainland Chinese pirate fleets and Straits Chinese pirates remains
minimal. Chinese piracy apparently grew from this cooperation between poor Chinese and
Malays in self-serving piracy likely until the two ethnic groups inexplicably ceased cooperation.
Singapore-based Chinese piracy eventually evolved into sophisticated operations capable of
defeating nearly all but the most formidable vessels after years of neighbors considering them
peaceful.
The shared interests between Malays and Chinese in Singapore manifested itself through
some cooperation on the quest for plunder. Singapore’s ethnic diversity, weak political
structures, liberal political economy, and close contact between people of various ethnic
backgrounds permitted the pirates to work together and overcome various linguistic and cultural
differences. Singapore’s liberal political economy facilitated this cooperation because of the
heavy flow of migrants desired by the leadership, along with a weak marine police incapable of
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protecting many vessels from piracy. Chinese and Malays exploited these aspects of Singapore’s
political economy for their own ends despite the expectation that the various ethnic groups would
remain separate.

Chinese Secret Societies, Malay States, and Piracy

Chinese pirates based in Singapore and elsewhere became quite potent in the South China
Sea by the mid-19th century through the development of strong organizational skills and tactics
honed in the waters around Malaya. The development of this capability particularly challenged
the people of Cochin-China, those living in the Kingdom of Cambodia and southern Vietnam.
Chinese pirates operated in both solitary vessels and small fleets that terrorized the surrounding
waters from their bases in Malaya. They became powerful enough to force their opponents to
adapt or face severe consequences. Having safe population and trading centers in the Straits
Settlements permitted Chinese pirates a place to develop in comparative safety while they built
piratical systems that rivalled even that of their Malay counterparts.
The Chinese pirates in Singapore targeted Cochin-Chinese shipping because of their
vulnerabilities despite the joint counter-piracy efforts of the Straits Settlements and Cambodian
governments. The Straits Settlements’ government noticed the impact of piracy against
“harmless and defenceless” Cochin-Chinese during the 1840s even though the overall of piracy
was in a downward trend.408 Many Cochin-Chinese vessels sailed to Singapore without arms
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because their government forbade them from doing so.409 The Vietnamese government under
Emperor Thieu Tri seemed more concerned with regulating incoming trade in their country by
mandating foreigners leave the port immediately after conducting business, along with
preventing the spread of Christianity within their borders. The government even prohibited
visitors from speaking privately with individuals in Vietnam.410 From the 1840s and into the
1850s, Cochin-Chinese vessels often came under attack from pirates heading into or out of
Singapore. They were easy prey and often lacked sufficient weapons to defend themselves. At
times Cochin-Chinese had muskets to scare off pirates, but I found no reports of them using large
guns to defend themselves.411 The King of Cambodia in 1850 cooperated with Singapore’s
governor to hunt down Chinese pirates plaguing his subjects. He ordered his agent, Constantino
Monteiro Ocuha Tuthea Rum Rong, to work with Straits authorities to defeat Hainanese pirates
“who intercept and rob all trading boats…” by sailing with Straits Marine patrols and pointing
out the hiding places of Chinese pirates.412 Vietnamese and Cambodians made for comparatively
easy prey, which permitted Chinese pirates based in Singapore to excel at the art of piracy while
the governments of these countries and the Straits Settlements often failed to protect their
subjects in these waters.
One rather unfortunate voyage of two Cochin-Chinese vessels in May 1849 illustrated the
immense difficulties faced by seafarers in the South China Sea at this time. A Singapore
gunboat escorted the 33-coyan and 20-coyan boats to Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu Putih but
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shortly after the gunboat departed, the two vessels came under attack from two Malay perahu.
The Cochin-Chinese had muskets aboard and fended them off. On 7 May, the two found
themselves amidst ten Chinese junks. Three of them maneuvered to prevent the escape of the
boats whose crew realized what was occurring and attempted to change course. Eventually the
pirates boarded the boats and stole everything of value except for some provisions to ensure the
return of the crew. Chinese pirates again boarded one of the boats on two separate occasions
only to discover that cargo already taken.413 Chinese pirates operated at times in significantly
sized fleets with an understanding of naval tactics. The origin of these remains unclear, but the
difficulty of such a voyage because of piracy was evident by the multiple attacks by pirates.
Chinese pirates in this instance had little or no interest in seizing the vessels or enslaving the
crew, meaning they only desired the cargo. Mercy granted to the crews showed a strategy to
persuading crews from resisting in the future by offering them a strong chance of survival if they
did not fight back. However, we cannot know how often pirates showed mercy in relation to
killing the entire crew because records of missing Cochin-Chinese crews remained limited to a
few reports, probably because they had limited connections with Singapore institutions that
recorded such events.
During the various civil wars of the 1850s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, Chinese pirates, including
those affiliated with secret societies, worked with various Malay political factions concerning the
issue of piracy. Chinese secret societies grew stronger in the Straits Settlements to the point
where they developed into independent pirate groups. Local chiefs in Selangor and Perak grew
desperate during the civil wars of the time and opened up their riverine towns and villages to
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pirates or enabled the locals to conduct piracy against vulnerable vessels sailing the nearby
waters rather than specifically targeting the vessels under enemy flags. The political economies
of various factions during civil wars in 19th-century Malaya, especially from 1871-1874,
permitted Chinese piracy in particular to thrive because of the need for capital, including basic
food supplies necessary for the various factions to wage war against their enemies and even to
survive.
Chinese secret societies maintained various roles in Malaya throughout the 19th century,
including those of pirates. These societies developed a strong violence capacity during the early
19th century evident by becoming involved in the Siamese-Kedah War of 1825, along with
fighting in Malacca between the two important groups, Ghee Hin and Hai San, as early as 1834.
The Straits Settlements lacked either the will or ability to tackle these societies before the 1860s
and ‘70s because it was simply too weak to deal with them.414 Without looking into the structure
or in-depth history of these societies, this work will examine the piratical role of these
institutions in relation to the larger Malayan and Straits Settlements political economies.
Early Chinese secret societies in Singapore exploited the weakness of the colonial state to
conduct crimes such as piracy around the island. The most infamous secret society during the
tenure of Resident John Crawfurd (1823-1826) was Thian Tai Huey, which was notorious for
practically uninhibited attacks and robberies in Singapore. These attacks included an incident,
according to Abdullah, in which pirates slaughtered all but four of a Siamese crew off Tanjong
Katong and plundered the vessel of its cargo. Despite a month-long investigation, the police
failed to identify the perpetrators and handed the vessel back to the survivors. Abdullah
414
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suggested that the main reason why the East India Company failed to apprehend the secret
society hidden in the interior was its inability to construct a road to facilitate better the movement
of police or soldiers to defeat Thian Tai Huey.415 The weakness of the colonial state, especially
in the early days of the colony, enabled Chinese secret societies to operate without punishment,
including committing crimes such as murder, theft, and piracy. Singapore lacked the
infrastructure and available police to deal with such a large problem.
The Perak Civil War saw the peak of violence between various secret societies that
aligned with various Malay factions to gain control of important territory. In the struggle for
Larut during the 1860s and ‘70s, the Si Kwan or “Four Districts” operated with the backing of
the Fui Chew Hakkas (Teochew) and Cantonese of southwest Guangdong, China, along with the
support of the Ho Hup Seah and Ghee Hin societies. The Go Kwan or “Five Districts” received
support from the Hai San comprised mainly of Chen Seng Hakka. The Si Kwan and Go Kwan
fought each other for dominance over Perak.416 In the course of a succession crisis in Perak,
Raja Abdullah formed a coalition with the Si Kwan group in exchange for Larut tax farms
against Mentri Ngah Ibrahim who aligned with the Go Kwan of the Hai San in 1872.417 Straits
Chinese, no longer regarded as meek, controlled the most powerful factions within the governing
coalitions and important players within the kerajaan economics system.
The development of these coalitions of Malay and Chinese factions fits well within the
LAO and kerajaan economic frameworks. Each of the factions possessed a violence capacity
that enabled them to protect their own interests and attack their opponents who operated as
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economic institutions. People within the elite made coalitions with other powerful players to
secure their own power in exchange for rents, while they attempted to seize the economic assets
of their opponents to minimize their wealth and power. However, the two rival coalitions failed
to agree on the terms by which they shared the economic output of Perak and fought each other.
Secret societies in Malaya continued piratical actions and such actions became
particularly prevalent during the Perak Civil War. Swettenham declared certain actors pirates
because “one faction at least was driven to such extremes that they attacked indiscriminately all
boats they could find passing the coasts of Perak and Larut, murdered their crews and carried off
the cargoes."418 The Chinese secret societies expelled the Malay authorities who once governed
Larut and subsequently the vicinity became a pirate stronghold. The war, which threatened to
spread to Penang, created a societal breakdown that forced the fighters to survive on provisions
from abandoned orchards and piracy. Their fast boats attacked vessels at sea and along the rivers
and creeks emptying into the waters off Larut.419 For the people fighting in Larut, piracy became
a means of survival brought on by a conflict over the Perak royal succession and the rights to tin
mining. This form of piracy derived from a political economy and weak state structure incapable
of sustaining this warfare, which then forced the secret societies to piracy for survival.
As the war dragged on, secret society members in Perak found themselves vulnerable to
food shortages as the land became too desolate to supply them. One letter from Tye Seng
Kongsee to San Nah Kongsee in Penang described the circumstances in Larut. Tye sent men to
collect forty bags of rice and other supplies, which he needed because he already exhausted his
rice supply by handing them out to his men in the provisions for a few days. He pleaded, “…you
418
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must send rice and provisions at once…” and also suggested that his comrade send wangkangs
and rowboats to attack the enemy stockade while he attacked with his men. Furthermore,
intelligence from secret society members in Singapore informed him that a Royal Navy warship
was already en route to his location.420 In another letter sent from Tye, he recounted that after
H.M.S. Midge destroyed the stockade on 20 September, though they received the aforementioned
food, it was only sufficient for four days and requested more provisions and ammunition. They
received more food, including seven baskets of salted fish by boat to last around nine days.421
These letters from soldiers under Tye at Larut show the desperation concerning hunger they
faced. They already possessed weapons and boats were available to them, which meant they
possessed sufficient capital and a strong-enough intelligence network to become pirates. The
desperation because of the shortage of food indicated that they had sufficient reason to attack
unfortunate enemy and civilian vessels.
Once apparent that their goal of controlling the Larut River was untenable because of the
Royal Navy’s intervention, the Si Kwan soldiers had the opportunity to gather food and other
provisions through piracy. Letters captured by the mentri implied that Tye’s men were Si Kwan
soldiers because the mentri had no reason to inform on his coalition partners.422 Furthermore,
Raja Abdullah already signed a cease-fire with Mentri Ibrahim on 10 August 1873 in the
presence of the Lt. Gov. Anson and Tengku Kudin, the Viceroy of Selangor. Abdullah ordered
the Teochew headmen in Larut to order “your armed junks and boats to come out of the River
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and creeks of Laroot with all possible Dispatch … anchor close to Her Majesty’s Ship ‘Midge’…
if you fail to obey this order you must take the consequences.”423 Raja Abdullah effectively
ordered the Si Kwan naval forces and leadership to surrender and end the war in Larut, though
quite possibly did not expect the Teochew to comply. If they violated his commands, they
answered to the guns of the Royal Navy and lost any legitimacy that came with their former
association with Abdullah. The coalition between the Ghee Hin society and the Malay elite
faithful to Abdullah hinged on the Si Kwan’s willingness to surrender their arms.
Unsurprisingly, many Si Kwan ignored the command.
The ensuing battle between Royal Navy and Teochew forces at the mouth of the Larut
River illustrated the independence of the secret societies and their indifference to any other
authority in regular combat. Unlike the previous encounters with the Royal Navy, the secret
society forces attempted to hold their position and fight a conventional battle. On 16 September,
over a month since Abdullah signed the cease-fire, Commander Grant of H.M.S. Midge and a
squadron of boats attempted to detain any vessel carrying provisions without passes from the
mentri in accordance with a proclamation from the governor. While approaching the stockade,
two large rowboats each with fifty to sixty men fired on the squadron, which caused a local pilot
on the schooner to hide below deck, leaving the vessel to run aground. Fighting between the
boats and stockades lasted for about an hour until British rocket fire persuaded the Chinese boats
to retreat to the stockades.424 This engagement revealed two important characteristics of the
Teochew at Kuala Larut. They no longer recognized the authority of Abdullah and certainly not
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the mentri or the Straits Settlements. Therefore, they acted on their own accord and the coalition
between them and the pro-Abdullah faction of the Perak Malay elite broke. They had significant
naval capability in that they fought fairly well against a squadron of Royal Navy boats in open
combat.
The Royal Navy vessels in the vicinity responded in force to the attack on their boats,
which forced the surviving Chinese fighters to flee and take to more desperate survival measures
because of the disintegration of their formal economic structure. On Saturday, 20 September
1873, a combined force of H.M.S. Midge, H.M.S. Thalia, and the mentri’s personal yacht
engaged the stockades and vessels at Larut when they fired upon the boats of the aforementioned
Royal Navy warships. In the course of the battle, up to 120 crew of the defending junks jumped
overboard with only one prisoner captured. The British forces burnt the lower stockade and
junks before advancing to the next stockade. By sundown, the advancing forces captured a junk
and destroyed the second set of stockades. The next day, British officers received word from an
agent of Raja Muda Abdullah that the entire Si Kwan force of 3,000-4,000 planned to surrender.
The Chinese headmen declared themselves thoroughly defeated and the Larut River became
clear, with a gunboat to guard the waterway from pirates.425 Although the victorious forces
tossed the heavy guns and muskets they found into the river, the abundance of ammunition
suggested that escaping men carried weapons into the jungle while evading capture.426 Despite
the seemingly decisive British victory at Larut and the closing of the war, problems concerning
piracy lingered. With several thousand Chinese now without employment and without the right
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to work the tin mines, piracy was a tempting occupation. With much of Perak in ruins and the Si
Kwan forces needing food to survive, piracy and banditry were the simplest recourse.
Furthermore, the Chinese soldiers likely hid their weapons away from the Larut River vicinity
until they needed them again. The course of the war hardened and taught them how to use such
weapons, which enabled them to engage in piratical pursuits at a future time.
Tye Seng Kongsee and his men’s attack on a small group of boats illustrated the way in
which they operated as pirates in the Straits of Malacca. Tye’s six rowboats were patrolling the
sea when their crews spotted three wooden boats on the evening of 27 September 1873 and
engaged them. Tye reported the course of the action: “two [vessels] got off and one we got and
killed over thirty men, got one 4 pounder and a 2 pounder besides over 10 muskets and other
property.”427 Although Tye’s company perhaps attacked a Hai San flotilla, he made no mention
of the nationality, ethnicity, or of any sort of reference to the political allegiance of the people
they killed. Quite likely, because of the limited amount of supplies available to these men and
the real possibility of starvation if they failed to acquire sufficient food, they lacked qualms
about attacking unidentified vessels. The survivors of Larut operated as irregular forces in boats
attacking smaller forces with the goal of seizing their victims’ possessions and cargo. The
disintegration of Malay political authority in Larut spread to the nearby waters because leading
Malays lacked the means to control or support the Chinese secret societies.
The Perak Civil War ended but the fighting continued with former soldiers and sailors,
with few other opportunities available, becoming pirates. Chan Ah Hong, a refugee from Larut
living in Penang, boarded Low Tong Pow’s wangkang in hopes of returning to his home after
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learning the war officially ended. Around 15 October, “two large armed junks and four long
rowboats chased” the wangkang with 330 onboard. The flotilla fired two or three times and
killed three men with one shot. Despite the crew’s best attempts to evade and fire at the pirates,
the pirates fired muskets and tossed stinkpots at them, which prompted Chan to jump overboard
and cling to a loose plank. The survivor witnessed the pirates seizing the wangkang as he swam
to the shore and proceeded to inform the mentri of the pirate attack.428 The pirates operated in
small fleets at times, which made effective resistance against them difficult save the most
powerful of vessels in those waters. In this instance, even a vessel with 330 people onboard
failed to defend against the pirates. Despite the official declaration ending hostilities, fighting
continued in the Straits of Malacca as the remnants of the secret societies’ armed forces wreaked
havoc on shipping.
The Chinese pirates, who formerly fought in Larut in 1873, targeted vessels they
concluded they had a strong chance of overtaking while Malay authorities stood by quite helpless
to stop them. On 27 October, pirate vessels concealed in the Dinding River attacked a Malay
boat carrying rattans and tin from Perak valued at $3,000 total. They killed four and wounded
nine out of a crew of seventeen. The pirates at 10 a.m. took the vessel Pulau Pangkor and seized
the cargo, along with burning the boat after spending half an hour plundering it. The local
penghulu volunteered to point out the pirate hideout at Pulau Tallong but warned the British
forces that they needed a steam launch to catch them because their boats were inadequate to
catch the pirate boats, which had twenty oars a side along with plenty of fighting men.
Furthermore, the pirates kept a strong lookout for enemy vessels and had plenty of creeks nearby
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to hide in when a more powerful enemy approached.429 The virtually indiscriminate attacks by
Chinese pirates were quite difficult for the Malays or Britons to stop because of their strength
and speed. Furthermore, like their Malay pirate predecessors, they usually had the option of
hiding in the maze of creeks along the Malayan shore.
The pirates became quite aggressive in that they attacked even square-rig vessels sailing
in the Straits of Malacca. Tan Cheen, a nakhoda of a British-flagged schooner named Kim Yeap
Sing, which traded between the Straits Settlements, departed Malacca on 14 November 1873
with cargo and coinage. On the 16th near Pulau Remo, with a calm wind he spotted a large and a
small boat rowing toward his schooner. When nearing the vessel, the two boats fired and over
the course of around a half hour damaged the rigging, bulwark, and sail of the schooner. With a
bit of luck for Tan and his crew, the smaller boat caught fire and the wind picked up enough to
enable their escape. The pirates headed in the direction of Kuala Sepetang, near the mouth of the
Larut River. Tan reported that eight vessels departed Malacca around that time but none had
reached Penang and he feared their capture by pirates.430 These pirates, likely secret society
members from the Larut district because the Perak War had just ended, attacked Western-style
vessels flying the British Ensign by using their crews to row faster than their becalmed
opponents. They also seriously threatened shipping from the Straits Settlements supposedly
under British protection and therefore its economy if left unchecked.
Tan came close enough to the pirates to report their background and vessel types, which
suggested that they were opportunists rather than professionals. The larger pirate boat was
similar to firewood-shipping boats with guns mounted at the bow, while the smaller boat
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resembled a Malay rowing perahu. The pirates themselves spoke the Macao dialect and dressed
likewise. Nakhoda Tan, however, failed to recognize any of the pirates.431 This report suggests
that the pirates were immigrants from the Macau or Guangdong who came to Malaya to find
work in other professions but became pirates out of desperation because they used vessels not
built for the purpose of piracy, like that of their homeland. Rather, they repurposed other vessels
for military purposes.
The immediate aftermath of the conflict witnessed an apparent increase in piracy, which
persisted even with the Royal Navy’s China Squadron present. In the wake of attack on Larut,
the seven rowboats remaining in the pirates’ possessions conducted “depredations with
wholesale murder. They do not fight under any flag: to destroy them is almost an
impossibility…” because they could hide in the villages regardless of how many boats hunted
them, according to Captain Woollcombe.432 “The piracies are much on the increase[,] the
rowboats now number eighteen, each of a very large description and manned by about 40. to 50.
men,” reported Captain Woollcombe.433 The pirates were so powerful that at the police station
on Pulau Dinding, where the aforementioned penghulu resided, the corporal there reported he
“feared an attack from the Piratical Rowboats,” resulting in Capt. Woollcombe leaving Lt.
Lascelles to guard the place with a cutter.434 The pirates in the Straits of Malacca operated
effectively and struck fear into the hearts even of those with power. Hunting down the pirates
became quite difficult because they fled and hid within the general population.
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The fragile coalitions that bound together the Ghee Hin and supporters of Abdullah
unraveled. Although Abdullah ordered the Si Kwan forces to surrender to the Royal Navy
warships, they refused until it became clear that further resistance was futile. Without control of
or passage through the Larut River, the tin mines became disconnected from the global markets
and almost worthless. Prior to their surrender, the Ghee Hin used their political coalition with
Raja Abdullah and the economic privileges they received as a means to advance and legitimize
their power and wealth. However, without sufficient logistics and provisions, the Si Kwan
forces resorted to piracy as means to maintain their positions. Once Raja Abdullah demanded
their surrender, the weakness of the Malay political establishment enabled various Chinese
groups to continue as pirates in the Straits of Malacca. The coalition between Ghee Hin and the
pro-Abdullah Malay faction fell apart and kerajaan economics lacked sustainability because the
Malay elite no longer had the means to seize the wealth of the leading organizations or eliminate
their leadership. The Perak Kerajaan effectively weakened to a critical point where the Malay
elite remained divided and without any faction, for the moment anyway, having sufficient power
to maintain order within the kingdom. The Perak Civil War revealed severe problems within that
state, including the policies of the Malay ruling elite that enabled Chinese piracy to thrive during
the war and thereafter until around 1875.

Conclusion

Straits Chinese pirates derived much of their success from their ability to adapt to the
political economies of Malaya such as that of the Malay states and British colonies throughout
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much of the 19th century. From the Malay kingdoms, Chinese merchants developed bases of
operation through the permission of the Malay elites who generally underestimated the political
prowess of such Chinese and permitted them to trade under the belief that they posed little threat
to their political power. The power of Chinese pirates became so great that the Malay kingdoms
had difficulty in suppressing them despite their centuries of naval tradition. Chinese pirates used
British-ruled Singapore to their advantage, despite the importance of piracy suppression to the
imperial mission, by exploiting the arms trade, hiding in the Straits Settlements, and using
Singapore as a pirate base from which they launched operations. Straits Chinese then employed
the capital gained from piracy to improve their economic standing in Insular Southeast Asia.
Chinese pirates developed into a serious naval threat to commerce in 19th-century Malaya
over the span of a few decades by exploiting the characteristics of Malayan political economies.
They found Singapore an excellent base of operations because they received the materials and
labor necessary for piratical operations without excessive British interference. Even the most
powerful of Straits vessels failed to defeat heavily armed junks. During the 1840s, Singapore
Chinese learned piratical methods from Malays by working with them in the waters off
Singapore. By the 1860s, Chinese pirates operated in the Straits of Malacca and South China
Sea with virtual impunity. The free trade policies of the Straits Settlements made countering
pirates extraordinarily challenging and the various other states in the region had great difficulty
in containing the Chinese pirates. Chinese secret societies became so powerful in Perak that the
Malay government there found itself unable to fight them effectively. Having learned the art of
piracy, developing information and supply networks, and possessing sufficient places to hide
from authorities, Chinese pirates feared few others in the region. Malayan Chinese lost their
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reputation as meek through the spilt blood of countless crews. They no longer needed the likes
of Chang-choo to fight.
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EPILOGUE:

During the 20th century, the Malay Peninsula became the home of some of Asia’s greatest
economic success stories, which became even more apparent after the end of colonialism. Yet,
Malaya’s socio-economic order retained many of the same characteristics with the old Malay
elite families retaining their power. A mere century before independence, the same families
ruled their respective states with piracy usually being prominent among the issues of the day.
Although peaceful maritime trade for centuries was a critical part of state formation in Maritime
Southeast Asia, piracy was also a critical tool for states to grow and survive in a highly
competitive region. During the 19th century, Western governments compelled, or even coerced,
local kingdoms into choosing either being on the outside of the global trade system by
supporting piracy or by becoming partners in supporting the system. Overtly opposing imperial
agendas risked blockades and war while neglecting traditional means of obtaining domestic
political support threatened the loss of political power. For decades, Malay states balanced the
two by suppressing piracy while secretly permitting its continuity. Western colonial and national
governments tolerated such behavior for some time but gradually lost patience with the Malay
governments in the region for their inability to maintain order and prevent piracy.
The breaking down of order at sea and along the coasts was a symptom of a larger
problem than merely a lack of “rule of law”; rather it was a byproduct of a fundamental problem
within the kerajaan economics system. Transnational maritime trade grants those who
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participate in it the power of mobility, sometimes socially rather than just geographically, and
usually wealth to those invested in it. In Malaya, such wealth and mobility threatened the power
of the elite, but they needed the assistance of marine traders or other seafarers to bolster their
power. Seafarers, even those bearing the titles of nakhoda and panglima, possessed the ability to
flee to other kingdoms and switch allegiances. For centuries, Malay maritime traders worked
with the Malay elite and colonial governments, but this relationship came under immense strain
during the 19th century. Various Malay elites allied with Chinese merchants in an effort to
protect and enhance its power, along with maintaining a rigid social structure that sacrificed the
more adaptable aspects of the economy such as Malay maritime trade for social stability. Of
course, the Chinese in Malaya in time became politically powerful and developed their own
political structures parallel to that of the Malay elite. The choice of protecting the Malay royal
families at the expense of the nakhoda and other Malay seafarers brought tremendous
consequences.
The application of force alone by the Royal Navy and colonial marine was insufficient
for the destruction of piracy in the long term because of the latter’s importance. Samuel
Congalton, perhaps the most successful of East India Company officers in the art of piracy
suppression, became successful through his knowledge of geography and Malay culture. Captain
Stanley of H.M.S. Wolf recognized Congalton’s “correct knowledge of the coast, of the piratical
haunts, and his general acquaintance with the languages, habits and manners of the natives
employed in this diabolical system of robbery, combined with the dread these persons seem to
have of his perseverance[.]”435 He recommended him for the task of sailing a steam vessel
against pirates. “There are few or no pirates now in the Straits for us to start off there at a
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moment's notice,” Congalton wrote to his brother in June 1849. He continued, “…as soon as her
Majesty abolishes the head-money for any poor savage of a Malay shot by her officers, piracy
will die out…,” indicating some tension between the Straits Marine and the Royal Navy.436
Although piracy picked up again after he wrote the letter, he argued effectively that brute force
against Malays was an ineffective strategy for the suppression of piracy not only in writing but
also through his lengthy career in the waters of Malaya. The demise of state-sanctioned piracy
in Malaya required persuading Malay elites to cease all support for such activities.
Gradually, Malay states moved toward greater integration into the Western-backed global
trade system at the expense of the old piratical ways. While the rest of the world benefitted from
decreased piracy in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, the Malay states needed
other ways to maintain political order because leveraging their position along strategic
waterways through piracy and tolls became less feasible. Malay elites integrated more intimately
with colonial governments and global economic forces in part to reap the benefits of those
relationships. They found the rewards for such far greater than continuing policies of statesanctioned piracy, which benefitted transnational merchants at the cost of segments of the Malay
elite. Although Western pressure was certainly a factor in this transition, Southeast Asians of
various backgrounds suffered so much from piracy they moved to suppress it on their own
initiative. A decrease in piracy and privateering globally was critical for market development
and the growth of international trade and therefore worthy of further study.437 Of course, piracy
continued at the dawn of the 20th century despite the efforts of authorities; its potency and
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economic impact declined immensely since the days of state-sanctioned piracy. Such
developments allowed for smoother sailing for trade and more cohesive global trade networks.
I define autonomous history as writing about Southeast Asians as central figures with
significant power over their fate rather than as solely writing from “the Southeast Asian
perspective.” No historian can possibly distill the diverse experiences and perspectives of
Southeast Asians into a single perspective, which makes finding “the Southeast Asian
perspective” impossible. Furthermore, rarely do historians of the Modern Era write monographs
with a source base comprising of a single viewpoint; instead, they weave multiple historical
perspectives into a single work. The key for moving away from Eurocentrism is to cease
assuming Western actors had so much power regardless of how politically inconvenient the
results are. Westerners did not introduce piracy to Malaya, nor did they introduce the concept of
“piracy,” and certainly did not obliterate all Malay maritime commerce from the barrels of their
guns. Historians must cease implicitly portraying Southeast Asians as innocent people corrupted
by the evil ways of the West and instead portray them as human beings capable of doing harm to
others for little or no reason. Congalton, though almost certainly more familiar with the
perspectives of Malay seafarers of the 19th century than any living scholar, retained Eurocentrism
in his writings by placing the actions of Great Britain as responsible for the proliferation of
piracy. Such notions of Western power fit outside my conceptualization of autonomous history.
Despite the dramatic changes of the 20th century such as independence, mainland
Malayan royalty kept their crowns unlike their Riau-Lingga counterparts who succumbed to
colonialism and failed to establish themselves in the Republic of Indonesia as officially
recognized royalty. Kerajaan economics enabled the established Malay elite to stay in power by
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monopolizing key sectors of the economy and preventing their people from obtaining wealth too
dramatically. Piracy was an important extension of the kerajaan economics system in that it
permitted the Malay ruling elite to maintain their status until it no longer served their interests.
Pirates in turn exploited kerajaan economics and colonial political economies to their own
advantage, often by using Malayan ports as bases and places to obtain intelligence and supplies.

The End of the State-Sanctioned Piracy System in Malaya

One act of piracy in Selangor signified the end of an era after which a survivor gave
evidence that took down the local piratical system. The trial for the attack represented the last
gasp of state-sponsored piracy in Malaya. “[Nakhoda] Doraman fell to the shots. Musa then
called out to ‘amok.’ Three of our people jumped into the water and were stabbed, and all the
others in the boat were also stabbed and killed.”438 Mat Syed initially testified on 29 December
1873 in front of A. R. Ord, a justice of the peace and police magistrate at Malacca concerning a
hearing of piracy and murder, but something quite unusual happened after that.439 The “Viceroy
of Selangor,” Tunku Kudin requested, Straits authorities permit Selangor to host the piracy trial
and Governor Andrew Clark consented because the attack took place in that territory. The court
was composed of three Malay commissioners, Tunku Kudin, John McNair, and J. G. Davidson,
while the most important prisoner was Tunku Allang, otherwise known as Raja Yakob, the son
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of Sultan Abdul Samad.440 To charge the son of a sultan with such a serious crime, although not
unprecedented for the Straits government, was highly unusual for a Malay state. The structure of
kerajaan economics in Malaya was changing. Selangor finally created a check on the piratical
behavior of Malay princes who hitherto usually did as they pleased with few consequences.
The efforts of Mohamed bin Hassan, a Malay Malaccan, played an important role in the
early stages of the British response to the pirate attack on the vessel registered under the British
flag. Lieutenant Governor Edward W. Shaw learned of the attack on the trading vessel,
registered as Number 71 under the command of Haji Abdul Rahman, from Mohamed bin Hassan
before the sole survivor returned to Malacca.441 Mohamed bin Hassan, brother-in-law of the
vessel’s nakhoda and brother of a crewman named Tomby Hitam, reported the attack on the boat
and crew from Malacca to British authorities, which Bilal Senin, a Malaccan returning from
Langkat, confirmed.442 Captain Shaw sent Mohamed bin Hassan to greet Sultan Abdul Samad
requesting the safe return of the survivor and the punishment of those responsible.443 The sultan
returned the survivor to Malacca in the care of the messenger and noted three of his men died,
suggesting he had his own reasons for finding the culprits of the attack.444 The efforts of
Mohamed bin Hassan, who probably wished to find those responsible for the murder of his
family members, contributed to the resolution of this potentially severe international incident.
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The first trial took place in the Straits Settlements because the sole survivor identified a
number of the suspected pirates came there shortly after the attack. Sergeant Major Mohamed
received orders on 12 December to arrest the suspected pirates who arrived at the river identified
by Mat Syed. After reaching the river and identifying the suspects, one of them attempted to
stab the sergeant major with a spear with unsuccessful results. The boat contained multiple
weapons, 445 including a gun, a spear, and sword, formerly owned by Nakhoda Haji Abdul
Rahman. Mat Syed identified the anchor as belonging to his former nakhoda and a sarong
owned by a fellow crewman.446 The apprehension of the suspected pirates brought risk even to
armed police in their territory and even though the suspects were heavily armed, hardened
warriors, they proved an inadequate match for the Malacca police. Having the trial, however, in
the Straits Settlements had a minimal political effect because piracy trials were common within
British jurisdiction and it was common knowledge of the Malay elite’s support for piracy.
Mat Syed made his escape from the pirates because of the assistance rendered to him by
other people in Langat who protected him. On 16 November 1873, the day of the attack, Mat
Syed escaped while his crewmembers and the passengers fell to either gunshot or stab wounds.
He survived by jumping into the water and hiding at the stern of the vessel before diving to
evade the pirates.447 After swimming to shore and hiding in the water for some time, Mat Syed
swam to a Bugis vessel and begged them to save his life. The Bugis let him onboard and kept
him after learning who he was and why he was in the water. Although the people at the fort
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learned of this and requested Mat Syed, the Bugis told them they would show the survivor
tomorrow instead of immediately turning him over because they did not fear them. The next
morning, the Bugis brought him to the fort but refused to hand him over and instead sent the
survivor to the sultan’s palace. The men from the stockade whom Mat Syed testified were
pirates followed the Bugis vessel while en route to the palace.448 The Bugis sailing to Langat
saved the life of Mat Syed and, despite the guns of the nearby stockade, refused to hand him over
to Tunku Allang, probably because they knew it meant death for him. Had the Bugis handed
him over or left him in the water, Mat Syed would have had little chance of survival.
Mat Syed had yet another stroke of luck that potentially saved his life with the help of
others. On arrival at the sultan’s residence, they found the sultan asleep. The datuk bandar
interrogated May Syed, who replied that he saw the attackers and that they came from the
stockade. Almost certainly because his identification of Tunku Allang, the sultan’s son, as a
pirate would have resulted in a negative response from the sultan, the datuk bandar advised Mat
Syed to lie to the sultan about being able to identify the attackers. After the sultan awoke, Mat
Syed complied with the advice and told the sultan he was afraid. The sultan then sent him to
Mohamed Syed’s shop in Langat where he waited until his uncle Mohamed bin Hassan returned
him to Malacca safely.449 Somehow, Mat Syed survived the short but quite dangerous ordeal
through the courage, kindness, and ambition of people in Langat. Perhaps some of the key
figures in this story wanted to limit the power of Malaya’s spoiled princes and their ravenous
appetite for piracy or perhaps they just felt compassion for the man who lost his friends.
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The trial came about through the efforts of numerous people, including Malays, who
made the detention of Raja Allang and his associates possible. The miraculous survival of Mat
Syed, in large part because of the efforts of Malays and Bugis in Langkat, made the trial
possible. According to Swettenham, some unnamed within the Malay elite considered those
accused by Mat Syed innocent of the attack but that they deserved the punishment on “general
principles.”450 Perhaps this meant they brought shame on the royal house at Selangor for
bringing such accusations on it or, less likely, because it was their responsibility for the
protection of commerce there. The guilt or innocence of the men tried is completely immaterial
to my argument because the trial symbolized the shift away from piracy as a rent for the Malay
elite, which began to realize that such activity no longer served their interests because of
increased British political pressure and the potential gains from peaceful commerce outweighing
the gains from piracy.
In the immediate aftermath of the trial and execution, the commissioners determined the
compensation for the victims of the piracy as usual when the Straits determined someone from
Malay royalty plundered a British vessel. In this instance, the commission determined the sultan
should pay $5,000 or its tin, equivalent in compensation. Sultan Abdul Samad complied and
ordered 286 slabs of tin or around seven tons, which H.M.S. Midge carried to Malacca while
H.M.S. Rinaldo towed a pirate boat away.451 The British policy for Malay states within their
sphere of influence for when Straits Settlements officials discovered that a member of the royal
family partook in the piracy of a British-registered vessel, usually demanded compensation for
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the losses. This instance was different because a Malay state volunteered to punish the son of the
sultan for an act of piracy.
Shortly thereafter, British and Selangor forces made a concerted effort to wipe out piracy
in the state by searching for pirate bases. Tunku Kudin and the commissioners for the trial set
out on an expedition to hunt pirates in Selangor.452 However, when Royal Navy warships
arrived at the village of Toomboh, a mere seven miles south of Langat, Tunku Kudin and the
commissioners determined it was merely a fishing village and proceeded to Lukut. Raja Bot,
ruler of Lukut, came aboard H.M.S. Thalia there and Tunku Kudin subsequently departed for
Klang. The China Squadron found no proof of further piratical activity in Selangor in the
immediate aftermath of the trial.453 The aftermath of the Selangor Civil War left power
significantly more centralized than in the years before. British forces then had the assistance of
the Selangor ruling elite in identifying pirates. The ruling coalition had the support of British
firepower to prevent any additional warfare or development of large-scale piracy in the state.
The year 1874 marked a turning point in Malaya’s history of piracy because states ceased
support for piratical operations and no longer ignored acts of piracy in their territory. Frank
Swettenham and a portion of the elite at Kuala Langat disputed the findings of the trial and
believed the executed men did not commit that act of piracy. The executions resulted in the
sharp decline of piracy off the Selangor coast.454 The cooperation between Great Britain and
Tunku Kudin also helped bring about the end of systematic piracy in Selangor.455 The local elite
no longer tolerated piracy as demonstrated in this letter where a Malay aristocrat named Raja
452

Ibid., 289.
Woolcombe to Shadwell, 21 February 1874, National Archives, United Kingdom, Admiralty Records, Piracy in
the Straits of Malacca, 1873-1874, ADM 125/148, 160-167.
454
Swettenham, British Malaya, 183, 184.
455
Swettenham, “Some Account of the Independent Native States of the Malay Peninsula,” 187.
453

240
Muhammad Ibni Engku Raja Abdullah al-Marhum wrote, “…one of my people from Tanjung
Gemuk went fishing and was robbed by people at sea. This I inform my friend, [I] fear others
the next time that like our people who go to sea, may be killed or otherwise.”456 Raja
Muhammad also requested the punishment of pirates for their crimes.457 Although piracy
persisted in Selangor in the years after 1874, members of the Malay elite determined that piracy
was a threat to the security of their people and moved against it. The reasons for the elite ceasing
support for piracy was probably the amalgamation of political, diplomatic, economic, and moral
problems associated with piracy. In any case, the Selangor elite, as with much of Malaya by this
point, removed piracy from the kerajaan economics system in addition to many other changes.
For the Straits Settlements, persuading the established Malay elite to crack down on and
avoid piracy required providing incentives that made supporting piracy no longer in its financial
interests. British authorities introduced monthly allowances for Malay chiefs placed on the
states’ civil lists conditioned on appropriate behavior with the funds coming from the respective
state coffers. Unlike previous rents and privileges granted under kerajaan economics, this
system was not a means to rationalize opponents’ economic interests or created to display
someone’s favor with the ruler. Rather, the new system ensured the Malay elite followed British
principles of good governance. Resident Wilfred Birch’s assassination in Perak and subsequent
war led to the reduction in length of Perak’s civil list, which reminded surviving chiefs not to
appropriate state revenues not already due to them. Piracy was the first means of income
exercised traditionally that Malay elites found no longer available. Instead, the allowance
became a vital aspect of the Malay political economy, with chiefs maintaining an administrative
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role in society rather than accepting a pension and leaving politics altogether.458 In Perak and
Selangor, the emergent colonial system took on piracy through force and the replacement of
kerajaan economics with a new professional administration system. Faced with the strong threat
of a violent death as a continuing possibility or the more comfortable lifestyle as a salaried
administrator, Malay chiefs as a whole chose the latter.
In February 1874, Governor Andrew Clarke accompanied by Vice Admiral Charles
Shadwell of the China Squadron visited the sultan in Jugra to discuss the aforementioned case of
piracy involving his son. The sultan gave his permission for the trial while implying the Jugra
piracy was merely a childish game.459 Perhaps he and his predecessors saw piracy as a means for
princes to learn the art of statecraft and warfare before ascending to a more prestigious position
within the kerajaan. The kurnia for Malay princes, however, faltered and piracy spread beyond
the control of any one power in Malaya throughout most of the 19th century. The Malay elites
lost interest in state-sanctioned piracy by the late 19th century as embodied by Abdul Samad
declaring to his followers, “Listen well, we shall not play these games anymore!”460
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APPENDIX
MALAYAN PIRATICAL CONTACTS WITH MERCHANT VESSELS, 1825-1850

Appendix: Malayan Piratical Contacts with Merchant Vessels, 1825-1850
Date
of
Pirate
Attack
30
April
1825

April
1825

April
1825

May
1826

Location of
Attack
Sembilan
Islands,
Malaya
Straits of
Malacca
between
Malacca
and
Selangor
Near
Singapore

Lingga

Vessel
attacked

Point of
Departure

Intended
destinatio
n

Vessel
Nationalit
y

Brig
Minerva

Malacca

Singapore

contracted
by EIC

2
Siamese
junks

P. Pinang

Singapore

Siamese

Trading
boat

Dutch
Schooner Singapore
Anna

Pirate
attackers

Result

4 perahu

Each pirate vessel had at least 100 crew
each and 30-50 oars, they fought for four
hours with exchange of fire and no result461

8 perahu

One junk in a running fight with pirates for
two hours, another escaped to Malacca
with one crew killed462

Singapore

8 perahu
(same)

Batavia

Passenge
rs; leader
of pirates
was a
fisherma
n from
Singapor
e who

Dutch

3 crew killed, rest jumped overboard &
swam ashore to jungle; boat taken & set
adrift463
Came aboard disguised as Haj travelers
and attacked the crew at night. Three
surviving pirates fled into the water by boat
but presumed drowned.464

461
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History of Old Times in Singapore, vol. I (Singapore: Fraser and Neave, 1902), 195.
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absconde
d to
escape
debt
Oct.
1829

NE point of
Lingga

Oct.
1829

NE point of
Lingga

Native
brig
City of
Aberdee
n,
Nimrod

Plundered by Pirates, number of crew
wounded severely465

Riau

Batavia

Singapore

English

Nakhoda
Jenie

5-6 large
perahu

Jan.
1830

Kedah
River

Malay
perahu

Penang*

20
perahu

July
1830

Off East
Coast

One
perahu

Pahang

Sept.
1830

P. Cocob

Malay
vessel

July
1831

At sea

2 trading
perahu

Pontiana

Singapore

another
perahu

Aug.

P. Tinggi/

1 trading

Singapore

Pahang

22

Singapore

2 large
perahu

No engagement, City of Aberdeen and
Nimrod becalmed surrounded by double
banked large vessels466
Attacked, nakhoda and one crew swam
ashore, the rest of crew captured and
distributed amongst attackers. Cargo also
taken and boat destroyed.467
Vessel attacked, crew killed, vessel
destroyed, some cargo allegedly by
Darmee and sent to Terengganu and its
sultan; claimed lacking sufficient
evidence468
1 man captured, two severely wounded.
Lost perahu.469
Likely fallen in with another perahu from
same port; found lashed together with three
bodies who were apparently murdered. 19
others carried away with cargo.470
Loss471
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1831

Coast Johor

perahu

Aug.
1831

P.
Tinggi/Coas
t Johor

3 trading
perahu

Bali,
Pontianak

Singapore

Bugis

Aug.
1831

P.
Tinggi/Coas
t Johor

3 small
perahu

Pahang

Singapore

Malay

Aug.
1832

Outside
Singapore
harbor

Sampanpukat

Pahang

Singapore

Sept.
1832

P. Tinggi

80-ton
Burthen
vessel

Terengga
nu

Singapore

Terengganu
Sultan

Perahu
with 100
crew
each,
most
double
banked
22
Perahu
with 100
crew
each,
most
double
banked472
22
Perahu
with 100
crew
each,
most
double
banked
Number
of pirate
perahu
30-40
perahu

Fired upon and swam to Johor473

Chased into Singapore Harbor by pirates
near Cape Romania474
Pirates captured and carried them to
Kemaman. The nakhoda and some of the
crew killed; pirates were from Singapore

472
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Ibid.
Ibid.
474
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 146.
473

vicinity: Galang, Temiang in Lingga,
Pahang, and Telok Blangah475
3 Nov.
1832

P. Tinggi

Sampan
Pukat
(armed
w/ 7
lelas)
Trading
perahu 6
coyan
burthen

Singapore

Nov.
1832

P. Cocob

Nov.
1832

Straits of
Singapore

March
1833

opposite
Padang,
Melaka side

Tope

April
1833

Terengganu

Sampan
pukat

Pahang

Oct.
1833

East Coast
of Malaya

Dutch
Schooner
Sari
Kenduru

Terengga
nu

Deli

2 perahu

Malacca

15 or 16
piratical
perahu

Fought for two hours until powder blew up
and pirates pressed attack; nakhoda and 12
of crew floated on wood and picked up by
fishermen476

Singapore

5
piratical
perahu

Crew fought until sinking; nakhoda killed
and crew picked up by pirates and carried
to Kampar.477

Singapore

5
piratical
perahu

Five killed and rest sold in Kampar478

Pahang,
Terenggan
u

Singapore

Singapore

Nakhoda
Pang

Tankeo

5 perahu

Chinese

A
number
of pirate
perahu

Dutch

Three
pirate
vessels

3 of crew killed 2 by spear, one by ball,
pirates from Singapore, Lukut, and Padang,
jumped overboard 10 killed479
Attacked by pirates off Terengganu and
forced into local river after severe conflict
with 9 killed five wounded and
commander was killed480
Fended off pirates, both sides pierced by
gunfire481
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an
23
Dec.
1833

Middleburg
h Shoal

Brig
Harriet

Singapore

April
1834

Just out
Singapore
Harbor

Native
boat

Singapore

April
1834

Singapore
Straits*

Pukat

N. Coast
Bintang

14
April
1834

Pulau
Tinggi

Tope

CochinChina

1834
(after
May)
20
July
1834

Riau
Archipelago
*

3 cargo
boats

Karimuns

1 boat

Jan.
1835

NE Coast
Bintang

English
clipper
Sylph

Riau

Pulau
Laut

3 large
perahu

Perahu disguised as traders; engaged with
guns; breeze picked up and brig escaped;
nearly collided with another vessel in the
afternoon while fleeing.482

3 pirate
perahu

Attacked, killed 4 and seriously wounded 2
or 3 and released vessel483

3 pirate
perahu

Singapore

CochinChinese
Some
piratical
craft

Singapore

Singapore

Malay

English

A vessel

Attacked by same perahu and taken to
Straits of Singapore; quite likely culprits
were from Telok Belangka, temenggung
Not present484
Captured, only 3 out of 16 escaped in small
boat for Cape Romania; 1 remained free.
Day of attack likely in early May but
possibly late April485
Deprived them of their masts, sails, and
crews' clothes; one of the crews swam to
island486
Attacked by a Galang vessel at 6 am, three
survived by swimming ashore; two died in
the boat487
Shipped wrecked with 1000 chests of
opium and menaced by pirates but was not
attacked b/c of quick Dutch action.488
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March
1835

Near Point
Romania

Sampan
pukat

March
1835

Tebing
Tinggi,
Sumatra

April
1835*

Pirate
perahu
w/ cloth
sails and
British
Ensign

Singapore

Terenggan
u

Chinese

3 Malay
boats

Singapore

Summan,
Panjangat,
& Syed

Malay;
crew of 21

7 perahu

Off
Pahang*

Sampan
pukat

Singapore
*

See ahAboo-she

5 perahu

April
1835

Riau
Archipelago
, Straits of
Singapore*

Pukat

Riau

Singapore

16
April
1835

Pulau
Tinggi

Junk

Canton

Singapore

Large
perahu

Chinese

5 perahu
w/ 40
men each

22 of Chinese crew murdered and nine who
leaped overboard picked up by gunboat489

Two crews entirely murdered, one had 3
who escaped on small sampan to
Singapore; 18 murdered.490
The pukat had been captured by five
piratical perahu belonging to the acting
bendarah of Pahang/ Syed Alloway. The
pukat had been alleged to have been
captured. 491
Pirates were 30 to 40 Malays w/ several
brass guns; raised British ensign and cloth
sails The offending vessel permitted the
craft to pass because only had gambier492
The fought for two days and pirates
boarded near Bintang; 30 killed and two
feigned death and floating ashore. Pirates
were from Telok Blangka493
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17
April
1835

Singapore
Harbor

Cargo
boat

18
April
1835

Singapore
Harbor

Small
boat

19
April
1835

Johor (East
Coast)

Junk

Cambodia

18
May
1835

Karimuns

Brig
Mavis

Calcutta

4 May
1835

Batu Pahat

perahu
six
coyan

May
1835

Pulau
Tinggi

Pukat

May
1835*

Straits of
Malacca

Brig
Catharin
e

May
1835

Near Cape
Romania
Islands

Perahu

Singapore

Cashmere
(US ship)

Singapore

Cashmere
(US ship)

Singapore

Singapore

Malacca

Malacca

Singapore

Tamil

ChineseCambodia

Nakhoda
Bayer

Malay
perahu

One crew injured, two killed, two missing
and some of tin cargo taken494

Malay
Sampan
with 5
Malays

Attacked them, wounding one missionary,
forced them back to Singapore, demanded
letterbox.495

2 boats

Off Johor at 2 p.m., attacked by pirates,
two of his men were wounded, chased
them until Red Cliffs when called off chase
on spotting a ship.496

7 pirate
perahu

Chased by pirate for some times, pulled
away with breeze and fired upon497

8 perahu
six large

Asked in Singapore about crew and
weaponry. Asked for tobacco and rice and
then fired on by fleet. Vessel captured.498
The crew was entirely murdered and the
cargo was stolen499

2 perahu

They beat their gongs and chased the brig
until a breeze picked up.500

2
piratical
boats

HCS Zephyr encountered the engagement
but was unable to help. The pirates
removed the cargo and sank the vessel.
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4 June
1835

Perak River

Pukat

Perak
River

Singapore

21
July
1835

Pulau
Tinggi

Dutch
Schooner
Catherin
a
Cornelia

Pahang

Dutch

Sept.
1835

Tanjong
Kangsang

boat

Sumatra*

Singapore
*

Sheik Ya
Ya

5 boats

Oct.
1835

Pulau
Karimun, P.
Kukup

Singapore

Malacca

Chinese

4 kakap
perahu

Oct.
1835

Cape
Rachado

Nagore,
India

Singapore
*

Tamil

3 vessels

Captured; landed at Lukut, crew freed, and
sold goods there506

Oct.
1835

Lukut

Pinang

Singapore

Tamil
(Nagore)

4 pirate
boats

Captured by pirates with no resistance.
Towed to Gallang under Panglima Awang,
dismantled.507

Chinese
Tope
Hoguan
Fuan
Chuliah
Brig
Heaplee
Kling
brig
Samdann

Inche
Bolat

4
lanchang

The crew escaped to the shore with some
wounded.501
They wounded one man and three seriously
wounded hurt by the explosion of some of
the gunpowder occasioned by the fire
thrown from the pirates. The pirates were
beaten off after a short struggle their
boats502

9 large
perahu

Menaced schooner until saw weaponry and
withdrew 503
At 7 AM, escaped by sampan with crew
and some copper duit504
Attacked by three but managed to escape
with a new breeze. The vessel was
damaged and some of the crew
wounded.505

501
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503
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ee
12
Nov.
1835

Selat
Panjang

Lancang

Indragiri

Singapore

Nov.
1835

Riau
Archipelago
*

several
(3*)
native
boats

Singapore

Riau

Nov.
1835

Straits of
Lobang

A pukat

Jan.
1836

West of
Singapore

Fishing
boat

Singapore

Singapore

Jan.
1836

South
channel of
Singapore

Achinese
perahu

Pedir
Coast

Singapore

2 Feb.
1836

Sembilan
Islands,
Malaya

Brig
Lady
Grant

Riau

Calcutta

Singapore

China

Malay

One
Bedah

Pirates hailed him and demanded tribute
which they could not pay, opened fire.
Wounded one man, they abandon the
lancang save one.508
30-40 person murdered509

Chinese

3 Galang
Kakap

Chinese

Malay
pirate
boat

Attacked by about 16 men and 2 lelas in
each boat, they took the pukat. The crew
jumped overboard. Passengers killed or
taken prisoner and then killed. One
escaped.510
Attacked by stones from six Malay pirates,
companions captured and sent to a large
perahu. 2 swam for shore511

12 pirate
boats

Chased perahu at noon Tuesday but perahu
escaped512

5
piratical
perahu

One large perahu carried a black flag on
the main with a lot of men; they followed
for some time but did not catch up until
midnight and fired on the brig. They
engaged and brig defeated them.513
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Feb.
1836
28
Feb.
1836
15
March
1836
16
March
1836
17
March
1836
19
March
1836

Northward
of Selangor;
Selat
Lambahgin
Outside
Singapore
harbor
Point
Romania/Ta
njong
Panjusu

Pukat

Perak

Singapore

Trading
boat

Singapore

Borneo

8 coyans
burthen

Pahang

Singapore

Near
Singapore

Sampan

Tanah
Merah

Selat
Tabrau

Johor

Fishing
pukat

Tanjong
Panjusu/Poi
nt Romania

Wangkan
g 56
coyans
burthen

Hainan

Singapore

4 perahu

Bugis fought until morning, 5 Bugis killed,
9 wounded, sustained damage, and sailed
in Malacca514
Boat had 2 men killed several wounded &
returned to Singapore515

8 perahu
lancang

Breeze allowed for escape and shot at 50
times in sails, none in hull516
Cutting Rattans and attacked attacked at
midnight; captured sampan with 7 pikuls of
rice517

Chinese

10
perahu

Fishermen attacked with 3 wounded; 1 shot
in breast, 2 cut518

10
perahu

3 of larger with 40-50 men and 7 smaller
with 25-30; fired for several hours; 5
Chinese killed; showed no resistance.
Pirate fired at junk for several hours and 5
Chinese killed, wounding others; they
boarded the junks and plundered the

514

263

Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register, 27 February 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singchronicle183602271.2.9.aspx; “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 400; Singapore Chronicle and Commercial
Register, 19 March 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa18360421-1.2.7.aspx.
515
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 400.
516
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 401; Singapore Chronicle and
Commercial Register, 19 March 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa18360421-1.2.7.aspx.
517
Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register, 19 March 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa183604211.2.7.aspx.
518
Ibid.

vessel; only 2 escaped and saved by Malay
fishermen519
23
March
1836

East Coast
of Johor

native
vessel
under
Dutch
colors

barque
Mas
Jadul
Bahur

March
1836

Cape
Romania

2 perahu

Natunas
or near
Belitung

March
1836

East Coast
of Johor, P.
Tinggi*

CochinChinese
vessel

CochinChina

CochinChinese

April
1836*

Sembilan
Islands
Malaya

Brig
Anna

Bombay

British

Cape
Romania

small
Malay
trading
perahu

Terengga
nu

Malay

April
1836

Singapore

Malay

3 perahu

Pirates pull from shore, boats of HMS Wolf
chased pirates, who rounded C. Romania
and escaped.520

11
Pirates fired on them and engaged for some
perahu (2
hours. Largest of traders took smaller in
schooner
tow but line cut and fell to pirates, but
rigged
escaped with arrival of 2 ships. 2 cloth
with
sailed perahu had crews of 100 men each.
cloth
2 pukat shaped with 40 men each. 7 had 30
sails)
men each521
3 crew found on P. Tinggi after being
prisoners for a month, later identified some
of pirates when vessel detained by Wolf522
1 large
Perahu of P. Jarra closed behind, carronade
perahu
fired and perahu fled; boat filled with
one low
men523
boat
Spotted pirates, sailed out to sea, one
followed him, perahu surrendered
9 perahu
immediately, crew ordered overboard, they
hold onto sides, the vessel plundered of

519

264

Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register, 19 March 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa183604211.2.7.aspx; “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 401.
520
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 401.
521
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 402; Singapore Chronicle and
Commercial Register, 14 April 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Default.aspx.
522
Spencer St. John, “Piracy and the Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago 4 (1850): 404.
523
The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 12 May 1836, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa183605121.2.2.aspx.

everything including mat sails. Fired at,
with 2 wounded; reached Singapore524
16
April
1836

Between P.
Tinggi Cape
Romania

1837

East Coast
of Malaya

April
1837

Johor,
opposite P.
Tinggi

CochinChinese
Tope

P. Babi

1 small
fishing
perahu

March
1837

April
1837

Southward
of P. Aur

CochinChinese
Tope
11
Malay
fishing
boats

Siamese
Junk

CochinChina

Chantibun

Singapore

CochinChinese

3 perahu

Fired on for 2 hours, 13 wounded, hid in
another tope525

Malay

About 20
perahu

CochinChinese

3 perahu
(orang
laut*)

P. Aur
Malays

8-17
perahu

Attacked and captured by Illanoon
pirates528

9 perahu
(7 large
with 30
men
each; 2
smaller
with 10
men each

Attacked at sunrise, fired from all
directions fought with 2 six pounders and 5
smaller guns. One man wounded by
splinter; escaped with breeze but much of
cargo of salt lost. 200 pirates attacked
probably Lanuns529

Dyak (and Lanun) perahu sailed and
captured at least 11 fishing boats and killed
around 40 people according to Raja of
Pahang.526
Pirates chasing tope flee at sight of Diana
and run into jungle. Their perahu were
destroyed; The tope had already been
captured 2 days earlier. 1 wounded 2 dead
2 missing527
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19
June
1837

Cape
Romania

July
1837

P. Tinggi

Nov.
1837

Batu Pahat

April
1838

Straits of
Riau, Pan
Shoal

18
May
1838
Oct.
1838

Off
Terengganu
Off
Terengganu

Brig
Ternate
3 Borneo
trading
vessels
Trading
boat 2
coyan
burthen
Small
boat

2 large
perahu

Singapore

Borneo

Singapore

Singapore

Malacca

Riau

Singapore

large
Chinese
junk
2 native
traders

Borneo

4 perahu

A perahu

Each perahu had large gun with barricade
on bow, low in water, large sail; Ternate
escaped with squall.530
Attackers supposed to be Lanun. One
taken and immediately burned, 2
escaped531
Pirate crew of 8, had gun and apilan, Fired
on boat, crew sailed to shore and fled into
jungle; pirates plundered vessel took
planks532

Chinese

Sampan,
8 Malays

Killed 3, and left 4th alive accidentally; he
paddled to shore533

Chinese

6 Lanun
perahu

Lanuns chased junk until intercepted by
Wolf and Diana.534
Chased by Malay pirates but escaped535

Singapore

May
1840

Mouth of
Johor River

Small
junk or
tope

Singapore

Hainan

Chinese

7-8 boats

2 June

P. Babi,

15 ton

Singapore

Rantow,

Tan Gim*

1 perahu

Junk fired small arms. Pirates were
Malays and Chinese who threw wooden
spears, one of which killed nahkoda. Crew
surrendered, vessel plundered and returned
to Singapore.536
Tunku Syed and 6 of his crew, who sailed
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1840

Karimun Is.

perahu

Bengkulis

10
Aug.
1840

Singapore
Straits

Chinese
sampan
pukat

Singapore
or Riau

Bintang

Chinese

2
sampans

4 May
1842

outside
Singapore
harbor

CochinChinese
junk

CochinChina

Singapore

CochinChinese

2
sampans

Malays boarded junk; plundered part of
cargo539

17
May
1842

Singapore
Roads

boat (of
a junk)*

China

Singapore

Chinese

sampan

Chinese nakhoda robbed by a sampan
while in harbor540

Aug.
1842

Pulau
Pisang

Malay
boat

Malacca

Singapore

Malay

2 perahu

Feb.
1843

Pulau
Tinggi

35 coyan
Chinese
Tope

CochinChina

Singapore

Chinese

5 Malay
sampans

in company on another perahu boarded and
supposedly killed all but 2. Tan Gim
escaped by swimming. Sailed to
Kampar.537
Attacked in evening by musket-armed
Malays. Resisted with 3 guns until
midnight when taken. Two killed and rest
swam overboard.538

Fired on boat killing nakhoda and 2 of
crew, 1 crew drowned when jumping
overboard, rest jumped overboard. Vessel
plundered.541
30 Malays were various weapons boarded
the tope, killed two of the crew, plundered
the cargo, and scuttled the tope. Crew
taken to P. Tinggi and liberated.542
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March
1843

Pedra
Branca

CochinChinese
vessel

CochinChina*

Singapore
*

CochinChinese

March
1843

A creek on
Singapore
Island

Small
boat

Singapore
*

Singapore
*

Tamil

Four found dead, three bound and one with
skull smashed544

2
April
1843

Cape
Romania

CochinChinese
boat

May
1843*

Cape
Romania

May
1843

Near Pulau
Aor

CochinChinese
tope
Chinese
100 ton
junk

26
May
1843

4 days from
Singapore

CochinChinese
junk

4 July
1843

Outside
Singapore*

Small
boat

Aug.

Boat

A perahu

Pirate crew of Malays and Chinese
attacked and wounded 3 crew.543

CochinChina*

Singapore
*

CochinChinese

2 Malay
sampans

Attacked by two Malay sampans, forced to
retreat. Malays reinforced, killed one crew
and wounded another. They captured the
boat.545

CochinChina

Singapore

CochinChinese

several
sampans

Malay pirates plundered the vessel of all
contents, wounding one crew546

Chinese

3 Canton
junks

Fired on junk repeatedly, boarded and
plundered $5,000 in cargo547

China*

Singapore

Cochin
China

CochinChinese

Singapore
Batu

Singapore

Malay

40 coyan junk with 6 guns attacked by junk
with large guns. Fired several rounds into
A Canton
the vessel. They killed 43, 5 hid below
junk
decks, junk plundered, junk set on fire. 5
survived on planks.548
Pirates killed the nakhoda and wounded 3
A perahu
of the crew; boat carried away by
pirates.549
piratical
30 men attacked the boat and killed the
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1843

Pahat

April
1844

Panosok/La
mpottan

Perahu

May
1844

Near Pedra
Branca

Cochin
Chinese
junk

15
May
1844

Cape
Romania

Cochin
Chinese
Tope

Sept.
1845

P. Sakeyang

Perahu

May
1846

Straits of
Singapore

June
1846

Straits of
Singapore

Cochin
Chinese
Tope
Chinese
Tongkan
g

perahu

Terengga
nu

Singapore

Singapore

Malay

3 boats

Singapore

CochinChinese

3 boats

Singapore

CochinChinese

3
sampans

Tong Kal

Malay

boat

CochinChinese

2 Sampan
Pukats

Chinese

Malay
perahu

Neighbori
ng Island,
Nongsa

nakhoda. Wounded three others. 4
survivors swam to shore. Sailed to
Karimun, likely Galang and Secunnat
people.550
Met Dramin, gave him betel nut, let him
go, attacked his boat killed one man, rest
fled into jungle, stole everything551
Pirates fired on junk, killing one, wounding
one, large ship appear and the pirates
withdrew552
2 sampans had Malays, 1 Chinese; The
nakhoda and six crew attempted to gain the
help of a barque to no avail; 10 remainder
crew surrendered. The tope was taken
ashore, plundered and burned. The crew
escaped553
Recognized 3 of 4 of attackers.554
Chinese and some Malay pirates attack the
tope but fail to capture; several CochinChinese severely wounded during battle.555
Pirates were 7 Malays and one woman;
killed 4 of crew by throwing spears and
fifth hid below' pirates plundered vessel of
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Aug.
1846

Sept.
1846*
Aug,
1847
Aug.
1847

Ayer Etam,
near
Karimuns

Pulau
Singkep
Singapore
Waters

2 Malay
boats

Singapore

Ayer
Etam

1 perahu

Malay

2 large
perahu,
18
sampans

Tamil

tongkang

Singapore

near Riau

a vessel

Singapore
*

Dec.
1847*

Pulau Buru

Malay
Boat

Jan.
1848

Straits of
Singapore

General
Wood

Great
Natunas

Chinese
Riau*

Singapore

Tamil

2 boats

Malay

2 large
gambier
boats, 2
sampans

10 pikul of rice, clothes, and some
opium.556
Malays sailed to collect gutta percha,
attacked by Galang Malays. Pirates fired
at boats six times with small arms
wounding one, rest swam ashore.
Plundered boats and sank one of them.
Galang Malays attacked and fired six times
with muskets wounding one. Malays
jumped overboard once other boats started
to come up.557
Raja of Singkep found three bodies in
boat558
Attacked at 1 am by Malays who killed one
and wounded two559
Two wounded, all products taken. 40
pirates with kris, etc
About 100 Chinese pirates from Singapore
killed the crew, stole the cargo, and
scuttled the boat
Chinese Pirates came onboard as
passengers, killed captain and Chief mate
in sight of Singapore, forced younger
mates to sail, they beached at P. Laut
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April
1848

South China
Sea*

CochinChinese
tope

Cochin
China*

Singapore
*

CochinChinese

Malay
boat

Siamese

Red-head
junk with
several
smaller
junks

April
1848

South China
Sea*

Siamese
Junk

Siam

Singapore
*

May
1848

Sungai
Tengah,
Singapore

perahu
pukat

Singapore
Town

Sungai
Tengah

Chinese

6
sampans

Terenggan
u

Malay

Chinese
junk

CochinChinese

2 Malay
perahu

April
1849
April
1849

South China
Sea*

2 May
1849

Pedra
Branca

Malay
Singapore
boat
Schooner
Louisa
2
CochinSingapore
Chinese
boats

Singapore
CochinChina

where pirates killed the mates. Survivors
saved by Malays who killed 70 of them in
longboats.560
Malay pirates attacked tope, wounding
several, one mortally. They ceased the
attack on arrival of Hooghly.561
Seized cargo of opium562

30 or 40 Malays attacked with spears
killing 2 and wounding 20; crew fled into
mangroves; Malays took everything they
could and burned the rest.563
Pirates fired onto boat, killing one,
plundered boat and set adrift with crew.564
Chased by pirates but able to escape b/c of
superior sailing565
One 33 coyans and the other 20 escorted
by gunboat to Pedra Branca, they attacked
shortly afterwards; fought off pirates with
muskets.566
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7 May
1849

South China
Sea

CochinChinese
boat

Singapore

Cochin
China

CochinChinese

10
Chinese
Junks

May
1849

South China
Sea

CochinChinese
boat

Singapore

Cochin
China

CochinChinese

10
Chinese
Junks

May
1849

South China
Sea

Singapore

Cochin
China

CochinChinese

May
1849

South China
Sea

Singapore

Cochin
China

CochinChinese

June
1849

Straits of
Malacca*

sampan

Malacca

Singapore

Aug.
1849

South China
Sea

CochinChinese
boat

Singapore

Cochin
China

June
1850

Lobam near
Pedra
Branca

Malay
Tope 10
coyans

Sarawak

Singapore

Malay

June
1850

1.5 day
from Pedra

Cochin
Chinese

Singapore

Saigon

CochinChinese

CochinChinese
boat
CochinChinese
boat

Chinese
pirate
vessels
Chinese
pirate
vessels

CochinChinese
Chinese
junk 20
coyans
burthen
Chinese
Junk

3 van junks passed from astern to prevent
escape, 7 engaged; took all cargo but food
and water to return.567
Also fell into hands of fleet and took
everything but basic food and water; was
attacked by Chinese pirates twice again
(listed)568
Same boat (again) attacked no cargo left,
some threw themselves into the sea but
returned onboard569
Same boat (again) attacked no cargo left,
some threw themselves into the sea but
returned onboard570
Attacked by pirates and returned to
Malacca571
Malay pirates attacked, wounded 2 of
them; men escaped by jumping overboard.
Unclear what month but almost certainly
after May.572
Resisted pirates, stabbing them with spears
kill 5 or 6573
Chinese lowered a boat with 10 armed men
to attack but was repulse with musket fire,
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Branca
June
1850

Near Tanah
Merah,
Singapore
Near Tanah
Merah,
Singapore

junk

boat

Chinese

2 Malay
sampans

Chinese

2 Malay
boats

CochinChinese

2 Malay
boats

Sept.
1850

Near Pedra
Branca

Oct.
1850*
Oct.
1850
Oct.
1850

Straits of
Malacca
Straits of
Malacca

3
Chinese
boats
CochinChinese
boat
a Perak
Boat
Bugis
Perahu

Kuala Muar

a boat

2 perahu

Straits of
Malacca

Malacca
Scotchie
or
Skutsje

2 perahu

July
1850

Oct.
1850

Singapore

Singapore

Pedra
Branca

18 boats
Singapore

Bugis

killing one and wounding several. The
junk returned to Singapore.574
8 Malays attacked boat; killing one with a
spear, desperately wounding another; two
escaped by swimming.575
At night, pirates fired 2 shots, missed,
eventually Chinese threw over some cargo
and used sails576
Each boat with six men shot at them, killed
one and wounded two who swam to
shore.577
Fleet seen near Tanjung Bernam; captured
Perak boat578
Engaged and escaped pirates, suspected
boats from Riau579
People in boat, including a woman fled to
shore.580
Menaced by same perahu with cloth sails
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